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To speak is to be a men. To speak is to sneak of. Therefore, to
speak is to speak of man. All human actions are the search-for-identity.
All subjects of which humans speak are concerned with this search-for-
identity. Man is interested in the world around him neither for the
world's nor for curiosity's sake, but for the sake of finding his own
identity. Man finds his own identity and defines his own self by virtue
of positing himself in a particular manner over against, and in relation
to, the world which surrounds him.
Paul's and Seneca's writings are records of what they spoke, that
is records of what they spoke of. In other words, Paul's and Seneca's
writings provide us with sufficient material from which it is possible
to infer what they thought of man.
In Paul's view, man is a creature who is not at-one-wlta-himself.
This not being at-one-with-himself constitutes man's actual self which
is a desire to be-in-itself, i.e. to be God. This is real man, but not
true man. True man is creature who realizes that the source of his
existence is outside of himself, that he can never achieve the status
of belng-in-itself. He cannot become being-in-itself because the
presence of the Other is an incarnation of man's limits. At the same
time the Other is an incarnation of nis true being and his sfc.ivation.
In tiie encounter with the Other man actualizes himself, I.e. ue realizes
that he is only potential being. Instead of being-in-itself he is a
being-sustained-by-the-Other. Only in the presence of the Other can man
find his own self. The absence of the Otner is the destruction of his
own self. The true nature and the salvation of man lies in man's
willingness and capacity to "emDrsce", i.e. to enter into communion with
the Other.
In beneca's view, equally as in Paul's, man is a creature who is
not at-one-with-himself. As opposed to Paul's view, Oeneca's view is
that man's desire to be-in-itself is potential, i.e. man's desire to be
God can, and muEt, be actualized. The reason why man is not actually
God is because of the presence of the Other. The Other is the incar¬
nation of man's limits; he is a hindrance and an obstacle on man's way
towards the actualization of himself. Hence the Other is man's hell,
man's original sin. To achieve the true state of being, to become an
actual being, i.e. God, man has to overcome his limitations. That
means man has to wipe out, to destroy the Other. In whatever form the
Other may present himself to man, man has to annihilate him. Man has
to become the source of the Other's existence. Everything has to
receive existence from man. When that is achieved, then man is ultimate.
He is the source of his own existence. He is the source of the existence
of the whole world. He has actualized his true state of being, i.e. he
has become God.
Hence, Paul and Seneca dealt with the same problem, but held dia¬
metrically opposite views about the way the problem should be solved.
Their respective solutions are analyzed in regard to the questions of man
and God, man and world, man and freedom, and man and eschatology. The
whole is then concluded by a general survey of their attitudes.
Use other side if necessary.
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ABSTRACT
To speak is to be a man. To speak is to speak of. There¬
fore, to speak is to speak of man. All human actions are the
search-for-identity. All subjects of which humans speak are
concerned with this search-for-identity. Man is interested in
the world around him neither for the world's nor for curiosity's
saxe, but for the sake of finding his own identity. Man finds
his own identity and defines his own self by virtue of positing
himself in a particular manner over against, and in relation to,
the world which surrounds him.
Paul's and Seneca's writings are records of what they spoke,
that is records of what they spoke of. In other words, Paul's
and Seneca's writings provide us with sufficient material from
which it is possible to infer what they thought of man.
In Paul's view, man is a creature who is not at-one-v/ith—
himself. This not being at-one-witi>-himself constitutes man's
actual self which is a desire to be-in-itself, i.e. to be God.
This is real man, but not true man. True man is creature who
realizes that the source of his existence is outside of himself,
that he can never achieve the status of being-in-itself. He can¬
not become being-in-itself because the presence of the Other is
an incarnation of man's limits At the same time the Other is an
incarnation of his true being and his salvation. In the encounter
with the Other man actualizes himself, i.e. he realizes that he is
only potential being. Instead of being-in-itself he is a being-
sustained-by-the-Other. Only in the presence of the Other can man
find Ms own self. The absence of the Other is the destruction
of his own self. The true nature and the salvation of man lies
in man's willingness and capacity to "embrace", i.e. to enter into
communion with the Other.
In Seneca's view, equally as in Paul's, man is a creature who
is not at-one-with-Mmself. As opposed to Paul's view, Seneca's
view is that man's desire to be-in-itself is potential, i.e. man's
desire to be God can, and must, be actualized. The reason why
man is not actually God is because of the presence of the Other.
The Other is the incarnation of man's limits; he is a hindrance
and an obstacle on man* s way towards the actualization of himself.
Hence the Other is man's hell, man's original sin. To achieve the
true state of being, to become an actual being, i.e. God, man has
to overcome his limitations. That means man has to wipe out, to
destroy the Other. In whatever form the Other may present him¬
self to man, man has to anniMlate Mm. Man has to become the
source of the Other's existence. EverytMng has to receive
existence from man. When that is acMeved, then man is' ultimate.
He is the source of Ms own existence. He is the source of the
existence of the whole world. He has actualized Ms true state
► of being, i.e. he has become God.
Hence, Paul and Seneca dealt with the same problem, but held
diametrically opposite views about the way the problem should be
solved. Their respective solutions are analyzed in regard to the
questions of man and God, man and world, man and freedom, and man




It has been categorically pointed out that the process of
Hellenization within Christianity was not started by Paul,1 and
2
even Schoeps admitted that "the acute Hellenization of the
Christian gospel" began with the Pastoral letters, which he takes
for Beutero-Pauline, and with the letter to Hebrews. However,
Paul seems to have been responsible, in the eyes of many interpreters,
for the introduction of Hellenistic thought in the Biblical sphere.
The charge against Paul was more severe, and the problem appeared
to be more acute, because of the generally accepted presupposition
that the Biblical-Semitic world, on the one side, and the Hellenistic
world, on the other side, were diametrically opposed, although it
was argued that Paul's world is not to be viewed as if it was
sharply split in two halves, but that a certain degree of unity is
to be admitted.
As to the problem concerning the relation between Paul and
Seneca it is taken for granted (justly!) that it is Paul who is
Hellenized and not Seneca who is Semiticized, although quite a
number of scholars have argued that Stoicism had Eastern-Semitic
roots (especially Pohlenz), and even that Seneca might have had
1. See e.g.: J.N. Sevenster, Paul and Seneca. Leiden, 1961, p.240.;
Albert Schweitzer, The Mysticism of Paul the Apostle, London,
1931, p. 334. ~™~~"
2. Schoeps, J.H., Paul. The Theology of the Apostle in the Light
of Jewish Religious History, London, 1961, p. 254.
3. Adolf Deissmann, Paul, A Study in ocial and Religious History,
New York, 1937, p. 35-
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Eastern blood.1
We shall not dispute any of these arguments here, for the
first one appears to contain some truth in it. As to the second
one it sounds highly improbable and unconvincing. Finally, what¬
ever the fact about these two questions might be, they do not
seem to be of high relevance for the problem that we are going to
treat.
The correspondence between Paul and Seneca, which came into
2
existence sometime in 3-4 century, has been proved to be faked, so
that it is not to be taken into serious consideration, as a possible
aid for throwing some light on the problem of Paul and Seneca.
Sound scholarship has also demolished a belief in the possible
meetings between Paul and Seneca, so that we feel free to discard
any discussion on the issue of friendship between the Apostle and
the Philosopher.^ Hence neither personal contacts between the two
men, nor possible direct or indirect influences on each other should
be taken either as a starting point or as a task of research. They
shall rather be treated as two men, contemporaries in the strictest
1. J.B. Lightfoot, St. Paul's Epistle to the Philippians, London and
Cambridge, 1868, p. 275-; see also: J. Kroll, Gott uhd H811e,
Der Mythos vom Descensuskampfe, Berlin, 1932, p.' 44'/.; Hugo
Preller, 'Paulus oder Seneca?' Festschrift Walther Judeich, zum
70. Geburtstag, Weimar, 1929, p.' £>'3.
2. F.X. Kraus,' Der Briefwechsel Pauli mit Seneca, Ein Beitrag zur
Apokryphen-Literatur,'Theologische Guartalschrift, No.49. Tubingen,
1867, p. 606.; E. Westerburg, Per Ursorung der Sake dass Seneca
Christ gewesen sei. Eine kritische Untersuchung", Berlin, 1881, *
p.6.; Sevenster, op.cit., p. 13.
3. Chas. H. Stanley Davis, Greek and Roman Stoicism and Some of its
Disciples, London, 1903, p. 16(377 R.'M. Gmaaere. Seneca" the" " "
Philosopher and his Modem Message. London-Calcutta-Sidney, 1922,
pp. 58-70.; F.W. Farrar, Seekers After God, Macmillan and Co.,
Publishers (1868?), p. 18.; Deissmann, op.cit., p. 74.; Westerburg,
op.cit., pp. 7-8.; Sevenster, op.cit., pp. 10, 14.
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sense of the word, whose teachings:
a) reflect ideas and beliefs of the social, ethnic,
philosophical and religious environment, and
b) are likely to contain a certain message for contemporary
readers and students who take them seriously.
The task of the present research is to examine and analyze
the thought of St. Paul and the thought of Seneca, and to make
an assessment of whether these two are, or are not, compatible and
identical.
Now, what has appeared to be the subject of what we have
listed under point "a)", the interpreters of Paul have regarded it
as their task to establish what are the major influences and ideas
standing behind Paul's letters. Thus it became a common feature
of Pauline scholarship to argue that he was a "Jew of Jews" or
2
that he was altogether Hellenized, although these two are not to
1. Thus the most consistent adherent of this movement was Albert
Schweitzer with his two volumes on Paul: Paul and his Inter¬
preters, London, 1912, and The Mysticism of Paul the Apostle,
London, 1931; See further: Max Pohlenz, Paulus und die Stoa,
Sonderausgabe, MCMLXIV Darmstadt, Zeitschrift fttr die
Neutestmentliche Wissenschaft und die Kunde der &lteren Klrche,
42, 1949, S.69-104, p. 19•; W.D. Stacey, The Pauline View of
Man, London, 1956, pp. 124, 139-; D. de Zwaan,'Paulinische
v eltanschauung', Zeitschrift fur systeiaatische Theologie, Heft 3,
1931. The article is moderate but tends to see mainly Jewish
influences in Paul's thought. R. Leichtenhan, 'Die Ueberwindung
des Leides bei Paulus und in der zeitgenossischen Stoa',
Zeitschrift fur Theologie und Kirche, 1922, p. 390.
2. This trend is mainly represented by Holzmann, Morgan, Bousset and
Reitzenstein as criticised by W.D. Eavies in his book on Paul and
Rabbinic Judaism, London, 1962, pp. Iff. Eavies is particularly
keen on seeing the Judaistic background behind every Pauline
concept.
be sharply distinguished.^ The most reasonable assessment would
be to say that the truth lies somewhere between these two extremes
Y/e do not want to argue in favour of what has been called "a
distorted and erroneous view of the relation between thought and
2
language", but, however, we find it impossible to agree with the
presupposition that St. Paul who has mastered the Greek language^
was not at all Hellenized. Bultmann is surely justified in
arguing that St. Paul's "letters show that he was a Hellenistic
Jew, i.e. that in his training Jewish tradition and Greek culture
L
are combined."
Although we are of the opinion that the language is
organically linked with the thought that it expresses we think it
wise to "hesitate before assuming that the 'implicit metaphysics'"
are embedded in the whole structure of the language. In other
words one should not exercise excessive speculation on Paul's
usage of the language,0 but, perhaps, it is not assuming too much
1. J. Leipoldt, Christentum und Stoicismus, Zeitschrift fur
Kirchengeschichte, Band 27, Gotha, 190o, pp. 145-46.
2. James Barr, The Semantics of Biblical Language, Oxford, 19^1,
p. 294.
3. R. Bultmann, Existence and Faith, Collins, 1973, P- 131*
4. EF, p. 131.
5. Barr, op.cit., p. 295.
6. For the variety of opinions on Paul's usage of the language see
W. von Loewenich, Paul, His Life and Work, Edinburgh and London
I960, pp. 16-17; F.C. Grant,'St. Paul and Stoicism', Biblical
World, vol. 4p, 1915, p. 279; C.K. Barrett, From First Adam to
Last, A Study in Pauline Anthropology, London, 1962, p. 96;
Interpreters, p. 236; Mysticism, p. 136; Stacey, op.cit.,




"the New Testament message cannot be separated from the
way in which it is proclaimed, at various times and
within various cultures. In order to reach the minds of
Greeks, it not only had to be written in Greek, but its
advocates had to employ categories of thought familiar
to their audience.
On the other hand we are presented with the difficulty precisely
because of some of the categories and concepts which are to be
found and which, it is known, are a corner-stone of the Greek
p
philosophy contemporary with St. Paul.
However, apart from the fact that Paul and Seneca used the
same categories and concepts,which poses the problem for an
interpreter, we are faced with another problem, and that problem
is that our contemporary thought is preconditioned by Pauline and
Senecan concepts. Thus we find ourselves frequently talking of
the "inner man" (Paul) our "inner selves" (Seneca) etc. On the
other hand, besides our using directly Paul's and Seneca's language,
Christianity spread and grew in our part of the world under the
strong influence of Roman Law and Stoicism. For that reason we
must reckon with the fact that we are brought up within the culture
1. J. Meyendorff, Christ in Eastern Christian Thought, Washington
and Cleveland, 19&9, p. viii; See also: Peine, 'Stoicismus und
Christenturn', Theologische Literaturblatt, Nos. 6-91 Febr. 1905,
Leipzig, p. 771 W.L. Knox. St. Paul and the Church of Gentiles,
Cambridge, 1939» pp. ix, 55; Stacey, op.cit., pp. 3» 36;
Leichtenhan, op.cit., p. 390.
2. E.g. concepts such as: nature, conscience, and self-sufficiency.
For the variety of opinions on this issue see: Stacey, op.cit.,
p. 107; Loewfc ~ch, op.cit., p. 14; F.C. Grant, Roman Hellenism
and the New Testament, Edinburgh and London, 1962, pp. 137-38;
PS, pp. 274, 278-79; Davies, op.cit., p. 116; C.H. Eodd, The
Bible and the Greeks, London, 1954, pp. 36-37; H. BOhlig, Die
Geisteskultur von Tarsos im Augusteischen Zeitalter. GOttingen,
1913, p. 82.
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and civilization which are to some extent preconditioned and shaped
by Paul's and Seneca's ideas.'1"
Consequently the difficulty which an interpreter faces is that
he is partly identical with both Pauline and Senecan ways of thinking,
and that prevents him from being altogether aloof from the ideas he
is interpreting, so as to be unable to give an objective inter¬
pretation.
Throughout a century of the investigation of the problems
relating to Paul and Seneca an external tool has been invoked as a
2 ^
help, namely the presupposition that both Paul and Seneca-' were
unsystematic thinkers. In the case of Seneca it was ascribed to
1. On the influence of Stoic thought and Roman Law on V»estern
thought and society see: E.V. Arnold, Roman Stoicism, Cambridge
1911, p. 269; E. Brunner, Han in Revolt, London and Redhill,
1947, pp. 26, 32, 131; R» Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of
Man, London, 1941, vol. ii, p. 324; M. Pohlenz, Grlechische
Freiheit, Heidelberg, 1955, p. 21; ^Preller, op.cit., pp. 79-80;
Grummere, op.cit., pp. 5, 54; M. Muhl, Die Antike Menschheitsidee
in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung, Leipzig, 1928, p. 101;
H. Baker, The Image of Man, Lew York and London, 1961, p. 78.
2. J. Munck, Paul and the Salvation of Mankind, London, 1959, pp. 6b-
o7; Schoeps, op.cit., pp. 13, 46; Beissmann, op.cit., p. 6;
Loewenich, op.cit., pp. 9, 142; Freiheit, p. 184; R. Scroggs,
The Last Adam, Oxford, 1966, p. 6T; Hellenism, pp. 144, 14b;
Adam, p.3; Sevenster, op.cit., p. 24.
3. S. Dill, Roman Society from Nero to Marcus Aurelius, London and
New York, 1904, p.10; F. Holland, beneca, London, 1920, p. lo4;
E. Holler, Seneca und die Seelenteil'ungslehre und Affektpsychologie
der I-littelstoa. Kalrntinz, 1934, p. 4; Dr. Holzherr, Per Phllosopn
Lucius Annaeus Seneca, Rastatt (Teil I u. Teil II) 1858-59; i,
p. 26; H. Steiner, Theodizee bei Seneca, Erlangen, 1914, p. 2;




his syncretistic tendencies, which he himself admitted. However,
we find it difficult to agree with such presuppositions. Apart
frora the fact that some authors have recognized the consistency
and systematic thought^ of the two men, it seems to be impossible
to give a systematic survey or interpretation of their respective
anthropologies, unless it is recognized that their thoughts are
consistent and systematic, at least to the extent that an inter¬
preter is able to put them under a coherent survey. Therefore,
without entering into detailed discussion of Paul's and Seneca's
(in-)consistency, we shall take their consistency for granted,
hoping that the main body of the thesis will justify the procedure.
This introduction so far has dealt, in a general way, with
some aspects of the problem raised by research into the relationship
between St. Paul and Seneca. Their anthropologies have also been
treated frequently within the general context of research. Some
other aspects of their teachings were usually more profoundly
treated.
Now, the most natural question to ask would be:
1. F. Cumont, Afterlife in Roman Paganism, New Haven, 1922, p. 8;
A. Bonhoffer, Bpiktet und die Stoa, Stuttgart, 1890, p. 92;
E. Zeller, The Stoics, Epicureans' and Sceptics, London, 1892,
P- 53; R.B. Hicks, Stoic and Epicurean. London, 1910, pp. 14,
368; St. G. Stock, Stoicism, London. 1908. p. 108; C.F. Baur
'Seneca und Paulus'. Zeitachrift fur wissenschaftliche TheoloKle.
1858, vol. 58, p. 444; Davidson, op.eit., p. 127; Lightfoot,
op.cit., p. 290; Gummere, op.cit., p. oO.
2. "Sed ne te per circumitus traham, aliorum quidem opiniones
praetribo De V. Beata, 3.2; "...et tamen excusatissimus essem,
etiam si non praecepta illorum sequerer, sed exempla", De Otio,
2.1; "'Epicurus', inquis, 'dixit. Quid tibi cum alieno?' Guod
verum est, meum est", Ep. 12.11.
3. J. Weiss, Das Urchristentum, Gottingen, 1917, p. 321; G. Bornkamm,
Paul, London, 1971, pp. xxi-xxii; O.P. Eaches, 'Paul's Use of the
Term "Man",' The Review and Expositor, No.5, 1908, p. 522; Mysticism.
PP« 34,98,139; Interpreters, pp. 15,41,60,247; Knox, op.cit., p.ix.
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"Why anthropology at all?"
Why anthropology indeed, especially when we recall that it has been
remarked that: "Paul's letters were not written...to give us an
account of his anthropology" (Sevenster, op.cit., p. 63)?
One is entitled to question this statement, far more so after
Bultmann's claim that the whole Pauline theology is expressed in
terms of anthropology.^" If Bultmann be mistaken, and Sevenster
right, then according to Sevenster's own opinion v/e are on an unequal
footing since "it is immediately clear from the titles of these (i.e.
p
Seneca's writings) works that man is their subject..." (op.cit.,
p. 67).
If we follow an argument of Paul himself, we shall have some
ground for subscribing to Sevenster's opinion, for Paul's kerygma is
Christo- and Theo-centric. So in his own words:
el Xotcrc&c o6x eyfiyepTat., xev&v Aca x&
xftpuYpa fipSv, xevfj xat fi ulcrctc fcufflv3
Hence Paul affirms that the content of his message, and the content
of the faith of his converts is one and the same - the risen Christ,
who for Paul is nobody else but:
6 utdc xoO deoO*
1. R. Bultmann, Theology of the New Testament, London, 1955, vol. i,
p. 191. -
2. Cevenster has in mind the works of Seneca such as: Le Vita Beata,
De Tranquillitate Animi, De Constantia Saoientis. De Otio, Ee
Brevitate V'ltae, Ee Ira.
3. I Cor. 15.14.
4. Rom. 1. 3,4,9; 5.10; 8.3,29; I Cor. 1.9; 15.28; II Cor. 1.19;
Gal. 1.1b; 2.20; 4.4; Eph. 4.13; I Thess. 1.13.
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Consequently, the whole Pauline kerygma (be it theology or anthro¬
pology) revolves around the risen Christ, the Son of God. This is
the centre on which all Pauline research should be focussed. Thus
all attempts to reconstruct Paul's thought from the different back¬
grounds, Jewish and Hellenistic, which have shown different depths
of insight into Pauline thought, could be summed up in the argument
of one of the most learned, and fairly objective, investigators and
critics of Paul, namely H.J. Schoeps.
Let us quote the passage in which Schoeps condenses skilfully
all of these three points:
a) the core of the Pauline problem,
b) the origin of this problem, and
c) its bearing upon an anthropological quest.
Hence insofar as we agree that the centre of Pauline thought is the
faith in the resurrected Christ, Son of God, Schoeps writes:
"What is the origin of the Pauline faith in the Son of God,
seeing that there is no basis for it in Judaism? The answer
is: it clearly goes back to the self-testimony of Jesus,
which for good reasons (cf. I61ff.) appeared intolerable to
the Jews, because it blurs the line of demarcation between
God and man,1 and contradicts strict transcendent monotheism,
that fundamental tenet of the Jewish creed (Beut. 6.4).
Hence we see in the utds OeoO belief, to which Jesus him¬
self testified according to the synoptic account - and only „
there - the sole decisive heathen premiss of Pauline thought".
This statement Schoeps has put in an even more condensed way and in
a more definite form by stating that:
1. However, it was argued that: "...wahrt Paulus deutlicher einen
Unterschied zwischen Gott und Christus. Das entspricht nicht
nur seiner judischen, sondern der orientalischen Denkweise
iiberhaupt." Tarsos, p. 19.
2. Schoeps, op.cit., p. 158.
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"The genesis of the whole structure is plain: the Messiah
was Son of God - which is the sole un-Jewish point in Paul's
thinking which explains all the other doctrines that have no
parallel in Jewish writings; if we like, it is1the
Hellenistic premiss of his (Paul's) thought..."
To make our three points clear, convinced that Schoeps's argument
is clear enough as not to require an interpretation, let us just
point out that Schoeps here backs up our argument that the central
point of St. Paul's thought is the faith in the Messiah, the Son of
God.
In regard to the other point, the origin of that faith - on
which we do not feel compelled to agree with Schoeps - he explicitly
says that it is non-Jewish, i.e. is Hellenistic; and finally the
third point, its bearing upon an anthropological quest is expressed
in Schoeps's words that that premiss of Paul "blurs the line of de¬
marcation between God and man."
Consequently, it follows that the content of Pauline faith
in Christ, the Son of God, is directly anthropologically relevant,
for it has brought about the problem of transcendence and immanence,
in such a way that it is most explicit precisely when man is at
stake. Hence, it is our opinion that Bultmann's view of Pauline
theology is correct, namely that Paul never considered God in Him¬
self as Being, but only in so far as he has reacted upon the concrete
situation of man. And the same is said of Pauline anthropology:
"Paul has contacts with Judaism in not considering man in
an objective sense, with a view to what he is in himself.
Man is seen a priori in the circumstances in which he
exists, primarily in the relationship of the creature to
the creator and to the created world.
1. Schoeps, op.cit., p. 209.
2. Hans Conzelmann, An Outline of the Theology of the Hew Testament,
London, 1969, p. 174.
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The above points we hope to develop in detail later in the thesis.
There remains one more point to be clarified, namely the
point of contact, or, if you prefer, there remains to be developed
a framework within which Pauline and Senecan anthropology can be
compared. So far we have seen two major points:
a) an argument has been levelled that Paul's basic belief,
upon which rest all his other doctrines and beliefs, is not
of Jewish but of Hellenistic origin, and
b) we have defended a theory of a moderate Hellenization of Paul,
based mainly on two grounds: first that the Pauline world
was, to a certain extent, a mixed one, i.e. Paul was in a
position to encounter both, Jewish and Hellenistic, ideas,
and second, in so far as the language determines thought
that it expresses Paul was Hellenized, for he spoke the
Greek language. (Here we want to stress again that we are
not giving too great an importance to the argument concerning
the relation between language and thought, but we believe,
however, that the link between the two cannot be denied
altogether.)1
An overemphasis of an importance of the link between the structure
of the language and the thought has played quite an important role
1. However G. Watson, in The Stoic Theory of Knowledge, Belfast,
1966, p. 7, writes: "I-ohlenz suggests that the Stoics were
particularly conscious of the problem of language and meaning
"because the leading men like Zeno and Chrysippus were bilingual
(v. Die Stoa, i, 3&). It was important that the words, the
physical aspect or frame should be conformed as closely as
possible to the meaning which penetrated them as maker's idea
penetrates his material."
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in biblical scholarship."*" According to the adherents of this
movement every language had its typical features and was separated
by an emphatically distinct line from the other languages which
were not of the same linguistic group, e.g. the Indo-European group
of languages versus the Semitic group of languages. Thus
Professor Barr writes:
"The habit of contrasting Greek and Hebrew modes of thought
has become extremely commonplace in modern theology and
has had very great influence upon it."^
This extreme school of biblical scholarship has mainly relied upon
the presupposition that there are "implicit metaphysics" in the
language as such. In fact the danger, to which Prof. Barr objects,
is not the presupposition itself but its excessive usage.
As far as the particular problem of Paul and Seneca is
concerned, we shall pose the problem as if it were a problem of
Greek and Hebrew language - and respectively Greek and Hebrew thought.
However, it is to be made clear here, that Paul would fall within the
Hebrew thought and language structure, and Seneca within the Greek
thought and language structure. We are doing this in order to
confine ourselves to the views of those who tend to see Paul, and
1. However see here ibid., p. 44. "By language things are meant:
meaningful language always implies a connection between word and
reality. Language is the linking par exellence, the most
effective realization of coherence. It seems to have been
reflection on language which induced them (Stoics) to say that
man, unlike the parrot for instance, has the fivvota dxoAoudtac
(SVF, ii, 223); for not only has he experience of it, but also
understanding of the principle behind; and consequently, helped
by 'material* language, he has much greater freedom in every case
where uxoAoudCa is involved. Through language he can demon¬
strate the human reactions to reality which derive from kolvcu
Svvouat. He shows how he shuffles and combines and contrasts
his perceptions."
2. Barr, op.cit., p. Q.
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the thought of the New Testament as a whole, as if resting entirely
upon the Judaistic background, and Seneca, being a Roman, is set
within the sphere of Greek language, not because he wrote in Greek,
for he did not, but because at the time of Seneca the philosophical
movements and thoughts of Athens and Rome were identical, so that
the language as such is of lesser importance.
Now, the main approach, to those who have linguistically
founded their interpretations, is that they have seen Greek and
Hebrew thought usually in terms of sharp contrasts. "The main
contrasts", writes Prof. Barr:
"drawn between Greek and Hebrew thought are usually the
following:
1. The contrast between static and dynamic. The Greeks
were ultimately interested in contemplation, the Hebrews
in action. Movement could not be ultimate reality for
the Greeks, to whom being must be distinguished from
becoming, and the ultimate must be changeless. For the
Israelites the true reality was action and movement,;and
the inactive and motionless was no reality at all."
The main modern interpreter of this sort at whom Barr's criticisms
2
are pointed is Thorlief Boman, who has made an effort to present
the difference between Greek and Hebrew thought in as black and
white terms as possible. Thus he writes:
"If Israelite thinking is to be characterised it is obvious
first to call it dynamic, vigorous, passionate, and sometimes
quite explosive in kind; correspondingly Greek thinking is
static, peaceful, moderate, and harmonious in kind".5
1. Barr, op.cit., pp. 10-11.
2. T. Boman, Hebrew Thought Compared with Greek, London, I960.
3. ibid., p. 27.
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and also:
"The Greek most acutely experiences the world and existence
while he stands and reflects, but the Israelite reaches his
zenith in ceaseless movement. Rest, harmony, composure, and
self-control - this is the Greek way; movement, life, deep
emotion, and power - this is the Hebrew way".1
Now, this view of Boman is no novelty in biblical scholarship for
already Albert Schweitzer had argued that the Hellenistic world-view
was static, by saying that: "in the Stoic view the world is thought
2
of as static and unaltering". This view did not end with Barr's
criticism of its basic presuppositions either, so that it is still
advocated. So, for example, Niederwimmer has called the
"griechischen Welt- und Menschenbild, das einen statisch-ruhenden
und in sich geschlossenen Kosmos".
Movement has been especially accepted (with justification!)
as the means of depicting Pauline thought, since the Apostle's
thought has been described as pre-eminently historical thought.
Thus Schoeps writes:
"The fact is that Paul sees all earthly happenings as cohering
with the continuity of a concrete divine plan of action. His
historical understanding is never influenced by the Greek
metaphysic of being, but derives always from the historical
outlook characteristic of Israel", (op.cit., p. 231)
And indeed, insofar as history is understood as a characteristic
human reality, whose hallmark is man's dealing with his environment,
or, if you prefer, with his world, Paul's thought is foremostly
historical thought. At least on this issue all interpreters are
1. ibid., p. 205.
2. Mysticism, p. 11.
3. K. l iederwimmer, Per Begriff der Freiheit im Neuen Testament,
Berlin, 1966, p. ?9.
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at one.1 Thus, for example, Paul has taken seriously Adam as a
2
historical figure, precisely because Adam's sin has borne historical
consequences and is characteristic of the historical existence of
every other man, and in that respect Conzelaann comments:
"As Ro. 5. shows, for Paul, even death of course is not
essentially a natural process, but an indication that the
relationship to God is broken, i.e. as a factor of historical
existence. This historical intent can already be seen in
I Cor. 15.22..." 3
Precisely on this basis, understanding historical existence as an
L
existence of movement, interpreters have seen a static concept of
existence and being in the Greek thought expressed through the
5
concept of nature. Having in mind this view of the basic
differences between Greek and Semitic thought, the one being static
and the other historical, i.e. dynamic, Erail Brunner wrote:
1. On the interpretations of Paul's view of history see: de Zwaan,
op.cit., pp. 569, 572; Baur, op.cit., p. 246; Muhl, op.cit.,
p. 101; Niebuhr, op.cit., i, pp. 135, 143; Mysticism, pp. 10-11;
Stacey, op.cit., p. 35. V»'eiss, Urchristentum. p. 379; Liechtenhan,
op.cit., p. 397; Knox, op.cit., p. 181; Brunner, op.cit., p. 435;
M. Baumgarten, Lucius Annaeus Seneca und das Christentum in der
tief gesimkenen Weltzeit, Rostock. 1895. pp. 123. 127; H. Greeven,
Das Hauptproblem der Sozialethik in der Keueren Stoa und im
Urchristentum, Giltersloh, 1934. p. 24; C.^T. de Vogel, Greek
Philosophy, iii, Leiden, 1959, p. 55; Scroggs, op.cit., p. 60.
2. See C.K. Barrett, A Confentary on the First Epistle to the
Corinthians. London, 1968, p. 351; Adam, p. 19; Scroggs, op.cit.,
p. 83; Schoeps, op.cit., p. 231.
3. Conzelmann, op.cit., p. 188.
4. "In der Weltanschauung des Paulus ist der ganze Kosmos ergriffen
von der Dynamik..." de Zwaan, op.cit., p. 545.
5. See H. Zahrnt, The Question of God, London, 1969, p. 73»
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"Whether man is understood, ideally from the point of view
of Idea or causally from that of Nature: in each case he
is understood non-historically". (op.cit., p. 436)
In other words, if historical existence implies a dynamic existence,
an existence on the plane of "nature" is a static existence. And
this is indeed our crucial point, for we are reminded that: "to
grasp the highest Stoic thought we need a definition of 'Nature'."1
Undoubtedly, the concept of nature is a basic concept of the Stoic
school, and of all schools of Greek philosophy.
The above listed views of the concept of nature, (Schweitzer,
Brunner, Niederwimmer, Boman) will prove to be precisely the oppo¬
site of what the concept itself implies. The definition and the
misapprehension of the word has been put this way:
"...we can see moving Purpose. It is Physis, the word which
Romans unfortunately translated 'Natura', but which means
'Growing' or 'the way things grow* - almost what we call
Evolution. But to the Stoic it is a living and conscious
evolution..."2
Indeed, in so far as it is legitimate to rely on "implied metaphysics",
we can point out that the word <ptiCTtc is a derivation of the verb
which means to plant, and thus the word itself implies move¬
ment. Thus an interpreter insists that: "Physis must be moving
upward, or else it is not Physis."
1. G.H.C. Macgregor and A.C. Purdy, Jew and Greek: Tutors Unto
Christ. London, 193o, p. 251.
2. Gilbert Murray, Five Stages of Greek Religion. Oxford, 1925,
p. 126. *
3. Gilbert Murray, The Stoic Philosophy. London, 1915» p. 49; See
also p. 32; "V.e call it 'Evolution'. The Greeks called it
Physis, a word which ve translate by 'Nature', but which seems
to mean exactly 'growth' or 'process of growth'."
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Not only is the concept of nature not to be conceived as
static, but the concept of nature is precisely the initiator of
movement within the general sphere of being and existence.1 Thus
it is argued that:
"Gerade durch den Begriff der cptiawc kommt in Gott Oder
der Logos die Bewegung als nothwendiges Moment hinein, ohne
dass freilich von den Stoikem besonders Gewicht darauf
gelegt worden ware. Uebrigens braucht man nicht nur aus den
beiden Begriffen zugelegten gleichen Definitionen auf die
Iden^itat zwischen Gott Oder dem Logos zu Natur zu schliessen
• • •
Hence we have every reason to believe that the concept of nature was
not a static but a kinetic one. As another interpreter puts it:
"Stoicism was, above all, as we saw, a philosophy which
emphasized the dynamic nature of reality, and by its
insistence on change, demanded the abandonment of any sort
of a static knowledge of the universe and any sort of
contentment at having arrived at a fixed, unchangeable
truth".3
Finally it can be illustrated from Seneca himself for he says:
"nihil ita ut immobile esset natura concepit", ^ and also: "cum dei
natura adsidua et citatissima commutatione vel delectet se vel
5
conservet".
It has been pointed out also that not only the concept of
nature is kinetic in Greek thought, but also the concept of truth:
1. For a further illuminating interpretation of the concept of
QMkxie see: R.A. Nisbet, Social Change and History, London,
Oxford, New York, 1969, pp. lo~24.
2. M. Heinze, Die Lehre vom Logos in der griechischen Philosophie,
Oldenburg, Wf27"pTT^r. ^
3. Watson, G. op.cit., p. 87.
4. N. Q. vi, 1.12.
5. Ad Helv. 6.8; cf.: N.Q. ii, 45? Be Ben. iv, 7.1; 8.3«
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"For two things in particular Christian theology is
Aristotle's debtor - his extraordinary skill in creating
a philosophical terminology, and his assumption that truth
is never static...
It is hoped that the above argument does not give an impression
that we have come to believe that because of the structures of the
Greek and Hebrew languages the respective thoughts have confined
themselves to these structures. Our purpose has been only to point
out:
a) that from the language we can see what sort of thought is
behind it, and
b) that the differences between Greek and Hebrew thought,
especially on the overdone examples of static-dynamic
contrast, are far less than is often assumed.
The reason why we have entered into this argument, apart from the
general points, namely that Paul's world is more of a unity than
of polarisation and that Paul was Hellenized in certain aspects by
the very fact that he has moved through the Greek culture and
environment of Greek language, is that we envisage a terminology of
"movement" as a possible vehicle for expressing both Paul's and
Seneca's anthropologies. We are not trying to argue that either
Paul or Seneca have seen movement as the essence of man or as the
nature of man. Our intention is rather, if we have to provide an
adequate terminology for comparing their anthropologies, to trans¬
late their respective anthropologies in terms of movement, for after
all Luke may be doing Paul no injustice when he has him say:
1. Macgregor and Purdy, op.cit., p. 24o.
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fev a£>T$ y&P CGuev xat xivotipeQa xat feapSv,1
and Seneca wrote: "Natura enim humanus animus agilis est et
2
pronus ad motus". Thus we shall adopt the notion of movement
as fundamental to the anthropologies of both, while distinguishing
between them by suggesting that the movement typical of Pauline
anthropology will be called a centrifugal movement, denoting that
man by his nature is an ec-static being, outward orientated, whereas
the movement typical of Senecan anthropology will be called a
centripetal movement, denoting that man by his nature is an
introspective being, inward orientated. These two movements, as
the means for expressing Paul's and Seneca's anthropology, we have
chosen, because they seem to coincide to a great extent with their
respective views of the world and of existence.
3
Thus Paul, who has been charged with dualism, and more
A
frequently defended as not being a dualist, we shall treat in such
a way as will enable us to dispense with the word "dualist", and at
the same time we shall be using the word "bipolar", understanding
by it a view of the world and existence which implies two different
realities, objectively distinct from each other, namely an objective
"I" and an objective "Other". On the other hand, Seneca, who was
5
also charged with dualism, but ultimately was recognised as a
1. Acts, 17.28.
2. De Tranq. An. 2.11,
3. Dee e.g., Urchristenturn. pp. 471-72, 476; Schoeps, op.cit., p.200.
4. See Conzelraann, op.cit., p. 177; Stacey, op.cit., p. 17o; Seven-
ster, op.cit., pp. 66,78; Scroggs, op.cit., pp. 60-ol; de Zwaan,
op.cit., p. 577; Th. Schreiner, Seneca im Gegensatz zu Paulus,
Tubingen, 193^, pp. o9-70, 81.
5. > . Capelle,' Beneca und die Humanitat,1 Monatshefte der Comenius
Gesellschaft, h.F. 1909/10, pp. 38-39; M. Pohlenz, Die Stoa, "
Gottingen, 1948, i, p. 321; Heinze, op.cit., pp. 79, 167;
(Contd.
20
monist,"1 we shall treat as a monist, by which we (shall) under¬
stand that Seneca has viewed existence as an objective reality
identical to itself in the sense that in his view of the world and
existence the "I" cannot be objectively distinguished from the
"Other". In Seneca's thought they are identical. But before we
proceed with an analysis of the problem we think it important to
state: what is to be understood under the concept of anthropology.
Considering the fact that man is a phenomenon distinct from
any other phenomenon he is to be treated as such, i.e. as a distinct
phenomenon, and not analogically on the basis of data provided
through analogical and scientific observation and deduction.
The question arises: "What is it that makes a man a
distinct phenomenon?" Put shortly an answer would be that: it is
2
his capacity of making "himself the object of his own action".
Undoubtedly man is a creature different from the other creatures
through the fact of his interference and dealing with his environ¬
ment, i.e. he is a historical creature, but more than that he is
Contd.) Holler, op.cit., p. 15; K. Deissner, Paulus und Seneca.
GQtersloh, 1917, p. 36 (114); E. Benz, Eas Todesproblem in der
stoischen Philosophie, Stuttgart, 1929, pp. 30, 42; Arnold,
op.cit., p. 241; Sevenster, op.cit., pp. 68, 75, 223.
1. Steiner, op.cit., pp. 1, 15, 34, 40, 78; Feine, op.cit., p. 75;
Arnold, op.cit., pp. 172, 196, 238, 257; Sevenster, op.cit.,
p. 41; Heinze, op.cit., p. 172; Bill, op.cit., p. 307; Davis,
op.cit., p. 74; Be Vogel, op.cit., iii, p. 52.
2. TNT, i, pp. 195-9o.
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the only historical creature. Man is a creature who gives a
personal dimension to impersonal reality, through art,1 he is a
creature who identifies things and other creatures from his
(human) point of view, (e.g. Adam naming the animals), through the
reality of language, symbols and numbers.
Now, his process of dealing with his environment, which
reveals itself through historical reality, is a process of
identification, i.e. a process of giving an identity to an un-
2
identified reality. From this point is to be posed another
question: "What is the relation of man's identifying the
objective reality of his environment to his making 'himself the
object of his own self'?" An answer is precisely that that
relation is what anthropology is about - namely an enquiry into
man's search-for-identity, in other words all man's actions of
art, science, history etc., which we are classifying as the
actions of identification, constitute the essence of man's humanity,
his search-for1-identity. In conclusion, man is the creature who
wants to identify himself, and an anthropological primary (and
sole!) task is to explicate the reasons for, the course and the
boundaries of man's identifying himself.
1. Thus M. Buber, Urdlstanz und Beziehung, Heidelberg, 1951, p. 28,
writes: "Kunst 1st weder Impression naturhafter Objektivitat,
noch Expression seelenhafter Subjektivitat, sie ist Vierk und
Zeugnis der Beziehung zwischen der substantia humana und der
substantia rerum, das gestaltgewordene Zwischen".
2. "Everything genuinely historical has both a particular and a
concrete character. Carlyle, the most concrete and particular
of the historians, says that John Lackland came upon this ear"th
on such and such a day. This indeed is the very substance of




Man being a creature who deals with an environment and
external or objective reality, deals (or at least wants to deal!)
with reality in its totality, and being "homo religiosus" that
implies that man wants to, and does, deal with the realm of the
divine, transcendent or supernatural.
Both Paul's and Seneca's writings provide us with sufficient
material on this issue to enable us to reach some definite con¬
clusions. It is hoped that these conclusions will show how much
there is in common between Paul's and Seneca's views on man's
relationship to God.
It is prophetically emphasized by Sartre that: "the know¬
ledge of man must be a totality; empirical, partial pieces of
knowledge on this level lack all significance.1,1 Relating this
definition, which we take as a correct one, to the problem of
Paul's and Seneca's views on man's knowledge of God we have to
clarify the position. The argument is that Seneca's and Paul's
views of knowledge, - even if they are different, although we
would object to such a presupposition, - are not of primary
importance. Although the argument is going to remain strictly
anthropological, we shall not altogether be able to avoid giving
the impression of conducting an enquiry that is biographical or
even psychological. This apparent pexABaaLs etc AAAo y^voc
will be due to the fact that Paul and Seneca themselves are men who
1. Jean Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, London, 1972, p. 575-
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desire to know. Hence the centre is man and the epicentre
knowledge. A. Richardson,1 defining the concept of knowledge in
the Old Testament has said that biblical knowledge: "is knowledge
in the sense of our knowledge of other persons rather than our
knowledge of objects, 'existential' rather than 'scientific'
knowledge."
With this definition we cannot agree, precisely because of
an emphasis on the totality of human knowledge, the more so since
we are primarily concerned with man, and not with knowledge. As
to an existentialist kind of knowledge the loose usage of the
terminology is no help, for Sartre, an arch-existentialist, does
not seem to distinguish between the two for he says that: "the
desire to know, no matter how disinterested it may appear, is a
relation of the appropriation. To know is one of the forms which
2
can be assumed by to have," and "that is why scientific research
x
is nothing other than an effort to appropriate." Sartre has
identified totally an "existentialist" and "scientific" knowledge
precisely emphasizing the fact that the knowledge of persons, in
human relationships, is identical with scientific knowledge.
Thus he argues that: "the lover's dream is to identify the beloved
object with himself and still preserve for it its own individuality;
let the Other become me without ceasing to be the Other. It is
at this point that we encounter the similarity to scientific
research..."^
1. An Introduction to the Theology of the Hew Testament, London,
1956, p. 40.
2. BK, p. 560.
3. BN» P- 577.
4. BN, p. 579.
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In conclusion, knowledge, in whatever sphere of human
activity, is of the same nature. Regardless of what the
immediate results of scientific research might appear to be,
knowledge always has one task - the-search-fop-man*s-authenticity.
Hence, to talk of different kinds of knowledge might be perfectly
in order, systematically and epistemologically speaking, but as
far as anthropology is concerned we shall rule out that
assumption as fallacious.
The other point, in the attempt to define the nature of
knowledge, is to answer, why the problem of knowledge at all. The
determinative point is the desire for knowledge, for: "Desire is
a lack of being. As such it is directly supported by the being
of which it is a lack."1 Just as knowing is "a form of
2 3
appropriation," equally "knowledge is assimilation."-^ What
happens in the process of knowledge is that: "There is a movement
of dissolution which passes from the object to the knowing
subject. The known is transformed into me; it becomes my thought
4
and thereby consents to receive its existence from me alone."
Consequently, man's desire to know is nothing else but his desire
to be. Almost the same definition of knowledge is given by
5
Heidegger, who says that the translation of the Greek word
dYXiPacrCri as "going toward" or "going near" is "an
1. BN, p. 575.
2. BN, p. 577.
3. BN, p. 579.
4. BN, p. 579.
5. Discourse on Thinking, New York, 1969, pp. 88-89.
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excellent name for designating the nature of knowledge."
By this is given a brief analysis of the nature of knowledge,
insofar as it is relevant for an anthropological enquiry. There
is no need for entering into a detailed analysis of the theory of
knowledge, or developing any especial aspect of knowledge. We
shall also avoid any especial argument for proving that Paul and
Seneca had the same view of knowledge, for it could hardly be
proved by an analytic method if one was to investigate their
theory of knowledge. However, what concerns us here is to state
that Paul's and Seneca's motives for knowing and knowledge are the
same as those of Sartre and Heidegger. Insofar as it is human
to want to know, there is no reason to presuppose that they had
different reasons for wanting to know from the reasons of some¬
body else who wants to know.
Some of the arguments and presuppositions - such as that
the desire to know is a desire to be, - will not be especially
analysed here, but will be explicated in relation to anthropolo¬
gical argument later in the thesis. It is significant that
it has been maintained that Paul did not have a speculative
doctrine of God,"*" and this was immediately characterized as
non-Hellenistic: "Ungriechisch denkt Paulus dabei nicht
spekulativ an das Wesen Gottes tiberhaupt, sondern geschichtlich
p
an seine 'Gerichte' und 'Wege'." And indeed we cannot find any
1. TNT, i, pp. 190-91; Sevenster, op.cit., pp. 34, 63;
G. Bornkamm, Das Bnde des Gesetzes, Munchen, 1952, p.72.
2. Gesetz, p. 72.
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trace of Paul's attempting to give an account of what God or the
Divine Being is. Yet one cannot but accept the fact that his
letters are full of passages which talk of God, but, strangely
enough, all these passages are all at one on one thing, and that
is that they talk of God as the one who acts in history and
responds to the human ways of life and behaviour on earth. So
for example raul says:*ATtoxaAAnx£xat yd.p 6py?) deoO An* oOpavoC
fent n&aav Aa£3etav xat Aoixtav AvOpconcav (Rom. 1. 18).
But this is where his discourse stops. No word of the nature of
the "wrath" of God is spoken. However, this wrath, which is
revealed by God, is precisely because of men who did not glorify
God as they should have,1 in other words the knowledge of God is
again the crucial problem. The problem is how are men going to
glorify God if they do not know him? The second question to be
posed is implicit: Did Paul talk, or not, of knowledge of God?
Briefly: yes, he did - and that is what is of interest to us here:
what was Paul's view on man's capability of knowing God?
He said that God's wrath was revealed from heaven on the
ungodliness of men, and then adds that they have no excuse, for
having provoked God's anger on account of ignorance:
x& Yvcoaxdv xoO deoO cpavepAv feoxtv £v aAxotc. (Rom. 1. 19)
This whole pericope deals with the knowledge of God, and the
language sounds Stoic, but Schoeps has proved that:
1. Rom.1.21.
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"What he (Paul) says in Rom. l:18ff. and 2:14ff. about the
natural knowledge of God which the heathen have, and which
has been described as theologia naturalis. need not there¬
fore be considered absolutely as a Judaicized stoicism.
It can equally well be Derekh Eres teaching, ventilated in
the Jewish missions of the time, a teaching such as showed
humanity the way from Noah to-, Moses - hence twenty-six
generations before the Tora."
There, where Paul is most straightforward on the question of
knowledge of God he is thinking mostly in Old Testament terms, and
it is precisely Old Testament writers who are claiming that man can-
2
not possess the knowledge of God. Thus Paul says: »q $&qoc
tiA.o5tou xat oocpiac xat yvtSaewc SeoO. &C &ve£epedvnxa xfi. xpCpaxa aGxoO
xat dve£txv£aaxot at 66ot a6x©0 (Rom. 11.33). -^le mos"k that can be
said about man's knowledge of God here is that man is aware of God
because he experiences acts of God, and that what man experiences
is communicated to man only as experience. Precisely because of
this, biblical language is notoriously anthropomorphic, for it is:
"legitimate for the natural sciences to free themselves from the
anthropomorphism which bestows human properties on inanimate
objects. But it is perfectly absurd to introduce by analogy the
same scorn for anthropomorphism in anthropology. In the investi¬
gation of man, what procedure can be more exact and rigorous than
to recognise his human properties."^ This is the paradox of the
1. Schoeps, op.cit., p. 224.
2. Richardson, op.cit., p. 39.
3. The Philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre, Edited by R.D. Curaming,
London, 1988, p. 418.
Bible which most interpreters have failed to note,1 namely that
the Bible is highly anthropomorphic precisely because it does
not deal with God in Himself, but with God as revealed to man.
And this particular Pauline pericope is entirely composed of Old
2
Testament fragments. In so far as man's affirmative knowledge
of God is concerned Paul has admitted it only on one occasion (in
principle!), but even then he has called it a "partial" knowledge:
<Spxt y lv&cmo Ik u£pouq, x<5xe feuiYvc&craiicu
xadcbc xat feneYv<J>o©tiv. (1 Cor. 13. 12).
However, the emphasis here seems to be put not on knowledge as
man's capacity, but rather on being known. The tendency of tne
argument is that I am known, and I shall know, when the time comes,
as I am known. Thus the standard for knowledge is that of being
known, about which Paul has a great deal to say. So for example
he says in I Cor. 8.3:
et 66 xiq &Yan$ x6v de6v, oGxoc ^Yvwaxat Git" aGxoG.
and almost the same he says in Gal. 4.9:
vOv &£ Yvdvxec Se<5v, pfiAAov Yvcood£vxec tmd 3eo0
These two examples of Paul's views are conditioned very much by
1. Thus for example some writers have argued that Seneca's idea of
God has been chastened and approached the Christian idea of God
by having become more spiritual and less anthropomorphic. But
that is precisely where the problem lies, namely in the fact
that the biblical view of God is very anthropomorphic. See:
Bill, op.cit., pp. 317, 331, 535; E. Zeller, Outlines of the
History of Greek Philosophy. London, 1886, pp. 253-5A;
Schreiner, op.cit., pp. 16-17, 50; Farrar, op.cit., pp. 44—45;
Baumgarten, op.cit., p. 116; Cf. Sen. Ep. 95- 49-50.
2. "Who hath directed the Spirit of the Lord, or being his coun¬
sellor hath taught him? With whom took he counsel, and who
instructed him, and taught him in the path of judgment, and
taught him knowledge, and shewed to him the way of understanding?"
Is. 40. 13-14; "For who hath stood in the counsel of the Lord
and. hath perceived and heard his word? who hath marked his word,
and heard it?" Jer. 23* 18; "Hast thou heard the secret of God?
And dost thou restrain wisdom to thyself." Job, 15.8.
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his Old Testament background, and Schweitzer comments on this:
"This being known by God, that is to say, the being
acknowledged by God as belonging to Him, plays a great part
in Paul's thought....This conception has nothing to do with
the Hellenistic mystical theory of becoming one with God
through knowledge, even though phrases connected with the
latter-, can be cited which have some affinity with those of
Paul."
Now, these examples show how Paul emphatically denies to man a
knowledge of God and emphasizes man's being known by God. The
root of this is exactly in his understanding of the nature of know¬
ledge which appears to be entirely Old Testament.
Our argument at the beginning was that knowing is a form of
appropriation and assimilation. So with justification Richardson
writes:
"It is of the profoundest significance that the Hebrew word
•know' (yadha') is used of sexual intercourse (e.g. Gen.
4.1, 17, 25; Num. 31. 1Q, 35; Judg. 21. 12; cf. Matt. 1.
25; Lk. 1. 34), for the husband-wife relationship is the
most intimate personal relation^ in human life, the most
active and satisfying knowing that exists."3
It surely is significant that the Old Testament should talk of
sexual intercourse in terms of knowing. That this concept was not
alien to Paul is revealed in the situation where he had to deal
with the question of sex in I Cor. 7.4: fj yuvfl toO tSCoo a&viaxoc
o6h fegouaiacet AAXa 6 Avflp. 6uoCtoc xat 6 &v?^p toO C6tou croidcltoc oAh
ftfjouatACet AXXd fj yuvA. What actual knowledge means - an
entire dissolution of any distance and barrier and difference
between the subject which knows and the object which is known - is
1. Mysticism, p. 306.
2. Cf. BN, pp. 579ff.
3. Richardson, op.cit., p. 41.
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implied in this verse. Paul regards man as being fully at the
disposition of woman (wife) and vice versa, just because he is
thinking of their relationship in terms of knowledge as he has
inherited it from the Old Testament. Paul deliberately does not
talk of man's knowing God precisely because "God is God and man is
man,...., man consequently possesses no faculty or ability of
himself to know God.Precisely on this ground Paul has accused
the Gentiles: fikkagav xrjv 6<5£av xoO 6xp&&pxou deoO fev duotcoyaxt,
e txdvog (p&apxoO dvOptonou (Rom .1.23).
The targets are here, first of all, philosophical speculations on
the Divine Being in the Hellenistic world and in Greek philosophy.
Paul is angry with the philosophers "precisely because the
philosophers replace him (God) by the image of images, the idea,"
for having an idea of God means knowing Him, means being able to
dispose of Him in the way it suits man. Having fully realized
knowledge of God means having fully grasped God in the most
concrete terms. On the other hand we can read in Dodd's Inter¬
pretation of the Fourth Gospel that no prophet of the Old Testament
has claimed to know God. "It is noteworthy," writes Eodd, "that
in this, and in nearly all Old Testament passages, man's knowledge
of God is not present but future."-^ If Dodd's claim and inter-
1. Zahrnt, op.cit., p. 55.
2. Buber, M., Eclipse of God, hew York, 1957, p. 50.
3. Cambridge, 1954, p. lc>3. This point of man not knowing God, in
the present but being directed toward the future, will, as it
will appear later in the thesis, play an important role precisely
in the anthropological perspectives of this problem. It will
have to do with the problem of the actualization and with the
problem of will to power.
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pretation are correct, then it would be good evidence for Paul
for a biblical background to the partial and total knowledge which
is future orientated: x6xe ftntYVtSoopat. After all, on the
question of knowledge of God, Paul could nox have been more explicit
than when he said: oOxwc *at tSl xoO deoO o66etc fiyvcmev et x6
TiveOya xoO OeoO ( 1 Cor. 2. 11 ).
and then:
xCc Y&P Syvto voCv nuptou, (1 Cor. 2. 16).
These examples are clear indications that Paul did not have any
intention of talking of man's knowledge of God in terms fashionable
in the Hellenistic philosophy of his time - namely to speculate on
the nature of God, or the Divine Being. Twice, when he spoke of
the knowledge of God, it was clearly Christ-centred knowledge of
God so that this ruled out again man's direct knowledge of God:
nat u&v ftilxopa fenatpduevov xaxd xffc yvciiaews xoO deotJ, xat atxpaAcoxC-
Covxec n&v v6nua etc xr)v tmaxo?lv xoO XptoxoO (2 Cor. 10. 5), and then:
5xt 6 de&c & etn&v. fex cm6xouc <p&c Adysjfet, 6c fiAau^ev fiv xatc xapGCatc
up6c <pojxtap.6v xf[c Yvooaewc xfic 6<5gnc xoO OeoO fiv rcpoacSntp
XptoxoO (2 Cor. 4. 6).
Hence, on these two occasions where Paul speaks of knowledge of God
it is put in such a context, that it in fact denotes a concept of
recognition. What basically remains firm on the biblical ground
is that God has revealed himself to man through Jesus Christ, and
through the obedience to Jesus man acquires the knowledge of God.
Thus in fact, as to man's capacity for knowledge of God by his own
powers, the status is unchanged. Man simply does not know God.
It sounds strange that Paul should not have encouraged man to attempt
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to come to the knowledge of God, but that is precisely the point
of the Bible: the historical existence, known as "fallen"
existence, started by man's attempt to know.1 Precisely because
being and knowing are identical man was tempted to know. His
lack of knowledge was nothing else but the lack of being, and
his wanting to know is nothing else but the willing to be. Thus
one interpreter is able to say: "Out of Adam, the man, grows a
being whose essential nature it is that he denies that he is a man,
2
and affirms his deity." And this is most paradoxical. In order
to be man man has to refuse to be what he is - man. This is the
meaning of not being what one is, but being what one is not
(Sartre). Man wants to be-in-hlmself precisely because he is a
lack of being.
If we turn to the problem of knowledge of God in Seneca's
philosophy it will soon become clear that there is a striking
difference between his and Paul's approach to this problem. First
of all it must be remembered that Seneca was a pantheist, and
1. That the problem of knowledge is the problem of being can be
clearly seen from Gen. 3-5: "for God doth know that in the day
ye eat thereof, then your eyes shall be opened, and ye shall
be as gods, knowing good and evil."
2. Adam, p. 12.
3. "...sed eundem quem nos Iovem intellegunt, rectorem custodemque
universi, animum ac spiritum mundi, operis huius dominum et
artificem, cui nomen omne convenit. Vis ilium fatum vocare, non
errabis; hie est ex quo suspensa sunt omnia, causa causarum.
Vis ilium providentiam dicere, recte dices; est enim cuius
consilio huic mundo providetur, ut inoffensus exeat et actus
suos explicet. Vis ilium naturam vocare, non peccabls; hie est
ex quo nata sunt omnia cuius spiritu vivimus. Vis ilium vocare
mundum, non falleris; ipse enim est hoc quod vides totum,
partibus suis inditus et se sustinens et sua." N.Q.ii, 45.1-3-
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has used several different names1 for the description of the Divine
Being. Because of his pantheism it is almost impossible to find
a passage in which he is not dealing with God in His Being. If
one reads carefully Seneca's writings one will not fail to notice
that the emphasis is laid on knowledge of "things divine and things
2
human." Knowledge is regarded as virtue and ignorance as vice.
Thus Seneca writes:
"Quid praecipuum in rebus humanis est?...sed animo omne 7
vidisse et, qua maior nulla victoria est, vitia domuisse.
It is not by chance that Seneca has laid an emphasis on knowledge,
and the further we proceed with our enquiry the more obvious
will become the role which positive knowledge played in Seneca's
philosophy. Seneca, being foremostly concerned with philosophy,
has argued that philosophy is not an occupation for one's spare
time, but is to be pursued above all things.^ If we look at
1. "Dlcet aliquis: 'Quid mihi prodest philosophia, si faturn est?
Quid prodest, si deus rector est? Quid prodest, si casus
imperat? Nam et rautari certa non possunt et nihil praeparari
potest adversus incerta; sed aut consilium meurn occupavit deus
decrevitque quid faeerem, aut consilio meo nihil fortuna
permittit.' Quicquid est ex his, Lucili, vel si omnia haec sunt,
philosophandum est: sive nos inexorabili lege fata constringunt,
sive arbiter deus universi cuncta disposuit, sive casus res
humanas sine ordine inpellit et iactat, philosophia nos tueri
debet. Haec adhortabitur, ut deo libenter paraamus, ut fortunae
contumaciter; haec docebit, ut deum sequaris, feras casum. Sed
non est nunc in hanc disputationem transeundum, quid sit iuris
nostri, si providentia in imperio est." Ep. 16. 4-6; Cf. Ep.
05.12; Ad Helv. 8.3; De Ben. iv, 7. 1-2; 8. 1-3; N.Q. I.
Praef. 13.
2. "Quid ergo est bonum? Rerum scientia. Quid malum est? Rerum
imperitia." Ep. 31.6.
3. N.Q. iii, Praef., 10.
4. See Epp. 17. 5.10; 29.12; 53.8-10; 59.10; 72.>4; 75.16.
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Seneca's definition of philosophy we will find that he again laid
an emphasis on knowledge. So he writes:
"Sapientiam quidam ita finierunt, ut dicerent divinorum
et humanorum scientlam. Guidam ita:,sapientia est nosse
divina et humana et horum causas."
Because philosophy is the knowledge of things divine and things
human, it is the only way of achieving virtue, and that is again
a knowledge-based concept:
"Hue et illud accedat, ut perfects virtus sit, aequalitas ac
tenor vitae per omnia consonans sibi, quod non potest
esse, nisi reruns scientia contingit et ars, per quanu
huraana ac divina noscantur. Hoc est summum bonum."
Consequently, there can be no doubt that Seneca was of a different
opinion from Paul on the issue of whether man could or could not
know God. As these passages show he was convinced of nan's
capacity to achieve knowledge of God and insisted on it, regarding
philosophy as the means toward this goal.
Under this conviction, of man's capacity to comprehend the
being of God, Seneca endeavoured to give a systematic exposition
x
of the problem in his 53th letter. What Seneca treats in this
1. Ep. 69-5. Here Seneca ^quotes.!from Plutarch's re Pla. Phil.
674E: OeCwv xe xal AvSpomCvcov fentcrc^un ; EP* 90.3•
Seneca says: "Haec (philosophia) docuit colere divina, humana
diligere, et penes deos imperium esse, inter homines consortium."
Seneca almost identifies wisdom and philosophy. See Ep. 88.33.
"Magna et spatiosa res est sapientia. Vacuo illi loco opus est.
De divinis humanisque discendura est, de praeteritis de futuris,
de caducis, de aeternis de tempore."
2. Ep. 31.8.
3. This letter being entirely dedicated to the problem of being
demonstrates how Seneca's primary concern was ontology and
not ethics.
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letter is actually the Greek concept of oOoCa for which he uses
a Latin translation "essentia" on the authority of Cicero and
Fabianus.1 His argument is as follows: "Quomodo dicetur 06oCa
res necessaria, natura continens fundamentun omnium? Rogo itaque
p
permittas mihi hoc verbo uti." (par. 6.). Then he proceeds with
his argument, (par. 7-8): "Magis damnabis angustias Romanas, si
scieris unam syllabam esse, quam mutare non possum. Quae sit
haec, quaeris? Td 5v. EUri tibi videor ingenii; in medio positum,
posse sic transferri, ut dicam 'quod est'." Proceeding with
■3
Plato's analysis of the question of "species" and the "things
4 5
which exist" Seneca says: "Quid ergo hoc est?"-^ and then answers:
"Eeus scilicet, raaior ac potentior cunctis." (para. 17). The way
in which he has deduced that x5 5v is God is developed in par.
10-11. Seneca's argument, there, is: "Hoc sic dividam, ut dicam
corpora omnia aut animantia esse aut inanima. Etiamnunc est
aliquid superius quam corpus. Dicimus enim quaedam corporalia
esse, quaedam incorporalia. Quid ergo erit, ex quo haec
deducantur? Illud, cui nomen modo parum proprium inposuimus, 'quod
est.' Sic enira in species secabitur, ut dicamus: 'quod est' aut
corporale est aut incorporale."
1. Ep. 58.6.
2. From the first part of the paragraph it is obvious that the word
Seneca is asking to be allowed to use is "essentia."
3. See ibid., par. 9, 11-12.
4. See par. lo-17.
5. From the context it is clear that Seneca is dealing with the
concept of "quod est" or xb 6v.
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Now, if we summarise this argument, we see that he argues
that there is an existing reality which man encounters around him¬
self. Some of this reality is authentic in its existence, i.e.
is in itself ''quod est", and some of it is inauthentic, i.e. is
lacking this "quod est," therefore is sustained by it. And what
is this "quod est"? Seneca uses Plato again: "Secundum ex his,
quae sunt, ponit Plato quod eminet et exsuperat omnia."1 And
then follows his own answer: "Quid ergo hoc est? Peus scilicet,
rnaior ac potentior cunctis." Hence this "quod est," which lias an
authentic existence, and sustains an inauthentic existence is God.
Finally, on the question whether there is the possibility of man's
knowing this "quod est," Seneca answers:
"Primum illud 'quod est' nec visu nec tactu nec ullo sensu
conprenditur; cogitabile est." (par. lo).
Thus the faculty of reason and intellect, with which man is
endowed gives him a positive capacity to know God. The same
sort of argument is put forward in N.Q., vii, 30.3'-
"Ipse qui ista tractat, qui condidit, qui totum hoc
fundavit deditque circa se, maiorque est pars sui operis
ac melior, effugit oculos; cogitatione visendus est."
And the argument culminates in N.Q. vi, 4.2:
"Quo nullum maius est, nosse naturam."
One has to have in mind that the concepts of Nature and God are
2
identical in Seneca's thought, hence to know nature is to know God.
Accordingly, two major differences, so far, between Paul and Seneca
1. Ep. 58.17.
2. See p. 33, n.l.
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in respect of man's capacity of knowing God are that Paul argues
against man's ability to know God and Seneca, on the other hand,
defends it; and secondly while Paul has never attempted to
develop any theological treatise on that issue, Seneca in fact did
develop it.
V<e have now to ask what are the repercussions of these
differences for the respective anthropologies of Paul and Seneca.
First of all we have to clarify some, already discussed, pre¬
suppositions. Thus we have to bear in mind that the anthropolo¬
gical enquiry should be an enquiry into a problem whicn we have
named a search-for-identity (see p. 21). Once we have established
that Paul denied to man a capacity of recognizing and knowing God,
and that Seneca - on the contrary - emphasized that capacity in
man, the question which naturally arises is: "Why did they differ
on that issue?" The reason for the difference and its background
will be discussed in the following section.
In the introductory part of the thesis we pointed out that
the most serious criticism, which has contained in itself all
other reproaches against Paul, was that through his belief in the
Son of God Paul blurred the line of demarcation between God and
man, (see p. 9)• According to this argument Paul simply over¬
emphasized the importance and value of man, and thus put in danger
a strictly transcendent biblical view of God. Schoeps argues
that Paul's "anthropocentric emphasis"1 springs from the
1. Schoeps, op.cit., p. 30.
3b
Leptuagint, which was already influenced by Hellenistic philosophy.
At the same time it was categorically maintained that "the restric¬
tion on the 'approach' to the divinity is one of the basic
provisions of the Biblical religion."1 On the other hand Paul
is firmly defended. For "Paul however," writes Albert Schweitzer,
"is a Jew, and even as a believer in Christ he stands, in
spite of his polemic against the law, wholly and solely
on the basis of the-absolute, transcendent Jewish
conception of God."
Schweitzer insists that Paul's "world-view is not one of an immanent
but of a transcendent God.Our main concern is to proceed from
the anthropological point of view, i.e. the primary importance
is to be laid on the issue of man, and not on the transcendence or
immanence of God. We have already pointed out that Paul took
Adam as a historical figure (see p. 15). Paul has understood
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the word Adam in its original meaning, which is man, and thus it
is maintained by a number of interpreters that when Paul talks of
Adam he is talking of the whole of mankind.5 Apart from that, the
1. M. Buber, Moses, New York, 1958, p. 42.
2. Interpreters, p. 204.
3» Mysticism, p. .8.
4. Adam, p. 6.
5. J. Penney, 'Adam and Christ in St. Paul', The Expositor, ix,
1904, p. 152; F. Prat, The Theology of St. Paul, London & Dublin,
1945, ii, p. 171; J. Hiring, The First Epistle of Saint Paul to
the Corinthians. London, 19b2, p. 179; E.E. Ellis, Paul's Use
of the Old Testament, Edinburgh-London, 1957, p. oO; Calvin's
Commentaries, The First Epistle to the Corinthians, Edinburgh &
London, 1980, p. 339;' " kcrbggs, op.cit., p. 10b; C.K. Barrett,
A Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, London, 1957, p. 117.
Corinthians, p. 351. Adam, p. 19; K. Earth, 'Christ and Adam',
Scottish Journal of Theology, Occasional Papers, No. 5, 195b,
p. 3; G. Wingren, Gospel and the Church. Edinburgh, 1964, p.37;
Brunner, op.cit., p. 301.
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Hebrew word a d a m a h means earth, a dark soil, so that aan as
such is identified with the creation:
"The account therefore tells the hearer what man is in him¬
self, man is dust; he was not only once made out of it,
but that is his abiding nature. Not only the first man,
but every man is formed out of dust."1
2
This concept is typically biblical. Equally often in the Old
■5
Testament man is referred to as being clay, and God is a potter
4
who has a power over him.
Paul is entirely in accord with the whole of the Old
Testament in considering man to be a part of creation, being a
creature of God. The state of human existence and man's position
before God Paul has described in strictly Old Testament terms:
£ dvdpojiie, t&evoOv ye oft x£c et 6 &vxanoxptv6uevoc x$ de$; pf) fipet
x£> itAdaua x$ nXAoavxt xt ue fenoCnoac oOxcocj ofix fixeu ££ouo£av 6
nepauefcc xoO rcnAoO fix xoO txOxoO cpopdpaxoc notffoat $ ufev etc xcutW
axeOoc# 8 etc (Pom. 9.20-21).
In the same manner Paul describes man as<p9apx6c as being
opposed to God as &<P&apx6c (Rom. 1.23), and he talks of xpGxoe
rtvdpoTtoc Yfic xotxdc (1 cor. 13-47). He calls Adam a
creature whichfinAdodp (1 Tim. 2.13)^ in a passive form of the
1. Boman, op.cit., p. 91.
2. Gen. 2.7; 3-19; 18.27; I Kings, 16.2; Job, 10.9b; 14.19; 30.19;
34.15; Ps. 22.15; 22.29; 30.9; 103.14; 104.29; 119-25;
Eccl. 3.20; 12.7.
3. Job, 10.9a; 33.6; Is. 29-lo; 45.9; o4.8; Jer. 18.b; Ps. 40.2.
4. Ps. 2.9; Is. 29.lo; 30.14; b4.8; Jer. 18.4ff.
5. Here Dr. Templeton has remarked: "I note you hold the P author¬
ship of 1 Tim." Our intention is not to enter a dispute over
Paul's authorship. But, as Prof. H. Anderson has remarked once,
the fact that one talks of "Deutero-Pauline" letters entitles
one to quote them in this context.
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verb pointing to the fact that he is created by God. The
oOapx&c fivSpojTtoe of Rom. 1.23, is identical with the xxtcxtc
of 1.25. That the concept of "creation" was not abolished in
Pauline thought can be seen not only from the fact that he has
used it so often and with profound understanding of the biblical
trend of thought,"1, but , what is more he has given a new impetus
to the relevance of this concept in his thought by having created
a concept of xatvfj hxCcti.c. again this concept of the
"new creation" is not an abstract concept but is attributed to
man who is £v Xptoxy , i.e. who is engrafted into God's work
2
of salvation.
Now, Buber's "restriction on the approach" is to be under¬
stood in terms of Creator-creation. "The original Biblical word
'Creation'," writes Brunner,
"means first of all, that there is an impassable gulf
between the Creator and the creature, that for ever they
stand over against one another in a relation which can
never be altered. There is no greater sense of distance
than that which lies in the words Creator-Creation. Now
this is the first and fundamental thing which can be said
about man: He is a creature, and as such he is separated
by an abyss from the Divine manner of being."3
Thus we come to the conclusion that in Paxil's thought man is a
creature who stands over against God as the Creator. And the
relation between the Creator and creature, or relation between God
and man is relation which can be called an "infinite qualitative
1. V.hat the term xxCoic in Paul's thought encompasses can be seen
best from passages such as: Rom. 1.20; 8.19-22; 8.33; Col. 1.23»
2. See 2 Cor. 5.17; Gal. b.15.
3. Brunner, op.cit., p. 90.
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distinction.nl
Bultmarin has rightly emphasized that Paul has made faith
2
in creation "the critical principle of his discussion," i.e. Paul
has emphasized the relevance of man's awareness of his being a
creature and God being a Creator. Thus the basic fact about an
in his humanity and about God in His Divinity is that God is
"wholly other" than man. They cannot be identified or confused
with one another. Hence, from the anthropological point of view,
the charge that Paul has blurred the demarcation line between God
and man looks less serious and it seems that he did not distort
the basic biblical provision, the restriction on the approach.
Thus BShlig writes - although we are not quite sure of his intention -
tnat: "wahrt Paulus deutlicher einen Unterschied zwischen Gott und
Christus. Das entspricht nicht nur seiner jtldischen, sondem der
orientalischen Denkweise uberhaupt.
Finally, our investigation, so far, on the relation of man
to God in Paul's thought enables us to draw two basic conclusions:
a) man by himself does not possess a capacity of knowing God
in His Being, and
b) man does not have that capacity because he is a creature
and God is Creator, i.e. man and God are qualitatively
different, not in degree, but in principle, so that what
1. Zahrnt, op.cit., p. 24.
2. EF, p. 204. The whole essay on 'Faith in God as Creator'
Tpp. 202-216) is instructive.
3- farsos, p. 19.
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is characteristic of their relation to each other is
their distinct "otherness".
Hence briefly: "God is God and man is man,..., man consequently
possesses no faculty or ability of himself to know God.
For the moment we shall leave this problem and turn to
Seneca. Later on we shall point out some other implications in
Paul's anthropology which stem from these basic presuppositions of
Paul.
"we previously stated that Seneca's conviction was that man
has the capacity and ability to know God by himself. In one of
his definitions of wisdom Seneca says:
"Alias quidem artes sub dominio habet. Nam cui vita, illi
vitam ornantia quoque serviunt; ceterum ad beatum statum tendit,
illo ducit, illo vias aperit. Quae sint mala, quae
videantur ostendit, vanitatem exuit mentibus, dat
magnitudinem solidam, inflatam vero et ex inani speciosam
reprirait, nec ignorari sinit inter magna quid intersit et
tumida, totius naturae notitiam ac suae tradit. Quid sint
di qualesque declarat, quid inferi, quid lares et genii,
quid in secundam numinum formam animae perpetuatae, ubi
consistant, quid agant, quid possint, quid velint.
Haec eius initiamenta sunt, per quae non municipale
sacrum, sed ingens deorum omnium templum, mundus ipse
reseratur, cuius vera simulacra verasque facies cernendas
mentibus protulit. Nam ad spectacula tarn magna hebes visus
est."2
From this passage we can see that the man who has achieved wisdom
is endowed with a gift of the knowledge of nature, God and the
human soul. If we ask which is the basic principle which entitles
Seneca to claim this, an answer, in our opinion, will be that the
basis for this is his concept of nature, First of all
1. Zahrnt, op.cit., p. 55.
2. Ep. 90.27-28.
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the universe is identified with Deity:
"Quid est deus? Mens universi. Quid est deus? Quod vides
totum et quod non vides totum.nl
"Nam mundus quoque cuncta complectens rectorque universi
deus in exteriora quidem tendit sed tamen introrsum
undique in se redit."2
x
"Totum hoc, quo continemur, et unum est et deus;"
We may also note that for Seneca God is identical with nature, cp6ai£:
"Vis ilium naturam vocare, non peccabis; hie est ex quo nata
sunt omnia, cuius spiritu vivimus."4
" 'Datura', inquit, 'haec raihi praestat.• Won intellegis te,
cum hoc dicis, rautare nomen deo? Quid enim aliud est
natura quam deus et divina ratio toti mundo partibusque
eius inserts?"5
"Ergo nihil agis, ingratissime mortalium, qui te negas deo
debere, sed naturae, quia nec natura sine deo est nec deus
sine natura,..."0
At the same time God being both universe and nature, is reason:
7
"Ratio scilicet faciens, id est deus."
"quisquis formator universi fuit, sive ille deus est potens
omnium, sive incorporalis ratio,... "8
And finally this very reason which is God, who is nature and universe,
is a real nature of man:
"Quid ergo interest inter naturara dei et nostram? Nostri
raelior pars animus est, in^illo nulla pars extra animum
est. Totus est ratio,..."y
1. N.Q., i, Praef. 13.
2. De Vita Beata, 8.4.
3. Ep. 92.30-
4. N.Q*, ii, 45.2.
5. De Ben. iv, 7.1.
b. Be Ben. iv, 8.2.
7. Ep. 65.12.
8. Ad Helv. 8.3.
9. N.Q., 1, Praef. 14.
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"divinorum una natura est. Ratio autem nihil aliud est
quam in corpus humanum pars divini spiritus mersa."!
"Quid in homine proprium? Ratio. Haec recta et consummata
felicitatem hominis implevit...horaini autem suum bonum
ratio est; si hanc perfecit, laudabilis est et finem
naturae suae tetigit."2
"Ratio vero dis hominibusque communis est; haec in illis
consummata est, in nobis consummabilis." 3
"Omnia animalia aut rationalia sunt,, ut homines, ut di, aut
inrationalia, ut ferae, ut pecora."
Now, what we have discovered, through a brief survey of Seneca's
strictly logical and consistent argument, is that God, Nature,
Universe, Reason and man are identical. Hence, what is missing
altogether is exactly what is in Paul called the "distance" or
"otherness" or "restriction on the approach." So, it is not by
chance that Schoeps has described the blurring of the line between
God and man as heathen and Hellenistic. Thus, what we find in
Seneca is not relationship which is characterized by "otherness"
or "infinite qualitative distinction" between the two, but on the
contrary "oneness" or "definite qualitative identification". In
the words of Brunner it "is not conceived as an actual relationship,
but as a substantial one, as similarity, affinity-in-being". Put
in Seneca's words:
1. Pp. bo.12.
2. Ep. 76.10; cf. Ep. 49-12.
3- Ep. 92.27.
4. Ep. 113.17.
5. Brunner, op.cit., p. 554.
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"Omnes, si ad originem priraam revocantur, a dis sunt."1
When this is related to the problem of man's knowledge of God it
becomes immediately clear why Seneca believed in, and advocated,
man's capacity for the knowledge of God.
Since man and God are qualitatively identical, being in the
realm of the human means being in the realm of the Divine. It is
always one and the same sphere. Seneca's monistic thought does not
allow the bipolarity of qualitative difference such as is pre¬
supposed in the antithesis of Creator-creation, precisely because:
"belief in the Creation is the great stumbling-block to Idealistic
2
Monism," and here we are faced with the ambiguity of the basic
assumption of natural religion: "I.Man cannot naturally Perceive.
x
but through his natural or bodily organs." This presupposition
does not contradict either Paul or Seneca, since for Paul God
and man differ in their natures, hence man perceives only that
which is within a category of creature like himself, i.e. he can¬
not have knowledge of God who being a Creator is of ultimate
qualitative difference in comparison with man. On the other hand
since God and man are, in Seneca's philosophy, identical they are
of the same nature, and man has capacity to knnw God by natural
perception through his natural faculties.
After having established that Seneca regarded knowledge of
1. Ep. 44.1.
2. Brunner, op.cit., p. 90,n.l.
3. William Blake, THERE is NO Natural Religion, essay a., The
Poetry and Prose of William Blake. New York, 1970. , j?. i
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God by man as possible, and after having stated the reasons for
such a belief we can see where it reveals itself in his philosophy.
A direct result of this belief of Seneca, directly anthropolo¬
gically relevant, can be seen in his broad usage and inter¬
pretation of the Delphic maxim yvSdt aauxdv. First of all let
us give a brief definition of that maxim as interpreted by Betz.
He puts it this way:
"...the God Poimandres asks the initiate to interpret the
following saying: , . .
o vopaac eauxov etc aoxov
'He who has recognised himself departs into him(self).'
The exegetical problem which the initiate is supposed to
solve concerns the relationship between 'kauxdv t
♦adxdv ' (scil., ' x6v dedv '). in his interpretation
the initiate shows that the two must be identical. The
Father-god consists of 'life and light' (par. 9), and so
does his son, the Anthropos (par. 12) who is identical with
the 'essential man' ('& cOatcoSne &v5pcorxoc * in par. 15)
of those who re * fivvouc » (par. 18). To 'understand'
this means to reverse the entire cosmogony and return
to one's immortal self which is the divine."
Later on Betz states:
"The strong influence of Posidonius can be seen also in
later periods of Stoicism, especially in Seneca. In
particular, several of Seneca's Moral Epistles contain
interesting passages. In Ep. 41 Seneca develops the
idea of the divine soul which has taken up residence in
man, so that 'to know God' is nothing other than to know
our divine selves."2
What Seneca says in that letter is:
"prope est a te deus, tecum est, intus est. Ita dico, Lucili:
sacer intra nos spiritus sedet, malorum bonorumque
nostrorum observator et custos."*
The actual meaning of this Seneca explains later in the 5th paragraph
1. H.D. Betz, 'The Delphic Maxim Yvcodt aauxdv Hermetic inter¬
pretation', Harvard Theological Review, vol. t>3> Oct. 1970,
No.4, p. 468.
2. Ibid., p. 475.
3. Ep. 41. 1-2.
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of the same letter:
"sic animus raagnus ac sacer et in hoc demissus, ut propius
divina nossemus, conversatur quidem nobiscum, sed haeret
origini suae; illinc pendet, illuc spectat ac nititur,
nostris tamquara melior interest."
The idea of God dwelling in man Seneca employed on other occasions:
"Animus, sed hie rectus, bonus, magnus. Quid aliud voces
hunc quaia deum in corpore humano hospitantem?"1
"'Quem,' inquis, 'deorura sponsorem accepisti?' Eum scilicet,
qui neminem fallit, animum recti ac boni araatorem. In tuto
pars tui melior est."2
"In insuperabili loco stat animus, qui externa deseruit, et
arce se sua vindicat; infra ilium orane telum cadit. Hon
habet, ut putamus, fortuna longas manus; neminem occupat
nisi haerentera sibi. Itaque quantum possumus, ab ilia ,
resiliamus; quod sola praestabit sui naturaeque cognitio."^
Hence the point of argument is that God is dwelling within man and
that the knowledge of God is identical with the knowledge of one's
own self. This is possible precisely because these two are
identical, so that addressing God as the "other" is in fact
addressing my divine self. This concept Seneca lias turned into
A
his well-known doctrine of self-observation, on which ground he
5
has been regarded as a great teacher of the guidance of the soul.
The typical passages on self-observation are simply direct in-





5. Dill,op.cit., pp. 334, 398.
6. Ep. 20.3.
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"Observabo me protinus et, quod est utilissimum, diem meum
recognoscam.Especially anthropologically relevant is:
"Atqui cum voles veram hominis aestimationem inire et
scire, qualis sit, nudum inspice; ponat patrimonium, ponat
honores et alia fortunae mendacia, corpus ipsum exuat.
Animum intuere, qualis quantusque sit, alieno an suo
magnus."2
Hence what comes out is the surprising result that in Seneca the
problem of man's knowledge of God is not a theological but an
anthropological problem. If we now try to draw parallels to the
conclusion that we have reached after an analysis of the same
problem in Paul (see p. 41f.),we shall be able to summarize it
as follows:
a) In Seneca's philosophy man by his own capacities is in a
position to achieve positive knowledge of God, and
b) man is able to know God because their natures are identi¬
cal. Between God and man there is no qualitative dis¬
tinction, so that the divine manner of being is actually
accessible to man's perceptive capacities.
If these two conclusions are to be compared to the conclusion drawn
concerning Paul's outlook, then we may ask: "Is there in fact
any point at which Seneca and Paul are at one? Is there any¬
thing in common between the two of them, on ground of which they
could be compared?" In anthropological terms the question is:
"Ed Paul and Seneca talk of the same man, the same reality and the
1. Ep. 83.2; Cf. Ep. 41.1-2; 73.1t>; 87.21.
2. Ep. 76.32; Cf. Ep. 92.30.
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same problem?" The answer is "Yes!" They do talk of the same
man with the same problem and in the same situation. However,
where they differ is in their answers to this problem. To put it
bluntly Paul and Seneca, while treating the same anthropological
problem, have offered diametrically opposed answers. Approaching
the problem from the strictly anthropological point of view the
problem can be stated this way: The task of anthropology is an
enquiry into man's search-for-identity (see p. 21), and this search-
for-identity is precisely that which constitutes the reality of an
actual man. This actual man is the subject of Paul's and
Seneca's anthropological discourses.
Now, the reality of an actual man is nothing but "the
desire to be." In other words "the best way to conceive of the
fundamental project of human reality is to say that man is the
being whose project is to be God...Or if you prefer, man funda-
2
mentally is the desire to be God." Accepting that both, Paul and
Seneca, have conceived reality in these terms and considered it
objectively it will become clear in what respect they have differed.
It will also become apparent why we have chosen the terminology of
movement for stating their respective anthropologies. Interpreters
have maintained that:
"The Israelites like all other ancient peoples were 'outer-
directed' and did not dissect their psychic life as modern
man does. In that sense, even to the Hebrew, 'being' was
something objective which existed independently of him and
stood fast."3
1. BN, p. 565.
2. BN, p. 560.
3- Boman, op.cit., p. 45.
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This argument transferred into the sphere of Pauline anthropology,
insofar as Paul is an Israelite, maintains that:
"Paul has contacts with Judaism in not considering man in
an objective sense, with a view to what he is in himself.
Man is seen a priori in the circumstances in which he
exists, primarily in the relationship of the creature to
the creator and to the created world.
2
The first thing said about man in the story of creation, is that
he is made in the image of God,-'5 so that "the imago dei idea is,
consequently, no secondary and peripheral detail, but it is a
4
zenith in Old Testament theology and anthropology." At the same
time it is claimed that "for the New Testament, however, we can
claim that, like the doctrine of Creation, it is a natural pre-
5
supposition."-^ In fact if one takes a close look at the anthro¬
pology of the "image", eCxt-sv, in the New Testament, one will
notice that, significantly, it is only Paul, of all the New
Testament writers, who has that type of anthropology. And, Paul
said expressly that man is the image of God and not as KSsemann
argues that:
"The apostle - unlike Judaism in general - never expressed
the view that man remained in the image of God, even after
the fall. Imago dei is for him Christ and Christ alone;
it is he who, with the membership of his body, restores to
believers, and to them only, the lost divine image which
was once the stamp of created being.""
1. Conzelmann, op.cit., p. 45.
2. That every man is an image of God can be inferred from Gen. 5.3»
where it is said that "Adam lived an hundred and thirty years,
and begat a son in his own likeness, after his image."
3. Gen. 1. 26-27; 9.6; Cf. Brunner, op.cit., p. 102.
4. Soman, op.cit., p. 112.
5. Brunner, op.cit., p. 499.
b. E. Kasemann, Perspectives on Paul, London, 1971, p. 22.
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To our understanding Paul was an entirely orthodox Jew in his
usage of the concept of the image of God in man. Erunner here, as
opposed to Kasemann, is Justified in his presupposition, for Paul
wrote:
dvhp u£v y&P o6x dcfteCAet xaxaxaXGrtxeadal x?jv xs<paXfiv,
etx&v xat 65Ea OcoO &u&px<tfv (1 Cor. 11. 7).
Then Paul almost in a direct way states this doctrine when he says:
4?ed6ecK>e etc dAAAXouc, dnex5uody.evoi xhv naAathv
dvdpomov cxbv xatTc Ttpdgecav adxoO, xat fevSuaAuevov xfcv v£ov
This pericope is talking directly of the concept of image in the
Old Testament, and, not to he overlooked, Paul does not use the
word de6c but xxlaxqs * Creator. It is not by chance that he
does that for the anthropology is inseparable from the theology of
creation. Furthermore Paul has directly referred to Christ as
the image of God. Thus he talks of: xfcv pa>xtoy5v xoO
2
eOaYYeAfou xffc toO XptaxoO, 5c fiaxwv etx&v xo(5 6eo0.
and then on another occasion Paul talks of Christ as being:
So apart from the two directly anthropological statements, here we
have two Christological statements. The relevance of these
Christological statements for Paul's anthropology is obvious from
1. Col. 3.9-10.
2. 2 Cor. 4.4.
3. Col. 1.15.
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I Cor. 15.49 where Paul says:
xat Kadwc £cpop£cxauev xfjv eCxdva xoO xoTxoO,1
2
cpop£aouev xat xt^v etx6va xoO fiuoupavCou.
An argument, therefore, would he: we as men are in the image of
Adam, and in the age of salvation shall he in the image of Christ.
Now, since Christ is an image of God, man heing an image of Christ
is immediately an image of God. Here Kasemann is right.
We have therefore every reason to take for granted that
Paul was fully acquainted with the anthropology of image, and that
the concept of image in his anthropology is of the same meaning as,
and deeply rooted in, the concept of the image in the Old Testament.
But now we are faced with the problem of how to define this concept.
The meaning of image is defined hy Brunner in this way:
"'Created in His Image, in His Likeness' is a parable,
hence its meaning does not lie on the surface. First of
all, it says that the nature of man - in his origin or in
general - is nothing in itself, and that it is not
intelligible from itself, but that its ground of existence
and of knowledge is in God. If we understand this phrase
in the light of the specifically New Testament doctrine, we
would do well to understand 'image' in the sense of
reflexion, that is, as an existence which points back or
refers back to something else."5
In the light of this definition we are to understand the arguments
of Boman and Conzelmann (see pp. 49-50), and at this point we can
define what is understood by our argument that the movement typical
of Paul's anthropology is "centrifugal" and that man's nature is
"ec-static."
1. I.e. Adam=man.
2. I.e. Christ=new man.
3. Brunner, op.cit., p. 96.
53
The centrifugal movement egresses the fact, that,
according to St. Paul, man is fully man, and is one with himself,
when he sees himself in relation to the Other. In Heidegger's
terms "man's nature is to be found by looking away from man.
Equally important, the argument that man's nature is ec-static
states the fact that man does not have an authentic existence.
Man's identity lies not within himself but outside of himself,
i.e. the reality of man is not actual but potential, constituted
by the reality of relationship; in other v/ords "the being of human
2
reality is originally not a substance but lived relation."
And the polarities which relate one to another, as to make a
relationship objective, are the polarities of Creator-creature,
i.e. man's creatureliness implies "that man does not appear
isolated, as being in himself, but is involved in already existing
relationships. To put it in an exaggerated way: I am my
relationship to God,or even better: "man's relation to God is
not something which is added to his human nature; it is the core
and the ground of his humanitas.t|Zf That means that man's centre
is outside of himself, i.e. man is man insofar as he is able to
relate to the Other. This centrifugal movement which constitutes
man's ec-static nature is implied by the very fact that man is
5
creature. Man who is in Paul thought of as an unit, is under-
1. Heidegger, Discourse on Thinking, p. 56.
2. BN, p. 575.
3- Conzelmann, op.cit., p. 193.
4. Brunner, op.cit., p. 94.
5. See: Sevenster, op.cit., pp. 66, 78; Scroggs, op.cit., pp. 60-
61; Bchreiner, op.cit., pp. 69-70, 81; de Zwaan, op.cit.,
p. 577; Arnold, op.cit., pp. 419-20.
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stood under the concept of aGpa i.e. "man, his person as a
2
whole can be denoted as soma." If the man, denoted by offipa in
Paul's thought, is essentially a relationship - being at the same
time a creature - then he is a relationship to the Other,
objectively distinct from himself, i.e. being a creature he is
a relationship to the Creator. Bultraann has argued that man is
aSSpa in the sense of being able to make "himself the object of
his own action,i.e. he is in relation to himself. But this
interpretation of Bultmann, which is based on Heidegger's philosophy,
has been sharply criticised by Buber. "One can," says Buber,
"stretch out one's hands to one's image or reflection in a mirror,
but not to one's real self.Man is not relationship to himself
but to the Other, because, as Buber argues, the relationship to
5
one's own self arises from Nietzsche's saying that "God is dead.
Hence what is implied in this concept of a<3pa (=*creatureliness)
is man in his capacity to relate to the Other,J so that "cr3pa
7
stands for man, in the solidarity of creation, as made for God."
On account of this understanding of man as aopa , who is related
1. TNT, i, p. 194; Stacey, op.cit., p. 190; Sevenster, op.cit.,
p. 76; Cf. Rom. 6.12-19; I Cor. 6.15; 7.4; 9.27; 12.27; 13.3;
2 Cor. 4.10; Gal. 6,17.
2. TNT, i, pp. 195-96.
3. Ibid., p. 195.
4. M. buber, Between Man and Han, Collins, 1971, p. 204.
5. Ibid., p. 203; Cf. F. Nietzsche, Die frShliche Wissenschaft,
Frag. 125, 343.
6. J.A.T. Robinson, The Body. London, 1963, p. 16.
7. Ibid., p. 31.
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to the Other, Paul is to be regarded as essentially within the
Hebrew tradition since "the implication of 'the body' for Hebrew,
as opposed to Greek and later Western, thinking is one of solidar¬
ity, not of individuation.1,1 Thus we can say that Paul has en¬
visaged man as a relationship to the Other, objectively different
from himself. This Other is God who is Creator, for only He stands
as "wholly other" over against man who is the creature. In other
words the actual reality of man is that which constitutes his re¬
lationship to the Other on the planes Creator-creature, God-raan.
This reality is an event which occurs within the sphere of infinite
qualitative difference between the two.
Pauline man is man whose "I", whose ego, is not an actual
but a potential one precisely because that "I" is the reflection
of the objective reality of the Other. Man has his "I" insofar as
he is willing and is able to recognise the "Thou" of the Other.
In theological language this is to say that man is true man when
he recognises and realizes his self through the recognition of the
Other, God the Creator, as ultimately different from himself.
Hence my "I" is not rooted in me myself, but is outside of myself,
in the objective reality of the Other. "His (man's) continuity
and identity also rest outside himself, in his participation in
the heavenly world and in his communication with the Word of his
2
creator." This is exactly the meaning of man's being an image.
1. Ibid., p. 78.
2. Kaseniann, op.cit., p. 27.
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As soon as the Other, as an objective reality, in whose image man
is, is removed, man perishes, because he ceases to be an image of
the Other, and becomes an image of nothingness.
On this basis we have to consider the Pauline term dtxatooAvn
as an anthropological term. Paxil writes: fix«v ftpijv AuxcuooAvriv
t?W £x v6uou, AAA& x?W 6u3l Ttfaxeoe XpiaxoO, x?|v ftx OeoO SixatoaAvqv*
Righteousness stands here for the concept of man's identity,
indicating that man has no authentic existence, in the sense that
his centre is not within but outside of himself. He (man) neither
is the source of his existence nor does he belong to himself, he
belongs altogether to the Other, to God.1 Thus Bultmann is
correct in identifying righteousness, as being a Judaistic concept,
with authentic existence:
"And he (Paul) fully agrees with Judaism in understanding
this authenticity as 'righteousness*...As for Judaism,
'righteousness' for Paul is primarily a forensic and
eschatologieal concept, i.e. it does not mean, first of
all, man's moral uprightness, a human quality, but rather
the position that he has in his relations with and before
others, and pre-eminently before God in the judgment. His
righteousness is his 'acceptance* which is granted to him
by others and especially by God. Paul entirely agrees
with Judaism that man can finally receive this acceptance
only from God in the last judgment."2
It would not be an exaggeration to say that every verse where Paul
1. oAfiele y&P ^luwv fcaux$ £5, xat o6&etc £auxij> ArcoSviJoxe«.. feAv xe yap
£Spev, x$ xuptv CSpev, 6Av xe Anodv^crxaixev, x$ xupCcp AnoQv^axouev.
£Av xe oov ftAv xe AnoSviJaxouev, xo(J xupCou £au£v. (Rom. 14. If).
2. EF, p. 161.
* Phil. 3. 9.
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talks ofSLxaLooflvn is anthropological,1 but especially obvious
are those places where the concept ofStxaiootivn is related to
the concept of Thus Paul, being fully Old Testamental
about the concept of the image of God in man, relates this concept
entirely to the concept of6^E;ct calling iaanetx&v xat deoO.2
i.e. man is not only an image in the sense that he is nothing in
himself, but more than that, he has to remain a proper image in the
sense that it has to reflect itself always in the Other, which
Paul expresses through the verb5°£^C". By this Paul simply
means that man has to recognise his ultimate creatureliness over
against God as creator who is of an infinite qualitative distinction.
For that reason Paul insists on man's glorifying God.^ Thus Paul
emphasizes that: ^ StaxovCa xoO Ttveduaxoc Saxai tv 56£yi
arguing that: nepicrcreGet. 6taxovCa xffs 6txatoa$vr)£ 6o£t|4
Translated in anthropological terms this means that insofar as
1. Here Prof. ^Anderson has remarked "Every verse where Paul talks
of 6ixawoo£vri is anthropological? What of Romans 10:3? God's
righteousness!" hut this is precisely to justify the saying
that an example of an exception proves the rule, therefore see:
Rom. 1.17; 3-5, 21-22, 25-26; 4.3, 5-6, 9, 11-13, 22; 5.17, 21;
6.13, 16, 18-20; Q.10; 9. 30-31; 10. 3-10; 14. 17; I Cor.
1.30; 2 Cor. 3.9; 5.21; o.7, 14; 9. 9-10; 11.15; Gal. 2.21;
3.6, 21; 5.5; Eph. 4.24; 5.9; 6.14; Phil. 1.11; 3.^,9;
1 Tim. 6.11; 2 Tim. 2.22; 3.1o; 4.8; Tit. 3-5.
2. I Cor. 11.7.
3. Rom. 1.21; 15.6, 9; I Cor. b.20; 2 Cor. 9.13; Gal. 1.24;
2 Thess. 3»1.
4. 2 Cor. 3.9.
SixatocrflvTi is authentic existence - which is outside of man - the
6<5£a is the concept which describes the presence of that authentic
existence in a particular way. That "particular" way is nothing
else but an acceptance of the Other, realization and recognition
of the difference between the two, i.e. to glorify God = to
recognize the Other, means to be at one with oneself, means to
realize that man's actuality is potential, and to be actualized or
realized means to accept one's potentiality, i.e. to become an
image in the true sense. For this reason Paul has heavily stressed
the difference between man and God by saying:
Y ivfiaOo) 65 6 deck: n&s dvdpomoc ipeftaxnc,
xaS&Ttep YfiypctxTat" Sneoc fiv 5txauod$S rote
Adyotc crou xat vtxfiaeus £v MpCveaOaC oe.1
Thus the reality of true man is acceptance of the fact that he is
not the source of his own existence, that he is not his own creator
and that he is not an ultimate One, but is confronted by the Other,
i.e. he is not alone but is in relationship, and as long as he is
in that sphere of existence he is a true man. Man ceases to be a
man when he ceases to recognize the Other, and wants to actualize
his potential self by, and from, himself. For this reason Paul
insists on the weakness of man, and what sounds so paradoxical, he
insists that man is strongest when he is weak, for he is true man
when realizing that he rests on a foundation, and that his source
of existence is outside of himself:
1. Rom. 3.4; Cf. Ps. 116.11.
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fl yotp SdvautQ fev AodcveCqi xeXeCxat.1
2
5xav y&P AadevS, x<5xe 6uvax6c etvu.
xaCpouev Yap 5xav ?iugCq Aadevd5uev ,3
. 4
x6 Aadev&s xoO OeoO toxupdxepov xc3v avOpasajv.
5
x& dadevff xoO xdcruou ££eX££axo 6 dedg
Thus in Schoeps's own words:
"In his very weakness he (man) recognizes God's almighty
power, in the realization of his creatureliness he receives
the truth and dignity of his being, he is able to be the
Creator's creature...
The argument could not be more plain. It is obvious that Paul's
emphasis was on man's need to realize that he has no capacity to
sustain his own existence, to know God in the sense of explaining
his (man's) own existence. He is basically confined to the
reality of potential, and not actualized existence, hence to be
himself he must accept the Other, for it is exactly in the Other
that his existence is based. Thus Schoeps has even less right
to accuse Paul of having blurred the demarcation line between God
and man, and thus automatically having become Hellenized.
If we look at Seneca's writings we shall soon realize that
as regards man's relationship to God there is very little in
common between him and Paul. There where Paul has seen man and
1. 2 Cor. 12.9.
2. Ibid., 12.10.
3. Ibid., 13.9.
4. I Cor. 1.25.
5. Ibid., 1.27.
6. Schoeps, op.cit., p. 292.
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God related to each other on the plane Creator-creature, I-Other,
Seneca, on the contrary, has seen it as an affinity in the manner
of being. As we have shown earlier in the chapter, in Seneca's
thought man and God are qualitatively identical. Sometimes this
is expressed in popular mythological language, and sometimes in a
philosophical form.
If we remember for the moment an analysis of Seneca's 5Sth
letter which has dealt with the problem of being (see pp. 34ff.)
we shall note that he had subsumed the "corporalia" under "quod est"
i.e. God. If we now turn to the letter 106 we read in paragraphs
4-5:
"Bonura facit: prodest enim. Quod facit, corpus est.
Bonum agitat animum et quodammodo format et continet,
quae propria sunt corporis. Quae corporis bona sunt,
corpora sunt; ergo et quae animi sunt. Nam et hoc corpus
est. Bonum hominis necesse est corpus sit, cum ipse sit
corporalis."
When we relate these two arguments to each other what comes out as
a result is this: "animus humanus" is "corpus", "corpus" is "quod
est", "quod est" is "deus" hence "animus humanus" is "deus".
Therefore what is plain is that there is no dimension of qualitative
difference which could be classified under the concept of a
"restriction on the approach." There is no distance as a category
of relationship between the two who are "wholly other" to each
other. A demarcation line has not only been blurred but entirely
wiped out. The whole perspective of human reality and human being
has been shifted from the plane of "outside" to the plane of
"inside". The "otherness" of human reality has been made an
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"identity". True man, in his true humanity, is not envisaged as
a potential being but precisely the opposite, a true man is a
concrete actuality. This is the absolute and definite difference
between the Pauline and the Senecan view of man. In the following
pages we shall see how it is that we can describe Seneca's view of
man as a centripetal movement and human nature as introspective.
After we have established that by purely philosophical and
metaphysical speculation Seneca has identified the human spirit or
soul"*" with God, we shall see that he sometimes expresses this
concept in popular terms. Thus for example:
"sic animus magnus^ac sacer et in hoc demissus, ut propius
divina nossemus,"
^5
"Omnes, si ad originem primam revocantur, a dis sunt."-^
"divinorum una natura est. Ratio autera nihil aliud est
quam in corpus humanum pars divini spiritus rnersa. "4
"Deus ad homines venit, immo quod est propius, in homines
venit; nulla sine deo mens bona est. Semina in corporibus
humanis divina dispersa sunt."5
"Ideo vir magnus ac prudens animum diducit a corpore et
multum cum meliore ac divlna parte versatur,"b
7
"Tunc animus noster....Sursum ilium vocant initia sua."
1. He uses different terms on different occasions like: anima, mens,
animus, ratio, summuin bonum, virtus and melior pars, meaning








"Animum quidem eius in caelum, ex quo erat, redisse
persuadeo mihi,"l
"Nemo inprobe eo conatur ascendere, unde descenderat.
Quid est autem cur non existimes in eo divini aliquid
existere, qui dei pars est."2
"Habebat perfeeturn animum et ad summaa sui adductum, supra
quara nihil est nisi mens dei, ex quo pars et in hoc pectus
raortale defluxit. Quod numquam magis divinum est, quarn
ubimortalitatem suam cogitat et scit in hoc natum hominem,
ut vita defungeretur,"3
"I nunc et humanum animus ex isdera, quibus divina constant,
seminibus compositum moleste ferre transitum ac migrationem
puta, cum dei natura adsidua et citatissima commutatione vel
delectet se vel conserve!.
"Quidquid optimum homini est, id extra humanam potentiam
iacet, nec dari nec eripi potest. Mundus hie, quo nihil
neque maius neque ornatius rerum natura genuit, et animus
contemplator admiratorque mundi, pars eius magnificentissima,
propria nobis et perpetua,-et tam diu nobiscum mansura sunt,
quam diu ipsi maneblmus."
"Animus quidem^-ipse sacer et aeternus est et cui non possit
inici manus."
What we can see from the above passages is that essential human
nature is identical with the divine nature, on the basis of which
we cannot entertain any thought of the relationship in terms cf
qualitative differences. What was typical of Paul, a qualitative
distinction and distance between God and man, has disappeared in
Seneca's writings. Pauline metaphorical language, describing man
as being an image of God, cannot be employed by Seneca for the
1. Ep. 86.1.
2. Ep. 92.30 (see par. 31).
3. Ep. 120.14.
4. Ad Helv. 6.8.
5. Ibid., 8.4.
6. Ad Helv. 11.7; cf. N.Q., i, Praef., 12; De Ben., ili, 28.1-3.
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simple reason that the relation of an image to its object has been
replaced by the identification of the two. Man and God are
identical. However, the movement of the reality of man in
Seneca*s anthropology has remained. In Paul the movement has been
classified as a centrifugal one, because man is related to the
Other who is different from, and is outside of, himself. Seneca*s
movement is a centripetal one, because man is identical to him¬
self in his actual reality. He is being-in-hinself. Seneca
himself argues that man is a moving reality:
"Quemadmodum flamma surgit in rectum, iacere ac deprimi non
potest, non magis quam quiescere; ita noster animus in motu
est, eo mobilior et actuosior, quo vehementior fuerit."1
2
"Nature enim humanus animus agilis est et pronus ad motus."
"Invenio qui dicant inesse naturalem quandam irritationem
animis commutandi sedes et transferend±-,domicilia; mobilis
enim et inquieta homini mens data est,"-5
Anthropologically speaking to define the nature of this movement,
which Seneca alleges to be proper to man, would be actually to
define man himself. If we gather some of the basic data which
were discussed so far then it will be possible to proceed.
First we saw that man and God are identical by their
Ll
affinity in manner of being. Secondly, on account of this affinity
1. Ep. 39.3.
2. Be Tranq. An. 2.11.
3. Ad Helv. 6.6.
4. "...inter bonos viros ac deos amicitia est conciliante virtute.
Amicitiam dico? Immo etiam necessitudo et similitudo, quoniam
quidem bonus tempore tantum a deo differt," De Provid. 1.5.
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man is himself capable of knowing God. Thirdly, knowing something
means possessing it, that is being its ultimate source of existence.
This problem, which was discussed in Seneca's usage of Yvtodi
crauxdv maxim, is now developed in the other, but similar, aspect
of Seneca's anthropology. Earlier in the thesis we have ruled
out that Seneca's view of the world and man should be regarded as
a static view, but we shall agree with, and insist on, the argu¬
ment that Seneca's view of man is the view of an "in sich
geschlossenen Kosmos.,,x In Seneca's view man is not a static but
kinetic reality, and yet, that reality is to be actualised and
perfected in itself and by itself to the point of self-sufficiency,
2
which is a corner-stone of Seneca's anthropology, in the sense
3
that "I apprehend myself as the original source of my possibility."^
Seneca insisted upon man's being able by himself to be that which
he wants to be, believing in human capacity. The primary task
of man, in Seneca's view, is man's finding himself in himself,
which is within his concrete existence and within his grasp:
4
"Quicquid facere te potest bonum, tecum est."
By having said this Seneca has immediately made it clear that his
view of man is of man as an actuality and not a potentiality, i.e.
1. Niederwimmer, op.cit., p. 79.
2. Epp. 9.1, 3-5, 8, 12-19; 59.8, 14; 71.26; 73-14; 74.30;
76.35; 85.37-41; 91.2, 4; 120.12-13, 18; De Const. Sap. 2.1;
5.4-7; 6.1-8; 8.3; 9.1; 15.3; De Tranq. An. 13.3; De Provid.
2.1-2.
3. BN» P« 41*
4. Ep. 80.3.
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man is not likeness in the sense of a relationship to the object
of which he is the likeness, but rather he is an object of his
own likeness. He is the end and the source of his own existence.
Man's foundation is within, himself and the outside reality is not
a part of himself. In his own words:
"Quid sapiens investigaverit, quid in lucem protraxerit,
quaeris? Primum verum naturamque, quam non ut cetera
animalia oculis secutus est tardis ad divina. Deinde vitae
legem, quam ad universa derexit, nec nosse tantum sed sequi
deos docuit et accidentia non aliter excipere quam imperata.
Vetuit parere opinionibus falsis et quanti quidque esset,
vera aestimatione perpendit. Damnavit mixtas paenitentia
voluptates et bona semper placitura laudavit et palam fecit
felicissimum esse cui felicitate-,non opus est, potentissimum
esse qui se habet in potestate."
2
"Imperare sibi maximum iraperium est."
"Guem magis admiraberis, quam qui iraperat sibi, quam qui se
habet in potestate?"3
;,innumerabiles sunt qui populos,/qui urbes habuerunt in
potestate; paucissimi qui se."
And this was rightly interpreted:
"Das Erste, was nach Seneca nothig ist, ist die Selbst-
emancipation des Einzelnen von jener allgemeinen geistigen
Fremdherrschaft."5
It seems that self-knowledge and self-command are fully identical,
since they both are talking of one and the same thing. The one
talks of man's divine self and man's recognizing it, and the
other talks of the nature and meaning of that divine self in man.
1. Ep. 90.34.
2. Ep. 113.31.
3. De Ben. v, 7.5.
4. E.G., iii, Praef., 10.
5. Baumgarten, op.cit., p. 73.
Man, according to this theory of Seneca, is the ultimate being
who disposes of himself fully and the whole of existence is
identical with himself. In terms of movement this is to say that
man is a being who has the capacity of searching into an external
reality, which is objectively different from himself, giving it
thus an existence, and becoming a source of the whole of existence.
For this reason eneca emphasizes the importance of knowing and
possessing one's own self, for it is the only objective reality
that Seneca advocates. And this begs a question about the Other.
Who or what is the Other, and what is man's position regarding the
Other? As far as Seneca is concerned, the Other is the one who is
not in, who is not within myself. If we apply this to the basic
data of Seneca's anthropology, - namely that man is a source of
his own self, that he is divine and consequently that he is a
source of the whole of reality, - then as far as the Other is
concerned we can say that:
"I can not consider the look which the Other directs on
me as one of the possible manifestations of his objective
being; the Other cannot look at me...since I am precisely
the one by whom there is. world; that is, the-, one who on
principle can not be an object for himself."
To put it in more concrete terms, this is to say:
"If there is an Other, whatever or whoever he may be, what¬
ever may be his relations with me, and without his acting
upon me in any way except by the pure upsurge of his being -
then I lave an outside, I have aniature. My original fall
is the existence of the Other."
This is exactly the meaning of Seneca's teaching on the self-
1. BN, p. 257.
2. Ibid., p. 263-
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sufficiency of man, the core of his anthropology. Man, in
Seneca*s view, is primarily the being who should be, or even is,
an actual and not a potential being. Potentiality implies the
recognition of the Other, an acceptance of objectively external
reality, different from myself, by the being of which my identity
is realized, i.e. human reality is the potentiality lived in a
manner of relationship between the two, between the I and the
Other. However, for Seneca "human reality is the desire of
being-in-itself.If we translate this in terms of movement
that means that a centripetal movement of man is his effort and
an attempt to transcend his potentiality, to actualize the desire
of being-in-itself. But, as we have seen, that is impossible
as long as there is an objective Other outside of myself. Hence
my attempt to actualize myself comes from the presence of the
Other, in other words "my project of recovering myself is
2
fundamentally a project of absorbing the Other." The Other is
a threat to one*s existence by his very presence, just because he
testifies to the existence which does not spring out of the one.
For that reason man has to eliminate the Other, since only by
becoming an ultimate one can man be authentic. By being ultimate
man's identity is identical to himself, i.e. man becomes an actual,
authentic, self-sufficient being instead of what he In reality is:
a potential, unauthentic, depending-on-the-Other, being. From
this basic belief of Seneca spring both his humanism and his
1. Ibid., pp. 565-66.
2. BN, p. 364.
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anthropocentrism. The basic means for achieving this task of
human reality Seneca has regarded to be man* s capacity for know¬
ledge and knov/ing things human and divine. The point which Paul
has criticized Seneca has defended. Both, Seneca and Paul, knew
the truthfulness of Nietzsche's saying that "Wo der Baum der
Erkenntnis steht, ist immer das Paradies."1 Knov/ing the reality
of this they have interpreted it in entirely different ways. Paul
insisted on the creatureliness and weakness of man. He is
2
spitefully asking otyjt fin&pavev 6 Oebc xtjv oocpCav xoO KoayoUy
giving it a shattering blow by saying that ao^a TO° *6auou xoOxoo
3
ua>pCa uapS. x§ £cmv. On the other hand Seneca insists
that "Capax est noster animus,"^ seeing in philosophy an answer to
the question of man's identity. "Hoc enim est, quod mihi philoso-
phia promittit, ut parern deo faciat. Ad hoc invitatus sum, ad hoc
5
veni; fidem praesta.""^ If we thus see the approaches to the
problem of man in Paul and Seneca we notice that:
"What once seemed to be the highest privilege of man
proves to be his peril and temptation; what appeared as
his pride becomes his deepest humiliation. The Stoic
precept that man lias to obey and revere his inner principle
the 'demon' v/ithin himself, is now regarded as dangerous
idolatry." °
1. F. Nietzsche, Jenseits von Gut und Bose, Fr. 152.
2. I Cor. 1.20.
3. I Cor. 3.19.
4. Ep. 92.30.
5. Ep. 48.11.
6. E. Cassirer, An Essay on Man, New York, London, Toronto, 1970,
p.11.
u9
And this problem of idolatry brings us ultimately back to the
question of man. As it was said that, "man creates his idol in
his own image,"1 so it was rightly said that in the Stoic philosophy
"the living God in human shape had taken the place of the god made
2
of stone or gold or ivory." This is exactly the situation of
Seneca's philosophy. Man is God, because he knows God and "to
be known directly is the characteristic mark of an idol.
(Kierkegaard)
Considering this, it would be fair to describe Paul as an
apophatic thinker in the sense that: "If in seeing God one can know
what one sees, then one has not seen God Himself but something
intelligible, something which is inferior to Him. It is by unknowing
(dyvoaia ) that one may know Him who is above every possible
object of knowledge. "/+ As opposed to Paul's theology stands
Seneca's theology, which is "'cataphatic' or affirmative theology,
5
the theology of 'divine names'," which is based on the human
reason and intellect, thus wiping out the qualitative difference
between man and God.
1. Brunner, op.cit., p. 187.
2. L. Edelstein, The Meaning of Stoicism, Cambridge, Mass., 1966,
p.14. *
3. Zahrnt, op.cit., p. 28.
4. V. Lossky, The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church.
Cambridge & London, 1968, p. 25.
5. Ibid., p. 39.
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MAN AND WORLD
Man is in the world, and to talk about the world means to
talk about man. It is so for two reasons: firstly because man
is in the world and cannot escape it, and secondly, the world is
spoken of, - as anything else can be spoken of, - from, and solely
from! man's point of view. Ultimately the question of the world
is the question of man. But, more than that, we have to reckon
with the fact that man is not only homo, but man is homo religiosus,
therefore: to talk of the world means to talk of God.
Man's dealings with the world, in the last resort, are
nothing else but attempts to answer an ultimate question: the
problem of man's identity. In this respect anything that man
does and undertakes can be regarded as the tool for the arriving
at the point of answering the real question: man, hence:
"Anthropology must then eo ipso be cosmology just as
certainly as, conversely, the cosmos is primarily viewed
by Paul under an anthropological aspect, because the
fate of the world is in fact decided in the human
sphere.
Man can deal with the world only through the means of his perceptive
capacities, i.e. man cannot postulate anything about the world
which is not given through the objective data which are subject to
man's research. On the basis of analysis and the systematizing
of these data it is possible for man to postulate the facts and
realities which otherwise are not directly palpable and self-
1. Kasemann, op.cit., p. 23»
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evident to human experience. In short the knowledge of God and
knowledge of the world are inseparably related to each other,
and both ultimately bear anthropological relevance. In Rom.
l.lSff. Paul gives a short exposition of his view on the problem
of knowledge of the world and God:
t6 yvwot&v xoO deoO tpavep6v fiaxtv £v aOxote. & 3e&e Y&p cx&xoEe
£cav£paaev. x& y&P &<5paxa adxoO &n& xxCaeoss xdauou xoCc
noii^Vtaau vood?;eva xaOopflxat (w. 19-20) .
This particular part of Paul's letter to the Romans has been often
labelled Stoic in its structure of thought and argument. Schoeps,1
however, has pointed out that this is not necessarily the case,
finding the Judaistic background for this (see p.27). Along the
same lines Pofalenz has argued:
"Die Worte xb Yvoxrxdv xcO deoO » die doch voraussetzen
dass Gott in seinem innersten Wesen unfassbar bleibt,
werden nicht aus der stoiechen Philosophie sondern nur
aus der jQdischen, platonisch beeinflussten Gedankenwelt
verstSndlich."2
The emphasis should not, however, be put upon the source and back¬
ground, but on the meaning and the implications of this argument
of Paul.The importance of the concept, whatever its source may be,
is not in its origin and background, but in its content and impli¬
cations. Thus Bultmann interprets this passage:
"Man* s being in relation to God is primarily a being
claimed by God as the Creator. When Paul makes use of
the Stoic theory of a natural knowledge of God (Rom.
1.20ff), it does not serve him in order to conclude to
God* s being in the world and to the divinity of the world
1. Schoeps, op.cit., p. 224.
2. Pohlenz, Paulus und die Stoa. p. 7.
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and the security of man by reason of divine providence,
but rather in order to conclude to God's being beyond
the world, to the world's creatureliness and to God's
claim to be honoured by man.-. Correspondingly, 'world'
for Paul means 'creation'."
Hence, what immediately becomes clear is that the world and man,
2
each being a creation, are qualitatively identical, and as such
they stand over against God as Creator with a gap of an infinite
qualitative difference between them. Just as the word xdayog
denotes the concept of creation in Paul's theology the same has
been said about the word cpiteue:
"Die alttestamentliche 'Weltanschauung' der grossen FQhrer
Israels kennt keine 'Natur' als Offenbarung Gottes: was wir
Natur nennen, ist fQr sie recht eigentlich die StStte des
Wunders, und das Wunder 1st folglich die eigentlich offen-
barende Betatigung Gottes. Wo Paulus somit am meisten als
Grieche erscheinen konnte, namlich, wo er im Begriffe zu
sein scheint, Weltanschauung und Gottesanschauung inein-
anderzuschieben, tut er dies geradezu nicht."3
As far as Paul's understanding of the world in epistemological terms
is concerned it is of importance to reckon with the fact that
Paul's language is highly mythological and anthropomorphic. And
this has an anthropological relevance:
1. EF, p. 151; cf. I Cor. 3.22.
2. See how logically Paul argues in Rom. 1.23 saying that heathens
fJXAaj-av ttW 66?>av xoO dsddpxou OeoO fev 6y.oidy.aTi etxovoc cpoapxoO
Avdo&uou anh concludes in v. 25: xSu fiAdxpeuaav xS xxCaet
Ttapd x6v xxtaavxa. Therefore, as God and man stand over
against each other in qualitative distinction, so do the world
and man stand together in solidarity of their creatureliness,
which makes them qualitatively identical.
3. de Zwaan, op.cit., p. 543.
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"...Paulus hat so gedacht, dass es ihm unschwer war, die
Welt als nicht Gotthaft und doch als gottgewirkt zu sehen.
Diese gottgewirkte Welt hat er als dreistufige gesehen, und
das 1st nicht ohne Belang fQr seine Anschauung vom
Menschen..." 1
This three-storied view of the world of Paul has been recognized
2
by BShlig as well, but he argues that it is not Judaistic in
origin.^ And indeed Paul talks of the world in terms of o&pavde,4
r tS
yfi , Haxax^vtov , as if these were three different strata of
the cosmic order in spatial terms. But when confronted with this
sort of language one must not forget that:
"Die paulinische Weltanschauung kennt also nicht einen
Weltprozess, sondem die Welt, auch was wir mit den
Griechen Natur nennen, wird gesehen als Ort der geschicht-
lichen Betatigung eines gBttlichen Willens."7
Hence, what we discover in Paul's language is the fact that he
O
"changes space into time, the substantial into the historical."
Paul is not primarily interested in the world itself, but in the
man who is in the world. Therefore we have always to consider
his statements about the world as anthropological and theological
statements. World in itself has no history and its historicity
1. Ibid., p. 556.
2. Tarsos, pp.# 64ff; cf. Preller, op.cit., p. 69; Urchristentum.
p. 466; Kasemann, op.cit., p. 23-
3* Tarsos. p. 86.
4. Rom. 1.18; 10.6; I Cor. 8.5; 15.47; 2 Cor. 5.1-2; 12.2;
Gal. 1.8; Eph. 1.10; 3.1; 4.10; 6.9; Phil. 3.20; Col. 1.5,
20, 23; 4.1; I Thess. 1.10; 4.16; 2 Thess. 1.7.
5. Rom. 9.28; I Cor. 8.5; Eph. 1.10; 3.15; 4.9; 6.3; Col. 1.16,
20; 3-2,5.
o. Phil. 2.10; Eph. 4.9.
7. de Zwaan, op.cit., p. 543.
8. Scroggs, op.cit., p. 60.
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is given to it only through the reality of man's dealing with the
world, hence man's being in the world and his dealing with the
world is nothing else but that which constitutes man as a
historical being. Ultimately, there is no history apart from
human history. Therefore, insofar as Paul is interested in the
world he is interested in it as the place of man's being histori¬
cal, and not as a natural phenomenon. The historicity of man is
inaugurated and determined by that which is called in theological
language a "fall". Adam is not a historical figure in the sense
that he can be singled out as a particular person and an individual,
but he is historical in the sense that he constitutes, or rather
symbolizes what makes every man to be a historical being.
We have already stressed that history is the reality of
man's dealing with his environment, and with his world, in such a
way that human affairs become a cosmic affair, and by being a
cosmic affair it raises theological questions and presuppositions,
and that is Paul's understanding of history:
"Es verdient aber auch Aufmerksamkeit, dass 'Geschichte'
fUr ihn (Paulus) nicht eine rein menschliche Sache gewesen
ist...der Sinn der Geschichte ist namlich der Sinn der
gottlichen killensbetStigung; das Ziel der Geschichte,
das diesem Sinne angemessen sein muss, ist die Absicht
Gottes in seinen Taten. Y/as^der Mensch davon weiss, weiss
er nur durch Offenbarungen."
This definition of Paul's view of history is on its way towards
the true Pauline concept of history, but it leaves the door open
for polarization so that it enables one to suppose that Paul
differentiated between secular and saving history. This view we
1. de Zwaan, op.cit., pp. 570-71.
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reject as false and non-Pauline. Although God has revealed him¬
self to his people, Israel, and the salvation of mankind has come
in Christ, i.e. through Israel, Paul does not indicate anywhere
that God's dealings with the world were not on a cosmic scale,
or that the events outside of Jewish history did not determine
to any extent God's plans for salvation. On the contrary Paul
writes: AnoKaAAirreTat y&P Apy^ GeoO Ati' oApavoO £rct uaaav
&a£(3ecav nat Aglhlgv dvdpdbncjv.1
Undoubtedly, here we cannot understand Israel, as the people of
God, under the word AvOpcauot , but mankind in general. Hence
history in Paul's thought is always considered in its cosmic
dimensions, and Israel's history is part of cosmic history and
conditions it. Another cosmic dimension of Paul's theology, with
an especial anthropological emphasis is Rom. 8.22: oCSupev -{hp
Art Ttaac fi hxCoiq oucrrev&CeL nat auvoSCvet dxp«- "coO vOv.
This is a direct way of saying that man's history is universal,
and that God is concerned with the whole of mankind, through man's
history. If we try to correlate the two passages above what we
see is that the whole world, the universe, or creation - since
these three are identical in Paul - have become the context where
the historicity of man is being revealed. This historical
existence of man, i.e. man's dealing with the world, takes such
a course, as provokes God's response in the form of wrath.
It remains now to be clarified in what sense and in what
particular way the historicity of man is revealed and realized.
1. Rom. 1.18.
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As we have pointed out history is initiated by the fall of Adam
(man) so that it can be said that:
"Ware er (der Mensch) nicht gefallen, so^wilrde er so wenig
wie der Kosmos eine Geschichte haben."
and,
"Dieser Mensch geht in die menschlichepGeschichte ein,
wie sie nach dem Fall geworden ist."
If we try to put the myth of the fall into anthropological language
which is fully historical, i.e. which is part of man's life and
man's being in the world (= being historical), then we can see
that the fall is the present reality of every man. The fall is
-5
every man's desire to 'covet divinity,' to become God and to
achieve an ultimate identity with him, to achieve an authentic
existence by transcending human potentiality and making actual a
trans-human potentiality. At this point we are confronted again
with the basic argument of this thesis: a) that man's nature is
a relationship, and b) that man's project, in his attempt to
assert himself, is to destroy the Other. In other words man is
a potential being, and his aim is - by the means of destruction of
the Other - to become an actual one. The means for realization
of this project is man's capacity for knowledge and comprehension.
If we take a brief look at Gal. 4.3, we read: Smo ra arotxeta
toO ndcnioo fiueda 5e6ouAwu£vot and in verse 9. Paul reproachfully
asks his converts: TtCSc firucrcp^cpeTe u&Atv £tu to. dcrdevfj naX
crrotxeta;
1. de Zwaan, op.cit., p. 577.
2. Baumgarten, op.cit., p. 362.
3. Scroggs, op.cit., p. 90.
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In Colossians 2.3, he warns the Church:
0A£xexe pa tig frySg 5otai 6 au/uxywycSv 6to. xfic ^laoaotptag xctl
nevffc AnAxnc xaxA xfjv napASocrtv xGv Avdpcmov, xaxd. xa axoixeta
xoO xAapoo xal oO xaxfii XptaxAv'
because, Paul argues: AneOAvexe ot>v Xptaxv xcov axotxeCov
xoO xAcruou,1 Kiederwimmer insists that:
"Paulus hat den Dienst der Elemente, die religiSse Scheu
und Verehrung der astralen Machte als Gesetzesdienst
verstanden und von daher beurteilt...Paulus hat sich nicht
direkt mit stoischen Traditionen auseinandergesetzt. In
der Auseinandersetzung mit den gnostisierenden Vorstellungen
von den Weltelementen, - Vorstellungen, bei denen der
stoische Einfluss unverkennbar ist, - ist aber implicit
zugleich auch die Auseinandersetzung mit der philosophischen
Tradition gegeben."2
It cannot be ruled out that Paul here had for his target some of
the Stoic teachings about astral worship. The attitudes and
beliefs with regard to the stars as exercising some sort of
influence on manfs life were features of the Hellenistic world,
and it would be strange to imagine Paul as not being aware of it.
However, whether the "worldly elements" are the astral worship in
the form known in Paul's time or not is of secondary importance.
But emphasis should be laid on the fact that astrology in
itself is a scientific approach to the relation between the stars
and man. Astrology is clearly linked with astronomy, so that
astrological belief about the stars determining man's life is
rooted in, and based on certain astronomical data. Hence,
astrology is not completely devoid of the scientific approach to
life. The basis of astrology is yvwotc.
1. Col. 2.20.
2. Niederwimmer, op.cit., p. 121.
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In anthropological terms, what we are confronted with here
is the problem of the Other. Man's fall was his attempt to break
off from the Other, by introverting into himself. Man has denied
the Other, because the Other was an incarnation of his potentiality
and an obstacle to his actuality.
Since total actualization is authentic existence, realized
in man himself, man has found eternal reality - the Other - a
serious threat to himself. It actually has become the Other to
him and his project now is to dissolve it. So, what man actually
does through the mode of his historical being in the world,
corresponds to the situation which we have described as the search-
foi>-identity. Worship, idolatry, and scientific research are
ultimately one and the same thing. They basically have one and
the same task, to secure man's existence from within, and for,
himself. For that reason any doctrine of God is inconceivable to
Paul, if that doctrine is achieved by scientific means, and thus
Niederwimmer rightly comments:
"Der fixierte Gott ist der GottA den der Mensch (fur sich)
beansprucht. Inn scheinbaren Ruckbezug auf sein gnadiges,
sich offenbarendes. verheissendes V'ort, richtet der Mensch
in Wahrheit seirfe/Gerechtigkeit (Rom. 10,3f.) auf. Der
fixierte Gott ist der Grund der Selbstrechtfertigung, und
das heisst des Versuches, sich aus sich selbst zu
verwirklichen.1,1
Thus a historical man, i.e. a fallen man, is not only involved in
the world but wants to become the source of existence of the world,
since it, the world, in the form of the Other limits him. Through
1. Niederwimmer, op.cit., p. 145.
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scientific research, which had taken a form of idolatry in Paul's
time, - for it was the way of producing a God of which one can
dispose - man is trying to assert himself over against the world,
securing his existence from within, and for, himself. In that
respect it is important that Paul insisted on the concept of dying
with Christ to the worldly elements (Col. 2.20), which, in our
language, means abandoning the deceitful thought that man is the
source of his own existence, that he is an actual being.
A genuine human nature which is to be found in Christ and
consequently in every Christian is an ec-static one, actualized
by the act of acceptance of its limits and potentiality:
ot uvetipaxi deoO Aaxpetiovxes hou nauxc&uevoi fev
XptaxiJ "ItjcjoO nat o6x £v caput Ttertotddxec#
Thus according to Paul living according to Christ and not
according to the worldly elements is being a spiritual man, and
"spirit when it is used of man is that in virtue of which he is
2
open and transmits the life of God," whereas the man who is
under the worldly elements, being in the flesh and not in Christ
is "man in contrast with God."
The man of the flesh, who trusts himself, is the one who is
trying to actualize his existence from within himself, asserting
himself over against the Other. The Other is God and the World
insofar as they are a threat to his authentic existence. Hence
the process is completely reversed, the Other who is the source of
1. Phil. 3.3.
2. Robinson,op.cit., p. 19.
3. Ibid., p. 19; cf. Brunner, op.cit., pp. 9, 3^+» 229.
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the existence of man has become a threat to man's existence and
man has to destroy him:
t9 y&P paxcudxnxi 4 xxCotg brcexdYn, o£>x fexoOaa, &AA&
x5v OnoxAEavxa, §<p* £Xtc£6i, 6tdxt xat a£>x?) ?| xxCatc
fiXcuOcpcad7^aexai, &ti& xffe 5ouAe£ag xfjg t?OopSc etc t?Jv
fiAeuOeptav xfig 66Snc xftv xgxvtov xoO OeoO.1
Man in his historical (=* corruptible) existence relates to the
world in such a way that he does not transmit the life of God to
the world, by becoming an agent of the relationship between the
Creator and the creature, between God and the world, but on the
contrary, by his attempt to secure his existence for and from
himself he has to subdue the world to himself, by means of scientific
research he has to become the ultimate source of its existence.
But as he (man) in reality is not the source of existence the
world becomes subject to corruption.
Thus we see that Paul had a clear picture of the bilateral
consequences coming out of man's historical existence (= sinful
existence). One is that man in the attempt to find his source of
existence in the creature - to which he is identical - loses him-
2
self altogether, with the total dissolution of his identity. And
the other is that man's attempt to find his source of existence in
the world ultimately leads him to the point of seeing himself as
the source of the existence of the world, thus subjecting the
•3
world to the state of corruption. It has been argued that:
1. Rom. 8.2D—21.
2. Gal. 4.3, 9; Col. 2.8, 20.
3. Rom. 8.18-23.
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"Nicht eine einzige Stelle findet sich im Neuen Testament,
die den Blick erv/eiterte auf die Gesamtheit aller Menschen,
ohne dass die Menschheit zugleich Gott gegentlbergestellt
ware. "-1
There, where mankind stands united, opposing God, is in fact the
issue of idolatry. Paul apparently understood idolatry in its
deepest sense and opposed it severely. Thus, just as he repri¬
manded the Galatians for having returned to the "beggarly elements"
so he praised the community in I Thessalonians: aOxot y&p nept fiuffiv
dnaYY^AAouaiv drtoCav eCooSov Caxoyev up&c £>u&g, nai u£>c ^Tcecrcpfiiixxxe
tip&c x5v beSv &ti5 x&v e 1fxakcov 6ouAede iv &e$ £§vxt Ka^
It would not be an exaggeration to assume that Paul's understanding
of sin and idolatry are inseparably linked together:
"The primal sin is not an inferior morality, but rather the
understanding of oneself in terms of oneself and the
attempt to secure one's existence by means of what one him¬
self establishes, by means of one's own accomplishments.
It is the boasting and self confidence of the natural man.
Paul speaks of it as putting confidence in the flesh."5
That which we have called a centripetal movement is expressed by
the Pauline concept of Sin/1 which means that "through the Fall the
unity of being and destiny, or of the 'I' and the 'Self,' has been
lost. Hence sinful man is forced continually to seek his Self or
1. Greeven, op.cit., p. 20.
2. I Thess. 1.9»
3. EF, p. 94.
4. On the importance of the concept of sin in Paul's anthropology
see: K. Stendahl,* The Apostle Paul and the Introspective
Conscience of the West', The Harvard Theological Review, vol.
lvi, 19o3» P» 2QQ; Preller, op.cit., pp. Schreiner,
op.cit., p. 45; Scroggs, op.cit., p. 90; Brunner, op.cit.,
p. 471; Gesetz, pp. 187-90.
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himself. Instead of circling round God the human life-movement
now circles round the Self - lost and therefore sought.""*" The
act of idolatry is the act of man's relating to his own self,
p
because "man creates his idol in his own image." If we for a
moment remember that Paul's view of man is a view of a being whose
essence is not something actual, but potential, i.e. man's nature
is relationship, then we can see how important is the problem of
idolatry. Idolatry is something which surpasses man's being in
the world, it is a state of existence in which man is depicted as
•3
being of the world. And why? Precisely because the world has
no authentic existence and is qualitatively identical to man, is
dust and in the last resort nothing. Its source of existence is
outside of itself. It cannot either explain or sustain itself
from its own point of view. Exactly from this background comes
Paul's argument:
oC6auev 5tl o66£v eCdcakov fev
Hence worshipping an idol (= being of the world) is worshipping the
world, and ultimately worshipping one's own self. Thus an idol's
being nothing in the world is the same as man's nothingness.
Worshipping one's own self means rejection of the Other,
and this attempt to assert himself and secure his existence from
within himself is the problem of man's being or not being himself.
By man's misconception of his true self he is putting himself in a
1. Brurmer, op.cit., p. 229; cf. p. 483.
2. Ibid., p. 187.
3. Jn. 15.19.
4. I Cor. 8.4.
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situation which leads him further away from his authentic
existence. Thus Paul writes: & fivdpome tc&g & HpCvoav. fev
$ yap HpCveiq t6v £xepov, aeauxdv xaTaKpCvetc.1
Man's existence in the world, be it of the world or not, is by
its nature historical existence and that means that man's being
in the world implies dealings with others, and with concrete
reality. So, Paul emphasizes not the ethical but the ontological
problem of man. Man has sentenced himself by having judged the
other precisely because Paul has seen man as the being whose self
is realized and actualized only through his relationship to an
Other objectively different from himself. Here we see that the
ontological structures of Paul's thought are neither ultimately
transcendent nor immanent. They are inter-related, but clearly
distinct from each other in terms of Creator-creature relation¬
ship. These two are ultimately different, and precisely because
of their ultimate difference they cannot be confused; hence there
is no need for separating them. Not only is man, being a creature,
related to God, being a Creator, but at the same time man is
related to the other man and to the world who are creatures like
himself. Trying to destroy the Other is the only way by which a
sinful man can assert himself, it is constituted by his fallenness
by virtue of which "man, man himself... cannot affirm without
2
denying." This basic need to deny, to judge, and to reject the
Other "recalls the fact that as a result of his sin Adam lost the
1. Rom. 2.1.
2. PJPS, p. 386.
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lordship over creation he was intended to have.""1"
What happens to the sinful man is that he has alienated
himself from both the world and God; that is to say, he has
alienated himself from himself, for his self was precisely
constituted by his relationship to the Other. As the result of
man's fallenness there arises an unnatural situation where the
objective Others constitute the danger to each other. Instead of
seeing themselves in each Other, man and world related to each
other by being related to God on the plane of creaturehood, they
2
all of a sudden seek to enslave each other. Sinful man is not
at home in the world, nor is the world at one with itself seeing
that it is in the hold of sinful man. "While I attempt to free
myself from the hold of the Other, the Other is trying to free
himself from mine; while I seek to enslave the Other, the Other
seeks to enslave me."
When compared with Paul's view, it becomes quickly obvious
that Seneca's picture of the world was a mythological one like
Paul's. Just as Paul's view of the world is one of the three-
storied universe so "the tripartition is found in Seneca,
4
o6pav6e, yfi* ueT&pauov, probably due to Posidonius." Thus we
5
find Seneca talking of the "celestia, sublimia, terrena," just
as he speaks of the earth, sea, and the underworld,b or about the
1. Adam, p. 16.
2. Rom. 8.20ff; Gal. 4.3,9; Phil. 2.8,20.
3. BN, p. 364.
4. De Vogel, op.cit.,iii, p.345.
5. N.Q. II, 1.1.
6. Hercules Furens, 597-610.
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seas, lands and shades.1 Simultaneously as we discover that
Paul and Seneca share a threefold view of the world we can dis¬
cover different origins of their thoughts.
Although Seneca talks of the underworld like Paul, as well
as the heaven (sky) and earth, a notable difference is that his
approach is scholarly and scientific in character, whereas Paul's
approach is rather something that one might call existential.
Thus for example Seneca's concept of cosmopolis "im ursprtlnglichen
Sinne ist die Stadt der 'Gbtter und Menschen* mit gemeinsamen
2
Nomos, dem Ausdruck immanenter Gerchtigkeit," and as to Paul it
was said that man and God are always apart from each other (see
p. 81 ). Hence, while we find in Paul the sense of otherness,
"5
on a cosmic plane, between God and the world, in Seneca, as we
shall see, this sense is totally absent.
Man's relationship to the world and man's being in the
world, in Seneca's philosophy, is as much knowledge-centred as is
the relationship of man to God. So he writes:
"Non praeterit me, Lucili virorum optime, quam magnarum
rerum fundaraenta ponam senex, qui mundum circuire
constitui et causas,secretaque eius eruere atqui aliis
noscenda prodere."
There is nothing surprising about Seneca's feeling of being
impelled to learn about the universe, for it is a natural
consequence of his belief that there is an ultimate identity
1. Hercules Oetaeus, 1477; cf. Kroll, op.cit., p. 423.
2. W. Ganns, Das Bild des Wei sen bei Seneca, Schaan, 1952, p. 62.
3. ArcoxaAtiTtTeTcu yb.p 6pyt) SeoG 6.n* obpavoO (Rom. 1. 18).
4. N.Q. iii, Praef., 1.
bo
between God, man and the world. To Seneca "the world is the
embodiment and expression of the knowledge of God,"1 and that
means that the process of knowing the world is the process which
identifies man with God. We have to look upon the problem from
the anthropocentric and anthropological point of view. Knowing
that "scientific research is nothing other than an effort to
p
appropriate," it is easy to detect that behind Seneca's anxiety
to know about the world stands the fear of the Other. To learn
about the universe, to know it means both: to possess it and at
the same time to find an authentic existence; i.e. by knowing the
Other man gives an ultimate identity to himself in the sense of
becoming an actual being. Thus it has been stated:
"Die Hellenen sind aber nicht nur die Augenmenschen, die
scharf ein ausseres Bild aufhehmen; sie wollen auch das
Wesen der Binge schauen."3
Naturally, this applies to Seneca as well, and far more so since
he has seen man to be the source and end of existence. To
Seneca's understanding "the paradox is not that there are 'self-
activated* existences but that there is no other kind. What is
truly unthinkable is passive existence; that is, existence which
perpetuates itself without having a force either to produce itself
or to preserve itself."4 An argument that "Seneca made a sharp
distinction between God as the cause of the universe and the
1. Watson, op.cit., p. 58.
2. BN, p. 577.
3. Stoa. i, p. 9.
4. BN. p. xxxii.
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universe which is His work,"""" is very unconvincing. "Unus omnium
2
parens mundus est," says Seneca, and it takes little to realize
that God is the father as well. Hence God and the world, both
4
being the father of man, are ultimately identical. After aU,
Seneca himself says:
"Ipse qui ista tractat, qui condidit, qui totum hoc
fundavit deditque circa se, maiorque est pars sui
operis ac melior,..."5
Two things cannot be doubted on any pretext: a) that Seneca has
conceived an existing reality as one, unique and actually related
to itself in the sense of ultimate identity, and b) that man's
task is to become the ultimate source and end of that reality;
i.e. as long as the reality exists as an objective Other, who
constitutes a threat to man's authentic existence and identity,
man has to dissolve the Other, and that is achieved by the faculty
of knowledge and comprehension. In that sense Pohlenz's inter¬
pretation is extremely apt.
Precisely because of this scientific attempt to answer the
1. De Vogel, op.cit., iii, p. 295.
2. De Ben., iii, 28.2.
3. On especially controversial opinions about the concept of the
fatherhood of God in Paul and Seneca see: Stoics, p. 328; De
Vogel, op.cit., iii, pp.81-86; Davidson, op.cit., p. 182;
Dill, op.cit., pp. 306, 393; J. Kreyher, L. Annaeus Seneca und
seine Beziehungen zum Urchristentum, Berlin^ 1887, p. 64;
Mysticism, p. 12; Kroll, op.cit., pp. 411-12; Leipoldt, op.¬
cit., pp. 136, 142-43, 165; Holzherr, op.cit., ii, p. 42;
Deissner, op.cit., p. 37; Sevenster, op.cit., pp. 37-38.
4. On Seneca's concept of God's fatherhood see esp. De Provid.,
passim.
5. N.Q., vii, 30.3.
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problem of his identity man has enslaved himself to deceit. For
this very reason v/e are not to suppose Seneca too naive when he
1 2
takes stars for divine bodies with prophetic qualities. Seneca
says of stars:
"Quid, tu tot ilia milia siderum iudicas otiosa lucere?
Quid est porro aliud quod errorem maximum incutiat peritis
natalium quam quod paucis nos sideribus assignant, cum
omnia quae supra nos sunt partem nostri sibi vindicent?...
Ceterum et ilia quae aut immota sunt aut propter velocitatem
universo parem immotis similia non extra ius dominiumque
nostri sunt."3
The problem here is not that Seneca has conceived the value of
astrology on the plane of superficial and naive worship, but some¬
thing more important. Seneca, namely, has taken the stars for
something that one might call the basic data or the basic elements
by the help of which man, through his perceptive and comprehensive
power, is able to answer the problem of his own existence. This
is exactly the concept which is covered by Paul's concept of ffc
axotxeta toC xdcp.ou which he has opposed so severely. He has
opposed exactly what Seneca has advocated, namely the belief that
man by observation and scientific research would be able to identify
himself with the Other and thus would be the ultimate one. Hence,
here Paul and Seneca speak about one and the same thing, and we
see that they entertain diametrically opposed opinions. What
Seneca considers to be man's prior duty and task, Paul attacks as
1. De Ben., iv, 23.4.
2. N.Q., vii, 28.1.
3. N.Q., ii, 32.7-8.
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folly and deceit. What Paul regarded as sin Seneca has defined
as virtue because: "die Einheit und Wesensgleichheit der Tugenden
kommt bei Seneca besonders dadurch zum Ausdruck, dass er alien
1
den Begriff des Wissens zu Grunde legt." "Therefore to live
perfectly one must know perfectly the whole interaction of cause
and effect, all of nature, and become in a sense identical with
2
it." Of course this whole complex of thoughts and concepts,
in Seneca's philosophy, is based on his emphasis on reason. Thus
he defines man:
"Animus scilicet emendatus ac purus, aemulator dei, super
humana se extollens, nihil extra se sui ponens. Rationale
animal es. Quod ergo in te bonum est? Perfects ratio."3
4
Seneca has taken reason to be "the supreme court of appeal," by
5
saying that: "Omnia itaque ad rationem revocanda sunt."^ In other
words the reality of the external world, the Other, is being con¬
firmed by, and has its source in, the human mind; i.e. by means
of reason man asserts himself against the world - against the Other.
Thus Seneca writes:
"sibi totus animus vacet et ad contemplationem sui saltern
in ipso fine respiciat. "f°
Hence as we have argued, man's duty is to make research and to know
1. S. Rubin, Die Ethik Senecas in ihrern VerhSltnis zur alteren und
mittleren Stoa, Nordlingen, 1901, p. 33 •
2. Watson, op.cit., p. 60.
3. Ep. 124.23.
4. Brunner, op.cit., p. 431.
5. Ep. 99.18.
6. N.Q., iii» Praef. 2; cf. Ep. 94.72: "Contra illos, qui gratiam
ac potentiam attollunt, otium ipse suspiciat traditum litteris
et animum ab externis ad sua reversum."
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in order to subdue the world to his control and finally become the
source of its existence. It has to be so for the simple reason
that Seneca has seen existence as one and identical to itself.
That implies one single source of existence, and it is natural
that man, looking from his point of view, should regard himself as
the source of the whole of existence.
This desire of man to know the Other, to become the Other's
source of existence, is something which is inseparably linked
with the search-for^identity, and Seneca speaks of it emphatically:
"magni animi res fuit rerum naturae latebras dimovere nec
contentum exteriore eius aspectu introspicere et in deorum
secreta descendere.
Indeed the target of scientific research is not research for its
own sake, but for the sake of an ulterior end, an attempt to
actualize the human reality which is confined to the sphere of
potentiality by the limits of man, i.e. "he (the knowing subject =
man) is characterized by pneuma of a particular type which marks
him off, and in time as we shall see, makes him superior to all
around him, so that he can order and dispose the world for his
2
own convenience." Knowledge as a theoretical faculty in Seneca's
thought cannot be separated from empirical knowledge, because he
believes that there is nothing which is not accessible to man's
comprehending capacity. Thus the sort of knowledge that he is
interested in is knowledge as a totality which is the opposite of
ignorance, so that knowledge is identical to virtue and ignorance
1. N.Q., vi, 5.2.
2. Watson, op.cit., p. 21.
91
to vice.1 In this context Seneca says:"Quo nullum maius est
2
nosse naturam." This statement is doubly important because
behind it lies monistic thought, where man, world and God are
identical, and knowledge expresses man's authentic existence.
Thus we read in Seneca:
"Beatum enim illud uno loco positum est, in ipsa mente,
grande, stabile, tranquillum, quod sine scientia divino-
rum humanorumque non potest effici."3
The great stable and tranquil mind here stands for an authentic
existence. The argument is clear enough. Man's un-at-home
feeling about himself, caused by the fact that he does not have
an authentic existence - which is due to the presence of the
Other - is quenched by man's destruction of the Other through
knowledge. Man wants to know things divine and things human
because these two are the elements of the commonwealth called
cosmopolis which is assigned to man:
"Ergo cum animum sapientis intuemur potentem omnium et
per universa dimissum,omnia illius esse dicimus, cum
ad hoc ius cotidianum si ita res tulerit, capite
censebitur.
And the reason that all things belong to man (primarily to the
Sage) is because he is "divini iuris atque humani peritus."^ This
knowledge of things human and divine and the knowledge of the
1. Ep. 31.6. "Quid ergo est bonum? Rerum scientia. Quid malum est?
Rerum imperitia."
2. N.Q., vi, 4.2; cf. Ep. 82. 5-6: "In insuperabili loco stat
animus, qui externa deseruit...Itaque quantum possumus, ab ilia
(sc. fortuna) resiliamus; quod sola praestabit sui naturaeque
cognitio."
3. Ep. 74.29.
4. De Ben. vii, 8.1.
5. Ibid., vii, 2.4.
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universe has as its outcome man's being a citizen of the world:
"cum sapienti rem publicam ipso dignam dedimus, id est
mundum,
"Die potius, quam naturale sit in inmensum mentem suam
extendere. Magna et generosa res humanus animus: nullos
sibi poni nisi communes et cum deo terminos patitur."^
"Ego terras omnis tamquam meas videbo, meas tamquam omnium.
Ego sic vivam quasi sciam aliis,esse me natum et naturae
rerum hoc nomine gratias agam;"^
These altruistically sounding cosmopolitan ideas of Seneca, which
are the outcome of his vision of man's being in the world, have
A
earned for him the reputation of being a humanist, whose maxim
was:
5
"Homo sacra res homini."
This indeed sounds very altruistic, but, if we take a closer look
at the whole complexity of Seneca's thought, we shall arrive at
an entirely opposite conclusion. First of all, we shall take
here Bultmann's definition of humanism as a correct interpretation,
and on that assumption we shall argue that Seneca's altruism,
1. Ep. 68.2.
2. Ep. 102.21.
3. De Vita Beata, 20.3; On the cosmopolitan ideas in Seneca's
philosophy see further: Ep. 28.5, De Otio, 4.1-2; De Tranq.
An. 4.4; Ad Helv. 8.5-6; 9.7.
4. On Seneca's humanism see: Preller, op.cit., p. 76; H.E. Wedeck,
'Seneca's Humanitarianism', Classical Journal, L, 1955, pp. 319-
20; A.L. Motto, 'Seneca, Exponent of Humanitarianism', Classical
Journal, L, 1955, pp. 315-18; Dill, op.cit., p. 117; Gummere,
op.cit., p. 70; Kreyher, op.cit., p.l; U. Knoche, Per
Philosoph Seneca, Frankfurt am Main, 1933, pp. 15, 20;
Deissner, op.cit., pp. 32-33-
5. Ep. 95.33.
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expressed in his discourses on friendship, and his cosmopolitanism
are ego- and anthropocentric, just as it was already pointed out
that: "Seneca contemplates friendship anthropocentrically and
even - though with great refinement - egocentrically.1,1 But now
Bultmann's definition of humanism:
"Der humanistische Glaube an den Menschen ist gar nicht der
Glaube an den Menschen in seiner empirischen Vorfindlichkeit,
an seine Verciunft, an seine Recht und sein VermOgen, sich
und der Welt die Gesetze zu geben. Er ist vielmehr der
Glaube an die Idee des Menschen, die als Norm uber seinem
konkreten Leben steht und ihm seine Pflicht und eben damit
seine Wtlrde, seinen Adel gibt. Humanismus ist der Glaube
an den Geist, an dem der Mensch teilhat, und Kraft dessen
er die Welt des Wahren, des Guten, des SchSnen erschafft in
Wissenschaft, Recht und Kunst."2
Just as Bultmann has pointed out the high aspirations of humanists
Seneca writes:
"0 quam contempts res est homo, nisi supra humana
surrexerit!"?
This sort of anthropocentricity of Seneca's humanism is entirely
consistent with the whole of his philosophical system, for, as we
have maintained so far, man is basically a being whose project is
to assert himself over against the Other. His aspirations are
always pointing beyond himself with the centripetal tendency of
drawing in and dissolving the Other. Hence, although Seneca
maintains that "homo sacra res homini est" we must not overlook
1. Sevenster, op.cit., p. 176; cf. Brunner, op.cit., p.553;
Baumgarten, op.cit., p. 73; Greeven, op.cit., p. 153.
2. GV, iii, p. 65; cit., H. D. Betz, Per Apostel Paulus und
die sokratische Tradition, Tubingen, 1972, p. 142.
3. N.Q., i, Praef, 5»
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the reason for that, and the root of that saying is this:
"Ea enim parte sibi carus est homo, qua homo est."1
Proceeding from this point we shall see that the actual existence
of the other man is a threat to man's existence, so that man's
reverence for the Other becomes more and more doubtful. It is
necessary to reckon with the other man as the mode of man's being-
in-the-world in Seneca's philosophy, precisely because his
philosophy is highly anthropocentric, or rather anthropological.
So, just as the world constitutes a danger to man's existence,
revealing itself as the Other, so does the other man constitute
the most direct and concrete otherness which man can encounter
in the world. It is not by chance that Seneca has dedicated such
long discourses to the problem of friendship and to the problem of
inter-human relationships in general. Man experiences the world
through the other man, precisely because of their identity with
and relation to the world and to each other through reason. In
conclusion, it is fair to say that it is an impulse of self-
preservation, and fear of the Other which makes Seneca say: "Ea
enim parte sibi carus est homo qua homo est."
Seeing a man as the being whose "original fall is the
2
existence of the Other," Seneca wrote to Lucilius:
"Sic est, non muto sententiam: fuge multitudinem, fuge
paucitatem, fuge etiam unum. Non habeo, cum quo te
communicatum velim. Et vide, quod iudicium meum
habeas: audeo te tibi credere.
1. Ep. 121.14.
2. BN, p. 203.
3. Ep. 10.1.
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A distrust towards the Other and the fear of the Other is Seneca's
way of depicting the reality of man in the world, so that man
faces the world not as the milieu for the actualization of his
self, but on the contrary as his peril. For that reason man
primarily has to look to himself and to assert himself over
against the world. Thus even friendship is exclusively an
egocentric concept:
"'Quaeris,' inquit, 'quid profecerim? Amicus esse mihi
coepi.' Multum profecit; numquam erit solus. Scito hunc
amicum omnibus esse."
The chance for man to find his own self in the other man is
entirely ruled out, and the reality of others is, primarily and
exclusively, seen as a destructive power and force instead of as
creative:
"Avarior redeo, ambitiosior, luxurior, immo vero crudelior
et inhumanior, quia inter homines fui...Recede in te
ipsum, quantum potes. Cum his versare, qui te meliorem
facturi sunt. Illos admitte, quos tu potes facere meliores
...Multi te laudant. Ecquid habes, cur placeas tibi, si is2
es, quem intellegant multi? Introrsus bona tua spectant."
This self-centredness of man in the world is exactly what in Paul
has been rebuked. Seneca has advocated the argument that
"Introrsus bona tua spectant," because he was convinced that the
question of man is to be answered primarily by looking at man:
"Quicquid facere te potest bonum, tecum est."-' And as the out¬
come of this, in addition to the fact that the Other is a threat
to one's self, Seneca has stated: "unum bonum est, quod beatae vitae
1. E£>. 6.7.
2. Ep. 7.3, 8, 12.
3. Ep. 60.3.
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causa et firmamentum est, sibi fidere."1 At this point Paul
and Seneca are diametrically opposed to each other, for Paul says:
ot nvedpaxi deoO Aaxpedovxeg xat xaux&uevot fev Xptax$ 'IpaoO
a n
xat o6x fiv aapxt TtenotOdxeg,
Thus, insofar as Seneca is representative of Hellenistic thought,
it has rightly been observed that:
"In der griechischen Auffassung gehSrt der Mensch wesentlich
nicht zum Kosmos..."3
or as Benz puts it:
"Der Mensch ist nicht hier (in Seneca) in der Natur, sondern eine
Trennung von Beschauer und Kosmos ist vorausgesetzt: der
Mensch wird Zuschauer des grossen d6apa» sich
selbst in den Kreislauf des Kosmos mit einbegriffen zu
ftlhlen, was poseidonisch ware, und ohne sich in das
Schaffen der gleichen Krafte hineinzustellen, die den
Organismus der Welt durchfluten und sich in Formung der
organischen Natur wie in der Seelischen, wie in der
Gestaltung der Geschichte gleichmassig auswirken. Der
Mensch ist nicht Zentrum der SchOpfung sondern - was einem
Roraer besonders imponieren musste - Beherrscher, ja
Ziichtiger der Natur."*
Hence, what characterizes Senecan man in the world is the fear of
the Other, which finally results in two basic attitudes of man
toward the world. First, man wants to flee from the world and
to be himself, as if he was not part of the world, i.e. he wants
to keep a distance between himself and the world which is the
Other. Second, even if he, man, is at a distance from the Other,
the Other is a threat to him because he actualizes the limit of man.
The world, being the Other, comes in the way between actual man and
1. Ep. 31.3*
2. Phil. 3.3.
3. de Zwaan, op.cit., p. 576.
4. Benz, op.cit., pp. 35-36.
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authentic existence. As a result man has to dissolve the Other
by knowing him (it), for by having known it he will become an
ultimate source of his own and the Other's existence.
God and the world are identical in the full sense of the
word, so that existence is unique and one, a self-sustained and
self-related reality admitting no qualitative difference but only
qualitative oneness."*" In the form of a diagram: "der Mensch ist
p Man
zwischen Tier und Gott hineingestellt": Animal—-—God. Existence
extends itself qualitatively all over its realm, so that any
difference that we might find between the two beings is a differ¬
ence of degree but not of quality. We can sum up and give the
following classification of the cosmic aspect of Paul's and
Seneca's anthropologies:
Paul has seen man as the being whose actual life and
existence are in discord with the cosmic order. Man and world
are qualitatively identical in the solidarity of their creature-
hood. Both, man's and the world's existence are unauthentic in
the sense that they both depend on God, i.e. their reality is
potential and actualizes itself through their relationship to the
Other on the plane of Creator-creature. Man and world being
qualitatively identical, and with an infinite qualitative distinc¬
tion from God, are not meant to regard each other as the source
of their existence. Man being in the world is exposed to the
1. N.Q., i, Praef, 10.
2. F. Husner, 'Leib mid Seele in der Sprache Senecas', Philologus,
Supplementbana xvii, Heft iii, Leipzig, 1924, p. 96.
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danger of falling a prey to the deceit by which he will regard
himself as the source of his own existence. Such a man is
characterized by Paul as aapxix6s» an(3 his ac"^011 as SqiapxCa.
Man who has a right sort of relationship to the world, through
which he asserts the world as his real sphere of operations re¬
cognizes that its source of existence is God, is Tiveuuaxtxdc,
and his action is one of utaxLq or 6txai.oa6vri (cf. Rom. 4.3>9).
To put it bluntly: Paul's view of man in the world cannot be
separated from his view of man before God. Man's being and
existence are primarily conditioned by the fact that he is God's
creature. Depending on the way man accepts his creaturehood is
determined his being in the world and his relationship to the
world. Both world and man depend on God because God has called
them to being from nothingness: xcAoGvxoc to ]ir\ <5vxa obc -5vxa
(Rom. 4.17). That means that the world and man do not have an
authentic existence. That which is actual about their existence
is that they are potential beings, since they exist only insofar
as they are related to God.
If we look at Seneca's concept of man's being-in-the-worid,
the first thing we notice is that the dimension of qualitative
difference is dissolved altogether. In discussing man and God
we have seen that they are qualitatively identical, and when we
look at the question of the relationship of the world to God we
see again that they are qualitatively identical. As a result of
that comes the identity between the three: God, man and the world.
On this ground Seneca was able to speak of the macro- and
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microcosmos. However, the serious question which arises from
this situation is an ontological one, namely the question of
being and existence. If God is an ultimate being or an authentic
existence, so also is man and so is the world; because they are
qualitatively identical. Now, since being or existence is one
and unique it follows that there can be only one objective source
of existence. It follows of necessity that someone who claims to
be a source of existence, in this case man, should see the Other
as a threat to his existence, and the Other is the world, God and
the other man, who makes the same claim. Hence the main project
of the one who sees himself primarily as the source of being is
to destroy the Other. Seneca's heroic man is faced with the
problem of asserting himself over against the Other, the world and
God, which he does through the faculty of knowledge, which is the
means for the denial of the Other. Thus he exclaims:
"cum viro tibi negotium est; quaere, quern vincas.""*"
Seneca's man is mainly encountering the reality around himself as
a threat to his existence, and he feels compelled to assert himself
over against it and to establish his identity within the limits of
his own being. Thus the world and God are a threat to his
existence, because the recognition of them would imply the
objective "otherness" of each of them, and where the Other is
there cannot be an authentic existence for man, since an authentic
existence is potential infinity, and where the Other is
1. Ep. 98.14.
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encountered the limit is actualized and the idea of infinity
has to be dismissed altogether.
From this point, of potential infinity, we step into a
third sphere of manfs search-foi>-identity and authentic existence,
namely man in the realm of freedom.
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MAN AMD FREEDOM
The problem that we are faced with here is most difficult
since we do not have any objective definitions of what freedom is.
Y/hile it is possible to deal with the problem of God or the world
in itself, and then relate it to man within the anthropological
context, this appears altogether impossible when the concept of
freedom is to be dealt with. And why? Because freedom is not
something which exists outside of the human context, outside of
the historical existence of man. Freedom is something which
exists, and is encountered, only where there is man. Thus,
strictly speaking, freedom is neither theological nor cosmological
but primarily and may be,the only genuine anthropological problem.
And that means that the problem is the problem of authentic
existence and identity.
Now, since we have ruled out the view that man is to be con¬
sidered primarily by looking at him as an isolated existence, the
enquiry into the problem of freedom will, of necessity, bring us
back to the sphere of the theological and cosmological aspects of
our anthropological enquiry. Hence, although we have stated
that the problem of freedom, being a problem of identity, is the
only genuine anthropological problem, it is related, however, to
the problem of God and the world precisely because being a man
means dealing with God and with the world.
Both Paul and Seneca have a great deal to say about the
freddom of man, and our task is to show whether their sources are
102
common and whether the concepts, whatever their sources might
be, are identical or not. To start with it has been recog¬
nized that:
"Dort, wo hellenistische und jtldisch-apokalyptische
Traditionen aufeinanderstiessen, konnten die griechische
Freiheit und die judische Endhoffnung eine Verbindung
eingehen.T Freiheit konnte ein apokalyotischer Begriff
werden."
In relation to Paul this is even more relevant if one gives full
weight to Schweitzer's and Schoeps' arguments that Paul's theology
was profoundly affected by the apocalyptic movements of his time
p
and that a non-eschatological Paul is unintelligible. As a
logical consequence of these two arguments, namely that Paul was
apocalyptic-eschatologically minded, and that that was a point
of contact with the Hellenistic concept of freedom, it was said
that:
"...aus dem Judentum. Faulus' Freiheitsidee nicht stammer
kann...Wir werden ruhig annehmen diirfen, dass Paulus von
dem griechischen Freiheitsgedanken Anregungen erapfangen
hat..."3
It was equally said that "Der Satz: 'Alles ist euer', ilberhaupt
Paulus* Lehre von der Freiheit ist stoisch."^ Liechtenhan also
wrote:
"lurch dieses Stirb und Werde wird jene innere Freiheit
gewonnen, fur deren Gchilderung Paulus freilicn Farbe
und Stil der stoischen Diatribe verwendet.
1. Niederwimmer, op.cit., p. 82.
2. Gchoeps, op.cit., p. 273.
3* Freiheit, pp. 180-181.
4. Leipoldt, op.cit., p. 147.
5. Liechtenhan, op.cit., p. 397.
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On the other hand it was uncompromisingly stated that:
"the Pauline idea of freedom differs in every respect from
Seneca's, and it is therefore highly unlikely that the
emphasis Paul lays upon freedom has its roots in Stoic
thought.
Along the same lines it was said:
"Nun hat das Alte Testament wohl keinen Freiheits-begriff,
wenigstens nicht in dem Sinn, wie man von einem
hellenischen, stoischen oder gnostischen Freiheitsbegriff
sprechen kann...Babei wird sich zeigen, dass es nicht zu
viel ist, wenn man behauptet, dass das Alte Testament den
Freiheitsbegriff des Neuen Testament prSstrukturiert."2
And whatever is said of the concept of freedom in the New
Testament is to be understood as if it were said of the concept
of freedom in St. Paul's thought since:
"...der Begriff der Freiheit irn Neuen Testament insbesondere
vom Apostel Paulus geformt wurde und daher auch in erster
Linie aus der paulinische Theologie zu erheben ist. In
diesem Sinne ist Freiheit wesentlich ein 'paulinischer'
Begriff."3
So, if an assessment is to be made we could say that Paul was
familiar with the Hellenistic concepts of freedom, has employed
its mode of speech, and yet has remained biblically preconditioned,
since he dealt with the problems presented to him by the Old
Testament writings. Having in mind the fact that he was
preaching biblical concepts to the Greeks it is quite conceivable
that he has made his message sound as intelligible to his audience
as possible. However, to assume that this concept of freedom is
altogether an Old Testament concept or altogether hellenized would
1. Sevenster, op.cit., p. 122.
2. Niederwimmer, op.cit., p. 7t>.
3. Niederwimmer, op.cit., p. 69.
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be too bold an assessment. Hence we shall examine it within
the framework of his anthropology and compare it with Seneca's
concept of freedom.
Just as it has been said of Israelites that they "like
1
all other ancient peoples were 'outer-directed'," so it has
been said that:
"Paul cannot simply define freedom in purely formal terms
as the possibility of doing what one wants, on the basis
of his concept of faith and his anthropology. Nor can he
define it along idealistic lines as the freedom of the
subject, because he has no idea of the free subject. Man
is always seen in his relationships. As Paul does not
consider freedom in itself, but only the freedom of faith
(and lack of freedom, as fallenness into sin and the flesh),
he does not find himself confronted with either the
psychological problem of the freedom of the will or the
cosmological problem of determinism or indeterminism as
part of a world-view."2
As we proceed it will become obvious that Paul's concept of free¬
dom was altogether preconditioned by his whole worid-view. As
Paul has conceived an existing reality as a relationship between
the one and the Other, the Creator and the creature, equally so
he has conceived freedom as potential reality which is not an
actual essence, something by and in Itself, but as a potential
situation, i.e. freedom is a mode of relationship between the two.
To talk about freedom without implying the relatedness of two
objectively distinct entities is not proper for Paul. To be or
not to be free means to be related to the Other in one or the
other way. Relatedness between opposites is characteristic of
1. Boman, op.cit., p. 27.
2. Conzelmann, op.cit., p. 275.
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the biblical concept of freedom. Thus old Hebrew society, being
a theocratic society, employs the term freedom in expressly
relationship situations, such as the ones depicting social
1
conditions in the society. And throughout the whole of the
Old Testament we do not find a single speculative attempt to
define the concept of freedom in terms which would allow us to
think that freedom was considered in itself. The concept of
freedom in the Old Testament is ultimately preconditioned and
determined by the view of reality as a whole, and reality was
conceived of in terms of relationship.
If one observes closely passages in which Paul talks of
freedom one can hardly fail to see that there is corresponding
analogy between Paul's and the Old Testament concept of freedom.
What becomes quickly apparent is that the term "freedom" in Paul,
just as in the Old Testament, depicts the condition of man in the
situation of relatedness to the external world, man, God, etc.
At the beginning of the chapter we stated that freedom
within the framework of anthropology is an authentic existence.
And as we have argued that man's authentic existence does not come
out of himself, equally so man is not the source of his own freedom.
Thus it has been commented:
"Die christliche Freiheit ist nichts aus dem Menschen
organisch Herauswachsendes, sondern sie ist ein Geschenk
Gottes, ein Wohnen Christi im Geist in unseren Herzen, eine
Befreiung von einer in uns selbst liegenden Hemmung, indem
von uns genommen wird, was der stoische Weise gar nicht
kannte - die Sonde."2
1. See: Ex. 21.2,5,26-27; Deut. 15.12-13,18; I Sam. 17.25*,
Job. 3-19; 39.5; Ps. 88.5; Is. 58.6; Jer. 34.9-14.
2. Feine, op.cit., p. 80.
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Or, put in even more accurate yards:
"Ytie der Mensch nicht mit sich selbst identisch ist, so
ist es auch die Freiheit nicht. Kie der Mensch sich ,
selbst fremd ist, so ist auch seine Freiheit entfremdet."
In the first chapter it was discussed in what sense man is not
identical to himself. Man is not identical to himself in the
sense that he is not self-sustained, actual being, but sustained-
from-the-Other being, an image, i.e. man is potential being in the
sense that he has existence as long as he recognizes the Other.
In other words his actuality is constituted by a paradoxical
acceptance of his potentiality.
"Hierin wird die Paradoxic des neutestamentlichen
Freiheitsbegriffes noch einmal deutlich. Denn Freiheit
ist im Neuen Testament ein Gottespradikat. Es kommt dem
Menschen nur insofern zu als er Imago Dei ist."2
Man, being an Imago Dei, is potential being because he is a
reflexion of the Other who is objectively different from man. Thus,
to say that man is free insofar as he is an Imago Dei, is to say
that freedom is a mode of the actualization of man's potentiality.
Man is free as an Imago because by being, and accepting, an Imago
he is at one with himself.
Having in mind a concept of freedom which is the freedom of
an image of God Paul wrote:
6 66 xdotoQ xb nveOuA fioxtv. o5 66 xb uveOya xupCou,
SAeudepCa. 4uetC udvxec &vaxexaxaA.uuu6vv upoa&u^
xf|v 6d£av xupCou xaxonxpLrduevot xfj^ abxryv eCxdva
ViexapiopcobueOa dub 6d£nc eCc CbEav,
1. Niederwimmer, op.cit., p. 88.
2. Niederwimmer, op.cit., p. 143; cf. Rom. 8.20-30; Eph. 1.4ff.
3. 2 Cor. 3-17-18.
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The Pauline concept of freedom is of necessity Christo-
centric, because his anthropology as a whole is Christocentric.
The Pneumatological aspect of Paul's Christology makes an impact
on his anthropology, precisely because Paul's argument is that
believers move in the realm of the Spirit. Paul's Christology
and Pneumatology are identical,1 and on that ground it is to be
argued that Christians move in the realm of the ~pirit and are
free. First of all, Paul himself says that Christ is Spirit
(2 Cor. 3«17). Further Paul argues that everyone who is baptized
2
into Christ has put on Christ; i.e. is identical with Christ.
He expresses it by saying that we who are baptized in Christ:
c<?op6aouev nat xffv etxdva xoO fircoupavCou,
Therefore an argument would be: man baptized into Christ puts on
Christ, or even more, becomes identical with Christ. Christ is
the Spirit, hence the existence of man who is in Christ is an
existence upheld by the Spirit.
Now, the attempt must be made to clarify the concept of
freedom within its anthropological context since, on the basis of
the above argument, Paul states that "the Lord is that Spirit: and
wnere the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty." (2 Cor. 3.17).
The argument is complex and a highly consistent one. Paul argues:
ot> y&P 6AAj3exe TtveOpa 6ouA,eiae4rtdXtv etc «h50ov,AAAd. £X&0exe TtveOya utoOeotas'
1. A. Wikenhauser, Pauline Mysticism. Edinburgh-London, 19oQ, p.88.
2. Gal. 3.27; cf. Rom. 6.3; I Cor. 12.13.
3. I Cor. 15.49.
4. Rom. 8.15.
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This "Spirit of sonship" is given to man because of Christ
who is regarded as "con of Cod.And the title of "con of God"
is descriptive language for the concept of Imago Dei since Christ
2
is regarded to be, as well, a true "image of God".
If we now look at the argument that freedom "komrnt dem
Menschen nur insofern zu als er Imago Eei ist," (see p. 106), then
we are bound to arrive at the conclusion that the quest for free¬
dom is a quest for the authenticity of man. We said in the first
chapter that the concept of image is the concept of relatedness.
If that argument is accepted then we can join Heidegger and say
that in Paul's view "freedom is essentially a relationship of open
■3
resolve and not one locked up within itself."
Thus, the ultimate conclusion would be, according to Paul,
that man is free when he realizes in himself the actuality of an
image (=relatedness), and in the opposite case (the case would be
an absence of the state of being an image) he is in a state of
slavery (cf. Gal. 4.7). As man's whole being is constituted by
his potentiality, i.e. his relationship to the Other, so is his
freedom. Hence it follows that man is free by and in the act of
the realization of his potential being. That simply means that
man's freedom consists in his relatedness to the source of his
existence. As the freedom of the image is the direct reflection
from the object of which it is an image, so is man's freedom
1. Rom. 1.3, 4, 9; 5.10; a.29, 32; I Cor. 1.9; 15.28; 2 Cor.
1.19; Gal. 1.16; 2.20; 4.4, 6; Eph. 4.13; Col. 1.13.
2. I Cor. 11.7; 2 Cor. 4.4; Col. 1.15.
3. M. Heidegger, Existence and Being, London, 1949, p. 342.
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expressed in terms of positive relationship, in terms of the
acceptance of the Other, and not in the negative terms of the
rejection of the Other, in terms of freedom of choice. This is
one of the paradoxes of freedom:
"In der Freiheit schlummert die verfuhrerische Moglichkeit,
die dSaonische Versuchung, sich von Gott abzuwenden und
sich selbst zuzuwenden, sich selbst hybrid zur Gottheit zu
erheben. Eben das aber ist die Urstlnde - und wer sundigt,
ist nicht mehr frei."1
And indeed Paul himself says:
5xi 6 naAau&g fiuSv dvdp^rtos aoveoTaupcoOri, Eva xaxupynCHJ xd
ow\ia xf|c duapxtac, toO unx£xi 6ouAe0etv fipds x§ &uapxC<j.2
Paul conclusively talks of his converts as of ones who fire 60OA01.
Tffc apaprCae ^ and he is categorical on this issue by arguing
that Sxe yap 60OA01 f»xe xffe djiapxCas, AAedSepoi fixe xfj
Sixaioodvij. (Rom. 6. 20) .
Thus Conzelmann rightly says:
"For Paul there is no question whether we are free or not.
To this extent he understands freedom radically, and not
in broken terms (as in modern subjectivism). , Therefore
he does not reduce it to an inner freedom..."
...which is a Hellenistic concept and a hallmark of the Stoic
5
concept of freedom. As opposed to the concept of "inner free¬
dom" Paul's view of freedom is the view of an outward relatedness,
1. Niederwimmer, op.cit., p. 107.
2. Rom. 6.6} this concept of Paul has influenced Johannine
theology clearly in the narrative of Jn. 8.34f.: 6
nottSv xrjv dpapxtav 6oOX&q fiaxtv xffc dpapxtas.
3. Rom. 6.17.
4. Conzelmann, op.cit., p. 163*
5- Freiheit, p. 180.
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i.e. man is simultaneously free from and free for the Other.
Man is freed from sin in order to be free for righteousness.1
Hence freedom is always that which relates man to someone or
something.
Man's enslavement to sin results in the enslavement of man
2 5
to a number of other situations such as: <p6£oe » cpGdpa » and
A
xct axotxeta xoO xdauou • These are the objective situations,
which stem from man's enslavement to sin, constitute his mode of
historical existence, his being-in-the~world, and finally culminate
in his being subject to death. Thus Paul states that6tcl
xfic duciprtac 6 b&vaxos and i.iederwimmer interprets it:
"1st die Freiheit Voraussetzung der btlnde - als der
Abwendung des Menschen von Gott und die Zuwendung zu sich
selbst, als die ergriffene Selbst-standigkeit - so folgt
daraus, dass Freiheit zugleich auch die Voraussetzung des
Todes ist. Qhne Freiheit gabe es keinen Tod."°
In this knot all the threads come together. At this point it is
obvious why freedom is authentic existence, and an anthropological
problem par exellence. At this point it also becomes clear why
Paul's concept of freedom is the concept which of necessity implies
relationship. It is so because Paul knows that "either God or Man
7
can be unconditionally free, but not both." Only one of them
1. Rom. b.18: ftAeuOepoS^vxec 6fe dnb xf|e dyapxCae £6ouA<i>\ttixe x§
2. Rom. 8.15. otxcuoaOvg.
3. Rom. 8.21.
4. Gal. 4.3; cf. Col. 2.8, 20.
5. Rom. 5.12; cf. ibid., o.21-23; 8.2.
o. rhederwimmer, op.cit., p. 133.
7. iirunner, op.cit., p. 431.
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can be unconditionally free because "Freiheit ict potentielle
1
Unendlichkeit," and to be infinite means to be the source of
one's own existence, means to have an authentic existence. It
is ruled out that Paul could ever have indulged in speculating
on that issue in such a way as to ascribe to man a mode of free¬
dom which would make man God. However, it is clear that Paul
has grasped the very roots of the problem and has understood the
situation in the way we have outlined, namely that the quest of
freedom is the quest of man, and to search for ultimate freedom
is to search for authentic existence. In other words "das NT
lehrt: der Menscn hat von sich aus keine Freiheit (RSra. 7 - um es
schematisch zu sagen), die Freiheit v/ird ihm aber von Gott durch
Christus in HI. Geist geschenkt (ROm. 3)."2
Insofar as freedom is to be identified with an authentic
existence, with an actual identity, man is not free, for he is
a creature. Being a creature means to have a source of
existence outside oneself, in the Creator. And yet it is argued
that:
"Die Freiheit sprengt fast die GeschSpflichkeit und doch
wird sie von der GeschSpflichkeit umgriffen und umgrenzt.
Die menschliche Freiheit ist demnach endliche Freiheit."3
Paul himself writes: £Aeu6epCq nude XpioT&c flXeud£pcoaev.4
as if he has envisaged the concept of freedom in itself. However,
we have argued that the concept of freedom in St. Paxil's thought
1. Niederwimmer, op.cit., p. 105.
2. Ibid., p. 87.
3. Niederwimmer, op.cit., p. 105.
4. Gal. 5.1.
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is a concept of relatedness, for man's freedom, just as man's
being and existence, is not constituted by his "inness", but by
his "outness", i.e. just as man is basically a relationship so is
his freedom.
Now, this argument begs a question. What is it that Christ
has freed us from and freed us for? According to Paul, what
Christ has freed us from is Mvcxxos, and what he has freed us
for is £cod. Thus he writes:
eC66xes 5xt Xpiax&s fiyepdetc £x vexpwv oGxdxt dTto£>vi5axe1,
dAvaxos ciGxoO oGxdxt xopiedei. 5 yfitp dnddavev,
xtjj dpapxCqi AudOavev dtpdrcag. 6 6fc £f5, £$ t$ de$.1
We have become free from death only insofar as we have been
liberated from the illusion that our roots and source of existence
lie in ourselves - the sin of Adam - that we stem from ourselves
and live to ourselves as an authentic and final goal. We are
free relatively by having been re-related to our genuine source.
Consequently, the ultimate freedom of man is his capacity to
recognize the Other and to relate to him as to his source of
existence. This is clear from Paul's words: $ 6e £5* £$
The idea of Christ liberating man from death is expressed
1. Rom. 6.9—10.
2. Insofar as self-sufficiency is a false view of freedom see
Paul's argument in Rom. 14. 7-9: o66ets ydp nikSv £aux$ D3, xat
oG6etc feaox$ dnoOv^axet. d&v xe ydp £<3pev, x$ xupdcp £o5uev, fidv
xe &no\hn$crato]iev, x$> xupC^ dtto-Sv^axouev, GAv xe oGv £<3uev GAv
xe dTtodv^axopev, xoO xupiou Gaudv.
See further: Gal. 2.20; 1 Thess. 5.10; cf. Lk. 20.36-39.
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in the most direct way in Rom. 8.2:
6 y&P v6uoc toO uvetHiaxoc TfJs £coffs £v Xptax$ 'InaoO fiA.eud6ptoa€v
ae &no toO v6uow xffc &uapxCac Kat xoO dav&xou.
and the same idea is carried on in I Cor. 15-26, 55*
Hence the freedom of man is actually objective freedom.
Man is free from death because he has become identical to his
authentic being, i.e. he has realized his actuality. In other
words he has accepted his potentiality, i.e. his creaturehood.
Man was not free, man was a slave of death and sin, because he
had misconceived his being and freedom. Just as he wanted to
be a self-sustaining being so he conceived his freedom to be
coming from within himself and relating him to his inner self.
Lack of freedom is constituted by his inability to be a source
of himself and to determine his own existence. This slavery is
characterized by the centripetal outlook of man in which he
regards himself as an introspective reality, self-centred and
actualized within the limits of his empirical existence. Bibli¬
cally speaking this is an existence known as sinful existence
where the Imago Eei is eclipsed. In terms of freedom it is a
state of slavery. As opposed to this is a new status and mode of
existence which is granted to man through Christ. It is the
1
status of sonship. Christ is the Son and so is every man who
is in Christ. And being an "image of God" (see p. 108)
is the authentic being of man, i.e. is an actualization of his
real being and his real freedom.
1. Rom. 8.14, 19; 9-26; Gal. 3-26; 4.6.
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By realizing that his roots and ground of being are outside
of himself man has freed himself from the beguilement that he
lives from and for himself. He realizes that he is from and
for the Other.
Lastly, man's ultimate freedom is the freedom of a creature
which accepts itself on the terms of its being related to its
Creator. Thus Paul wrote to Galatians:
bustc ycip tn feAeudepCqi £HAf|£r)xe, &6eX<poC (5. 13).
Paul is referring here to those who are being saved in
Christ, i.e. those who are called to salvation are identical with
those who are called to freedom. And those who are called to
salvation are saved by the restoration of the original state of
man, the restoration of an image and likeness, i.e. the re-
establishment of the true relationship on the plane of Creator-
creature. Hence to be called to freedom is to be called to
authentic existence.
Accepting the argument that the concept of 66Ea in
St. Paul is a concept for an authentic existence (see p. 57)
one can easily see that the concept of freedom too is inseparably
bound up with the concept of an authentic existence. In Rom. 8.21
Paul writes:
&t6xi nat aOxil nxtats £A.eudep<oi5flaexat. xfic 6ouXeCaQ xffc
«>Oop&£ ets xfjv fiAeuGeptav xffQ 66Ens xciv x£hvuv xoO GeoO.
Here Paul has expressed the cosmic dimension of the historical
existence of man and the impact of man's centripetal movement. An
authentic existence is an authentic freedom, not only the authentic
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freedom of man but of the whole of the universe, and this freedom
is expressed in terms of relationship, sometimes in metaphorical
language, where God the Creator, is addressed as father, and the
world and man, the creature, are referred to as children. Their
freedom consists in the glory which is realized by their
glorifying God, i.e. by their understanding and accepting their
status of an inauthentic existence. While in a historic state
of existence (=» corruption existence) they were subject to
corruption by the act of deceiving themselves that they were
independent. Man who has misunderstood himself, in the sense
that he has regarded himself as being the source of his own
existence, has imposed the state of corruption on the world,
because he has understood himself as a centre of the world and the
source of its existence. 3y the re-establishment of man's true,
original state the whole of creation is freed from the deceit of
self-sufficiency and thus from the subjection to corruption and
is brought back into "the freedom and glory", i.e. has again
assumed the status of an image.
In conclusion, it seems that Paul has viewed freedom as an
objective reality. In his view freedom is not something coming
from within, nor is it something which is added to the basic
needs of human existence. Strictly speaking freedom belongs to
the sphere of human reality and is to be spoken of only in terms
of man. Further, the concept of freedom in St. Paul is, strictly
speaking, a concept of relationship. There is not such a thing
as man's freedom from and for himself. Man is free from something
lit)
objectively different from himself, and is free for something and
someone, objectively different from himself. Insofar as absolute
freedom (= an authentic existence) is concerned, in short: man
does not have it:
&UoC(jiq 6 fiXeddepoc xlndelc SoOXoc £axtv XpiaxoO (1 Cor. 7. 22).
Man's freedom is constituted by his being able to accept
himself on the terms of what he really is (= a potential reality)
which frees him from the deceit that he is an actual being equal
to himself as an isolated unit. Man by nature is an ec-static
being outwardly related, and so is freedom, because freedom is a
peculiarly human phenomenon. There is no freedom apart from human
reality, and if man is to be viewed as an ec-static being, and Paul
views man that way, then there is no alternative to this under¬
standing of freedom. To put it in an exaggerated way, man is
equal to his freedom, i.e. freedom is a reality which could be
classified as "between the two"."'" This "being between the two"
means that man has no actual essence, but essentially is potential.
In order to be man man has to open up towards the Other, to
actualize this "between tne two". Man's movement has to be
centrifugal in order to cohere with his ec-static nature. To be
free is to understand myself in terms of what I am a relationship.
If we now turn to Seneca's concept of freedom the first
thing to be said is that in Seneca as in Paul freedom and authentic
existence are entirely identical concepts. The difference betv/een
1. This argument is valid insofar as one is ready to accept
Conzelmann's definition of man; "I am my relationship to God"
(op.cit., p. 193)*
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Paul and Seneca at tills point lie in their diametrically opposed
understanding of the actualization of this concept. While Paul,
on the one hand, understands freedom and authentic existence as
something that essentially comes to man from without and relates
him to the Other as a reality objectively different from himself,
Seneca, on the other hand, has understood freedom (= an authentic
existence) as something which is within the power of man. Free¬
dom is understood, by Seneca, to be within man*s capacity in the
sense that it is identical with man himself. Thus Pohlenz rightly
states that "Die Freiheit ist mit der Menschennatur wesenhaft
verbunden",1 or as it was said:
"Freiheit folgt aus dem Mensch-Sein, Unfreiheit ist Folge
des V.'elt-Seins. Ist der Mensch Mensch in der Welt, dann
ist er beides; er ist frei, sofern er Mensch ist, er ist
unfrei, sofern er in der Welt0ist, well er damit ja dem
Gesetz der Welt untersteht." 2
This understanding of man and reality in the Greek world was
possible because of its humanitarian tradition and anthropocentric
understanding of reality, for which reason it was said:
"Grundzug des hellenischen Wesens ist der Drang nach
Freiheit und Selbststandigkeit, und darin ist es begrUndet,
dass die griechische Ethik die Sittlichke.it ausschliesslich
aus der Physis des lienschen, aus seinem eigenen KSnnen und
Streben entwickelt und grundsStzlich von jeder hdheren
Macht absieht, die ihm sein Tun von aussen vorschreibt.
Die Weltordnung, mit der^die menschliche Natur gesetzt ist,
ist selbst gottlich,..,"J
In Seneca, freedom is authentic existence in the sense that man is
1. Freiheit, p. 181.
2. hiederwimraer, op.cit., p. 38.
3. Stoa, i, p. 135; cf. Freiheit, p. 18: "Grundzug ihres
"(hellenischen) Wesens aber ist der Freiheitsdrang."
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fully independent, i.e. "my freedom is a choice of being God",'1'
as Seneca writes:
"Itaque in tabulas vanurn coicitur nomen libertatis, quam
nec qui emerunt, habent nec qui vendiderunt. Tibi des
oportet istud bonum, a te petas."2
By giving one's own freedom to oneself, man ultimately identifies
himself with God, or even more emphatically, to underline the
anthropocentric aspect of Seneca's philosophy one could say that
man "makes himself man in order to be God."^ If to be man means
to be free (Pohlenz) then equally to be free is to be man, and to
be ultimately free is to be God himself. In this light is to be
seen Seneca's argument:
4
"In regno nati surnus; deo parere libertas est."
Here there is to be borne in mind that "deus" is the 6a£uov,
which is within and is ultimately identical with man. If we list
only a few examples of Seneca's attempts to define freedom, we
shall immediately notice that what is most characteristic is man's
fear of the Other.
Seneca writes:
"Quae sit libertas, quaeris? Nulli rei servire, nulli ^
necessitati, nullis casibus, fortunam in aequum deducere."
And in another letter he writes:
1. BN, p. 599.
2. Bp. 80.5-
3. BN, p. 626.
4. De Vita Beata, 15.7.
5. Ep. 51.9 •
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"Liber est autem nou in quern paruw licet fortunae, sed in
quem nihil. Ita est: nihil desideres-, oportet, si vis
iovem provocare nihil desiderantem."
The clearest definition of freedom tiiat Seneca has given reads:
"Expectant nos, si ex hac aliquando faece in illud evadimus
sublime et excelsum, tranquillitas animi et expulsis
erroribus absolute liberies. Quaeris quae sit ista? Kon
homines timere, non deos; nee turpia velle nec nimia;
in se ipsum habere maximam po testatern. Inaestimabile bonuin
est suun fieri.
There is no doubt that freedom here is identical with authentic
existence. "Not fearing either men or gods," is simply another
way of saying "possessing supreme power over oneself." Seneca
has conceived freedom as man's capacity to exist on his own, to
be centred in his own self in such a way that he can dispense with
the Other and reject him. The presence of the Other constitutes
lack of freedom for man, and thus an unauthentic existence. Thus
man has to prove to be able to do without the Other:
"Je schwScher das Band der AbhSngigkeit ist, das den
Menschen mit Gott verknOpft, je selbstbewusster er im
Bewusstsein seiner sittlichen Freiheit und Autonomie Gott
gegentibersteht, je mehr man sich des Verhaltniss des
Menschen zu Gott nur nach den das aussere Wohl bedlngenden
gdttlichen Eigenschaften zu denken gewohnt ist, um so mehr
wird einer Lehre, wie die stoische ist, der tiefere, im
Innera des Menschen in dera Lewusstsein der SQnde iiegende
BerQhrungspunkt mit dem Christentum fehLen". 3
Thus a disregard for the Other is an external sign of freedom and
an authentic existence:
"Non est autern libertas nihil pati, fallimur; libertas
est animum superponere iniuriis et eum facere se, ex quo
solo sibi gaudenda veniant, exteriora diducere a se, ne




3. Baur, op.cit., p. 190.
4. De Const. Sap. 19.2.
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This concept relates to the thought of inner freedom:
"'Servus est.' Sed fortasse liber animo."'L
so it is correct to say: "Der Stoiker erkennt, dass die Freiheit
2
in der Einheit des Selbst mit Gott liegt."
This ultimate freedom in which the divinity of man is
actualized is ejq>ressed in Seneca through the concept of virtue.
Thus Seneca writes: "Prima ars homini est ipsa virtus,"-^ and the
interpreter adds:
"Darum ist die Tugend die rechte Vernunft (recta ratio),
d.h. v/er tugendhaft ist, hat diese gdttliche ratio in
sich und ist dadurch sich selbst oetoc."4
Ultimately, the drive for freedom and for virtue, in Seneca's
philosophy are identical. At the last resort they are both the
drive for an ultimate freedom which is authentic existence. It
is highly significant that Seneca regarded suicide as a means for
attaining ultimate freedom,'1 for, paradoxically enough, "suicide,
in fact, is a choice and affirmation - of being, and Niederwiramer
is right when he writes:
"Der Eelbst-mord des Stoikers ist gerade nicht Selbst-mord,
sondern eigentlich Velt-mord. Im Suicid versucht er sein
1. Ep. 47.17.
2. Niederwimmer, op.cit., p. 51.
3- Ep. 92.10.
4. Schreiner, op.cit., p. 67; cf. Epp. 66.12; 7o.l7, 22.
3. Epp. 12.10; 26.10; 51.9; 70.12, 14-lb; 77. 14-15; De Prov.
6.6-7; Be Ira, iii, 15-3-4; Ad Marc. 1.2; 20.3; 22.7; cf.
J.M. Rist, Stoic Philosophy. Cambridge, 1909, pp. 233» 247.
6. BN, p. 479.
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Selbst endgtlltig von der ihnnnicht verfugbaren Welt, dem
Nicht-selbst zu erlSsen..."
And indeed, by its very presence and external reality, the world
constitutes a danger and threat to man, for it is the objective
limit to man's freedom. An impetus and a desire to actualize
his authentic existence make man assert himself over against the
Other. He does it by suicide for through the act of killing
himself he has absorbed and dissolved the Other. Through suicide
man has achieved an ultimate oneness, has become identical with
himself in an actual sense, he is "Kdnig in seiner Innerlichkeit
2
und so KOnig der Welt." Because of that the only one who is
really free in Seneca's philosophy, is the wise man who is self-
sufficient and virtuous, who is capable of scorning all external
4
things, and is fortified against external forces. To scorn
external things, i.e. to be ultimately free (= to have an authentic
existence) means to regard oneself as the beginning and the end
of the whole of existence, and that only a wise man can do, for:
"Freedom can be called its (virtue's) visible or outward
aspect: for wisdom, which implies all virtues, liberates
man from outward things. Epictetus therefore, calls the
non-philosophical man and says that Antisthenes
'liberated' him, viz. o^ru^^liing him not to desire out¬
ward things which are not in our power..
1. Niederwimmer, op.cit., pp. 51-52.
2. Niederwimmer, op.cit., p. 3•
3. Be Const. Sap. 19.2.
4. Epp. 9.3-5, 8, 12-19; 59.8, 14; 71.26; 73.14; 74.30;
76.35; 85.37-41; 111. 2,4; 120. 12-13, 18; De Const. Sap.
2.1; 5.4-7; 6.1-8; 8.3; 9.1; 15.3; De Tranq. An. 13.3-
5. De Vogel, op.cit., iii, p. 139.
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Insofar as virtue is authentic existence freedom is not only
her visible aspect but is entirely identical with her. For that
reason Seneca has considered very few, or no one, to be free:
"Tam prope libertas est; et servit aliquis?...Infelix,
servis hominibus, servis rebus, servis vitae. Nam vita,
si moriendi virtus abest, servitus est."1
Here also one can see that to be free, or to serve no one, is
actually the way of expressing the concept of authentic,
independent existence. Life itself constitutes the lack of
freedom, because it is an existence conditioned and not authentic.
From this conviction arises Seneca's scorn for life and an inter¬
pretation of suicide as being an ultimate freedom, as being an
act of destruction of the Other.
In accordance with his humanistic beliefs (see p. 93 )
Seneca could not accept man on terms of human empirical existence.
For that reason he argued:
"Liber est autem qui servitutem suam effugit;...Sibi
se^ire gravissima est servitus."^
To serve oneself means to accept oneself on terms of conditioned
existence, means to recognize the potentiality of man and his
essential lack of being. Such belief is inadmissible, and would
be contrary to the whole of Seneca's anthropology. That would
mean abandoning the basic creed of human existence, to strive for
the superhuman (see p.H8f.). Freedom, according to Seneca, is
1. Ep. 77.15.
2. N.Q., iii, Praef., pp. 16-17.
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experienced in an empirical life by man's choice, and right, to
reject the Other, and by his right to assert himself over
against the Other, by transcending the limits of man's conditioned
existence. For that reason it has been well said that:
"Das Leben ist Wagnis, ein unerbittlicher Kampf, dessen
Preis der Mensch selbst ist, ein Kampf, in dem er Uber
sich hinauswachsen muss."i
Man has to transcend himself in such a way that his introspective
nature is actualized by a centripetal movement. That means that
an ultimate freedom (= authentic existence) is realized from, by,
and within man himself. That is why the human mind has been
characterized as one "ex quo solo sibi gaudenda veniant," (see
p. 119), and yet this mind has to be free. As to the freedom of
mind Seneca says:
"Vacat enim animus molestia liber ad inspectum universi,
nihilque ilium avocat a contemplatione naturae."2
These two, the universe and nature, are identical since Seneca
regards both of these concepts as being divine. As such they
stand over against man as objectively different, and by the very
otherness of their being they constitute a danger to man's
existence. Thus man has a need to absorb and to destroy them
through the act of contemplation. By contemplating nature
and the universe man comes to know them, becoming thus an
ultimate source of their being and existence. By becoming, or by
1. A. Paul, Untersuchungen zur Elgenart von Seneca's Phoenissen,
Bonn, 1953, p. 83.
2. Ep. 92.6.
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having become, the source of their existence man has removed the
Other who was an objective threat to his existence. In other
words by being free one is an ultimate one, a source and the end
of the whole of existence and reality. Because of the knowledge,
which enables man to dispose of things and of his own existence,
Seneca has regarded the philosopher to be a true man. Thus he
quotes Epicurus:
"Philosophise servias oportet, ut tibi contingat vera
libertas.
And then he adds:
"Sapientia perfectum bonum est mentis humanae. Philosophia
sapientiae amor est et adfectatio." 2
Finally Seneca concludes:
"Sapientiam quidam ita finierunt, ut dicerent divinorum
et humanorum scientiam."^
Hence, the argument would run: I am a slave to philosophy and by
that very fact I am free since philosophy is the only way to
achieve wisdom and wisdom is knowledge of "things human and
things divine." Clearly, freedom is an ultimate knowledge of the
Other, which makes man free by having become the source of the
existence of the Other. Hence to be free is to be authentic.
Lack of freedom, on the other hand, is nothing else but the lack
of being, insofar as we are prepared to take an ultimate freedom
as an authentic existence!, and so:
"...der eigentliche Zwiespalt, in dem der Mensch lebt und
aus dem das Problem der Freiheit bzw. die Unfreiheit
resultiert, ist nicht der Zwiespalt zwischen der
1. Ep. 8.7; cf. Epp. 37.2-4; 88.2; 104.16.
2. Ep. 89.4.
3. Ep. 89.5; cf. Epp. 90.3; 88.33.
125
Innerlichkeit und allem 'Aeusseren', z.B. dem Leib, durch
den der Mensch auch Welt ist; der eigentliche Zwiespalt
liegt in Ich selber, er zerspaltet auch die Innerlichkeit
des Menschen. Auch in der Innerlichkeit ist der Mensch
nicht mit sich selbst eins - und also frei deshalb
ist der blosse RUckzug auf die Innerlichkeit, auf den
goto &vdp<oTio£ keine Rettung."1
This lack of being, revealed as lack of freedom, is realized
through the presence of the Other who makes man to be dependent
on him. For that reason "for Seneca freedom is closely linked
2
with the spiritual independence of the autonomous human being,"
in the sense that man is his own source of existence. "Der Glaube
an die Freiheit und die eigene Kraft des Menschen zur Erfiillung
seiner sittlichen Aufgabe,"-^ is the basis of Seneca's anthropolo¬
gical optimism. The belief that man can determine his own life
fully and authentically stems from his conviction that man dis¬
poses of himself in the sense that within the category of his
existence man does not face anything qualitatively distinct
which would limit him as the Other:
"Nemo inprobe eo conatur ascendere, unde descenderat.
Quid est autem cur non existimes in eo divini aliquid
existere, qui dei pars est? Totum hoc, quo continemur,
et unum est et deus; et socii sumus eius et membra."4
The whole Greek world was under the impression that:
"Der Mensch vermag seinem Wesen getreu zu bleiben auch
angesichts des Todes. Er kann sein bestes Teil, sein
Ich, auch in physischen Untergangej-wahren. Das ist
seine Freiheit und seine GrSsse."
1. Niederwimmer, op.cit., pp. 52-53.
2. Sevenster, op.cit., p. 117.
3. Freiheit, p. 178.
4. Ep. 92.30.
5. Freiheit, p. 60.
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And this greatness Seneca attributes to a Sage:
"Est aliquid, quo sapiens antecedat deum: ille naturae
beneficio non timet, suo sapiens. Ecce res magna,
habere inbecilitatem hominis, securitatem dei."l
Thus man's freedom consists of the actualization of what has
been classified as an "endeavour to become God." Hence, freedom
is not Just a choice, but a choice to be. It is taken away from
the sphere of ethics and is placed in the domain of ontology.
It deals with the problem of being rather than with well-being:
"Die Einheit von Freiheit und Nothwendigkeit constituiert
den Begriff des htfchstens Gutes. Dass Seneca diesem
Begriff des hochstens in Gott erfasst hat, ergibt sich am
deutlichsten daraus, dass er dem Menschen dieses hSchste
Gut als Ziel gesetzt hat."2
Precisely on account of his anthropocentric humanism Seneca was
hailed as a consistent and an orthodox Stoic, for he believed
that a wise man is "equal with God in moral purity and freedom.
This "equality" between man and God is man's real freedom. It
is the state in which man is self-sufficient, and in a position to
reject the Other. Freedom means the isolation of a solitary
heroic individual who has made himself a God. On this pretext
it was rightly said that:
"Geschichte des stoischen Freiheitsideal ist ein tragisches
Kapitel der Menschheitsgeschichte. Das Leben rachte sich
fur diese Vergewaltigung unerbittlich. Der Weg zum Ideal
des Weisen endete in der Resignation oder in der
Verzweifelung oder....in der Vereinsamung.
1. Ep. 53.11-12.
2. Baumgarten, op.cit., p. 55; cf. Ep. 120.10.ff; De Ben. vi,
21.2.
3. Dill, op.cit., pp. 308-09; cf. Epp. 53-11; 59.16; 72.8.
4. Greeven, op.cit., p. 59.
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This concept of freedom of Seneca is inseparably bound up with
his teaching on self-observation and self-command, which stems
from the philosophy of "know thyself" (see pp. 46ff.). Freedom,
being authentic existence, is identical with self-possession,
for one who possesses himself disposes of himself, not in a
relative but in an absolute way, i.e. he can give an existence to
himself and take it away. There is no greater freedom than that.
The man who is free to that extent has actualized his existence,
and transcended the limits of potential existence imposed on him
by his ec-static nature and expressed in the mode of a centrifugal
movement.
Hence, we can claim that Seneca's concept of freedom is
unilateral and anthropocentric. It is identical with the
authentic existence in which man fully disposes of himself:
"potentissimum esse qui se habet in potestate.""1"
2
"imperare sibi maximum imperium est."
"quem raagis admiraberis,-,quam qui imperat sibi, quam qui
se habet in potestate."
"quid praecipuum in rebus humanis" est?.. .ariimo omne
vidisse et, qua maior nulla victoria est, vitia domuisse.
Innumerabiles sunt qui populos,^qui urbes habuerunt in
potestate; paucissimi qui se."
Passages like these are frequent in Seneca and are correctly
related to the concept of freedom by Niederwimmer:
1. Ep. 90.34.
2. Ep. 113.31.
3. De Ben., v, 7.5.
4. N.Q., iii, Praef., 10.
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"Freisein heisst, sich selbst bestimmen kdnnen, iiber sich
selbst verftlgen kSnnen, sein eigener Herr sein; Freiheit
ist die Macht liber sich selbst, die SelbstmSchtigkeit...
Auch hinter-, der stoischen Freiheitsidee steht der Wille
zur Macht."
For this reason Seneca thinks it important that one should be
entirely an authority over oneself, that one should impose a
command on oneself, for by having done so man fully disposes of
himself and in that state is God. The "Freiheitsdrang" being
sustained by will to power has for its aim an authentic existence
because "every will wants to actualize, and to have actuality as
p
its element," and we have already clarified the position of
actuality and potentiality in the context of Paul's and Seneca's
anthropology. Thus, for example, emphasis has been put on the
Pauline (and biblical) future-orientated knowledge of God (see
p. 30, n.3 ), whereas Seneca is totally orientated to the present:
"Sapientis quoque viri sententiam negatis posse mutari;
quanto magis dei, cum sapiens quid sit optimum in ,
praesentia sciat, illius divinitati orane praesens sit."-5
"Hie (sapiens) praesentibus gaudet, ex futuro non pendet."^
Thus an interpreter has rightly remarked:
"The present can be grasped (v. D.L. vii, 141), it gives
the best chance of being verified (cf. S.E. Adv. Math,
viii, 247), and so it is the beginning of the systemati-
zation of structuring the knowledge. The Stoic, conse¬
quently, emphasizes the importance of the present tense
of the verb, because it is this which conveys most truly
the nature of reality. 'Only the present is real'
( CmdpxEtv )» k-e says,... (SVF, ii, 509)•"
1. Niederwixamer,op.cit., p. 3.
2. Heidegger, Discourse on Thinking, p. 80.
3- N.Q., ii, 36.1.
4. De Ben., vii, 2.4.
5. Watson, op.cit., p. 40.
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Indeed it can be said that while Paul's thought as a whole is
potentiality-minded so is Seneca's actuality-minded with a
profound emphasis.
It was argued that "the essence of man is his freedoul',and
2
this essence or "human reality is the desire of being-in-itself",
so that the lack of freedom is the lack of being itself and an
actualization of freedom is realization of being, is being-in-
itself. Man, therefore, can be free only by achieving authentic
existence, by becoming the source and aim of his own being. As
long as he has not achieved this he is faced with the problem of
the Other, which appears as the limit of his freedom. The
ultimate, unlimited freedom is the same as ultimate, unlimited
being. To be able to determine myself as free being means to
dispose of myself unconditionally and to be the source of my own
existence irrevocably.
Finally, it is clear that, just as in Paul, so in Seneca's
thought, the concept of freedom and authentic existence are
identical. Man is ultimately free when he ultimately disposes
of himself. This is the point on which both Paul and Seneca
have ultimately agreed.
Where they did not agree is that Paul, having seen man as
a potential being, an ec-static unit, whose being is sustained-from-
outside, or rather whose being is constituted by the reality of
being-related-to-the-Other, has seen freedom as man's way of being.
1. Niebuhr, op.cit., i, p. 18.
2. BN, pp. 565-66.
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The only free man, for Paul, is the one who accepts himself as
a potential reality, sustained by the centrifugal movement of
his ec-static nature.
Seneca, on the other hand, lias seen man as a self-contained
reality actualized within the reality of his empirical being. As
such man was identical with himself and his freedom was identical
with himself. To be free means "to fear neither gods nor men",
i.e. to dispose of oneself in such a way and degree as to be the
unconditional source of one's existence. By the fact that man
is faced by the Other he is being forced out of his actuality
into a sphere of potentiality, and for that reason he finds an
ultimate freedom in suicide. By suicide he is killing not himself
but the Other who is his limit and thus his hell.
Hence, for Seneca, as opposed to Paul, the free man is not
one who accepts himself on terms of his potentiality, but
precisely the opposite, the free man is the one who actualizes
himself. Being actual is being free, and being free is being
ultimate. By having actualized himself man has come to the point
where the whole of existence finds its source in, and springs
from within, himself. Just as man's identity in Paul is
identical with man's relatedness to the Other so is his freedom
identical with it, and in Seneca, just as man is identical with
his own self, being different from the Other, so is his freedom
identical with his independence from the Other.
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MM AND ESCHATOLOGY
If the search-for-identity and the problem of authenti¬
city constitute the core of an anthropological enquiry, then it
is fair to insist that the eschatological aspect necessarily
comes into it. Far more so since the question of identity and
authenticity is a question of man's limitation, and man's
limitation is death (Bultmann). To say the least an eschatolo¬
gical quest is an anthropological quest*
However, the eschatological perspective as presented in
the New Testament and in Stoic philosophy goes beyond the sphere
of the human in the sense that it is not only man who is
eschatologically affected but the whole of creation or the universe.
Our task is to narrow down the eschatological enquiry and
focus it on an anthropological level, but of course it can be
done only within the framework of eschatology as a whole. Or,
perhaps, it would not be an exaggeration to say that anything in
Paul's and Seneca's writings about God, the world and man, and
which can be included within the domain of eschatology, is speaking
of, and is related to, man. At any rate it was said of Paul:
"Anthropology must then eo ipso be cosmology just as
certainly as, conversely, the cosmos is primarily viewed
by Paul under an anthropological aspect, because the fate
of the world is in fact decided in the human sphere.1,1
Before we proceed with an exposition of the eschatological aspects
of the anthropology of Paul and Seneca let us point out that it
was argued that:
1. Kasemann, op.cit., p. 23.
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"Der stoische Glaube an die Unsterblichkeit, der
allerdings sehr pantheistisch gefarbt ist, bat Paulus
mindestens wankend gemacht, so dass er die jOdische
Vorstellung der Auferstehung nicht mehr rein durchftihrt."
This argument sums up in itself two points, a) an anthropo-
centric aspect of eschatology, and b) an affinity between Paul's
and Stoic eschatology. With the second we disagree, but we
shall not deal with it here. It was also said:
"On the philosophical side the Paulist view of immortality
is closely akin to the Stoic, andpis exposed to the same
charge of logical inconsistency."
The most categorical argument for an affinity between Christian
and Stoic eschatology, and thus possibly between Paul's and
Seneca's eschatologies as well, came from Winckler who writes:
"ThatsSchlich sind die vorztiglichsten Lehren der Stoiker
ins Christenthum iiber - und aufgegangen, und bereits im
N.T. nachzuweisen: Die Lehre vom Logos. Das ethische
Ideal und die Paradoxa. Humanitat und Kosmopolitanismus.
Die Empfehlung der Askese. Die-Lehre von Unsterblichkeit
der Seele. Die Eschatologie."
Winckler further argues that:
"Die stoische Unsterblichkeitslehre ist im Christenthum
nicht einraal mit alttestamentlichen Zusatzen versehen
worden, aus dem einfachen Grunde, weil;das Judenthum
Nichts dergleichen aufzuweisen hatte."
And finally, insofar as eschatology on a cosmic plane is concerned,
Winckler writes:
"Stoicismus und Christen'thum differieren in dieser Lehre
von der Wiedergeburt der Welt insofern, als der Christ
1. P. Barth, Die Stoa, Stuttgart, 1903» p» 181.
2. Arnold, op.cit., p. 421.
3. A. Winckler, Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des Stoicismus.
Leipzig, 1878, p. 3»
4. Ibid., p. 52.
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nur eine einzige Welt-Verbrennung und Neugeburt annimmt
der Stoiker-^hingegen eine ewige Wiederholung dieser
Processes."
Even though Vinckler did not state what he actually understood
under the concept of eschatology he argued for the similarity
between the Christian and Stoic teachings about the last things.
As for Paul's eschatology itself it was said that:
"Es ist nicht schwer zur stoischen Eschatologie die
paulinischen Parallelen zu finden."2
The argument that it is not difficult to find the parallels
between Pauline and Stoic eschatology is summed up by Smiley thus:
"Not all Stoics believed in the immortality of the soul,
but there are at least a dozen passages in Seneca that
indicate that he believed in a survival of the spirit...
It is perhaps unnecessary to quote the many passages in
the New^Testament that refer to the immortality of the
soul." 2
This is the most common mistake to be found in the every day
understanding of biblical eschatology, namely reading the New
Testament from the Hellenistic standpoint. Later in the chapter
we shall refer to Seneca's concept of immortality of the soul,
but as far as Paul is concerned it is an utter misreading of his
writings when one sees in them a Hellenistic concept of the
immortal soul. It has categorically been argued that:
"Paul was too good a Jew and too poor a Hellenist to describe
the soul as being delivered from the clothing of the body
so that it might ascend to heaven naked. The Jews had an
intense dislike of nakedness, which made it seem improper
for a man even to pray in private until he had clothed
1. Ibid., pp. 56-57.
2. Liechtenhan, op.cit., p. 387; cf. Hellenism, p. 21.
3. C.N. Smiley, 'Stoicism and its Influence on Roman Life and
Thought', The Classical Journal, Chicago, 1933/3^; vol. xxix;
p. 653*
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himself. Consequently he adopted the conception that
the soul did not simply lay aside the body, but put on a
new glorious body, the eternal habitation prepared for
the soul in its true home in heaven.
The immortal soul is the consequence of the teaching of an inner
self of man, which is divine by origin, and as such cannot be
found in Paul for:
"Die Lehre der naturhaft unsterblichen Seele ist nicht
paulinisch. In seiner Weltanschauung hat sie keinen
Platz. Sie ist griechisch und bedeutet, was z.B.
Epiktet formulierte mit dem Spruch, dass es im Menschen
ein pdpiov toO Beou , ein Partikelchen der Gottheit,
geben sollte."2
Such a view is non-Pauline because it leads precisely to what we
have classified as a centripetal movement asserting man as an
in-himself-centred-being, whereas we have argued throughout that
Paul's view of man is such that it presents man as an ec-static
being, outwardly orientated and centrifugally related to the
rest of the world.
3
Thus along the same lines Schweitzer writes:
"Eternal Blessedness is thought of by Paul not as purely
spiritual existence, but as an existence in the condition
incident on the bodily resurrection."
And this is the centre of the whole of St. Paul's message, as he
himself states it.^ The resurrection is the centre of Paul's
kerygma and of his message. The concept of resurrection makes
Pauline anthropology to be exclusively New Testamental and, to
push it to its extreme, Pauline. On account of resurrection it
1. Knox, op.cit., p. 137.
2. de Zwaan, op.cit., p. 576.
3. Mysticism, p. 68.
4. I Cor. 15-14; see pp. 6ff. of this thesis.
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has been said that:
"The conception of a bodily resurrection," is the point
on which, "Paul parts company with both Judaism and
Hellenism. "•*•
This is a counter-argument to P. Earth's claim (see p. 132), and
we take it as a fairly correct description of the eschatological
aspect of Pauline anthropology. Thus Paul, advocating fiercely
the resurrection of the body, writes:
cnteCpexat a&ua iJjuxik6v, SyeCpexat aSpa uveupatlkdv.
The reason that Paul insisted on the resurrection of the body is
twofold. First it is a sign of an ultimate triumph of Christ
over death, and secondly man in his humanity is constituted by
his corporeality (see pp. 53ff. of this thesis), so that an inter¬
preter rightly writes:
"our corporeality is the relationship to the world and
the creatureliness of our existence to which the appointed
cosmocrator must lay claim.if he is to establish the
basileia in the universe,"
1. Stacey, op.cit., p. 188. However Schweitzer in Mysticism,
p. 274, argues curiously that: "The beginning of the Helleni-
zation of Christianity consists in the adoption of a
Hellenistic conception of resurrection in place of Late-
Jewish. It was a conception which ran counter to Paul's
saying that flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God.
Hellenistic thought could not so conceive of the resurrection
required by the Christian hope as to suppose the soul, thought
of as corporeal, to become naked in death and to assume at the
resurrection a heavenly corporeity." This argument seems to
oppose Stacey's claim.
2. I Cor. 15.44.
3. I Cor. 15.55.
4. Kasemann, op.cit., p. 22.
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On the ground of St. Paul's uncompromising insistence on
the resurrection of the body, and with an understanding of
such/
corporeality/as we have outlined, KSsemann further argues:
"Man cannot be defined from within his own limits, but he
is eschatologically defined in the light of the name of
Christ, just as Adam once received his name from God,
thereby acquiring a definition as creature.1,1
And indeed, as it is argued by many (especially Schweitzer), this
interpretation fits entirely within the argument that Paul was
apocalyptic-eschatologically minded. So Schoeps writes:
"The non-eschatological Paul is simply2unintelligible; he
could not possibly find a following."
Simultaneously, as attempts were made to interpret Paul either
entirely in Hellenistic or in Judaistic terms, it was said that
■3
we can "assume that Pauline eschatology was rooted in Judaism,"-^
apparently running counter to Stacey's argument (see p. 135)*
Schoeps also has admitted that "the theology of the apostle Paul
arose from overwhelmingly Jewish religious ideas", saying that
Paul has "viewed the Messianic events within the framework of
Jewish expectation;" hence an "attempt to derive his eschatology
5
from Hellenism" should be considered misguided. Schoeps finally
concludes that:
"this type of eschatological thought which leads to a
transcendent reinterpretation of the Messianic idea
1. KStsemann, op.cit., p. 31.
2. Schoeps, op.cit., p. 273*
3. Davies, op.cit., p. 287.
4. Schoeps, op.cit., p. 259.
5. Ibid., p. 88.
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etc atOva ueAA6vxa was deeply harmonious with the
conceptual world of Paul.1,1
Pauline anthropology, complex as it is, is fully defined
in terms of authentic existence which is expressed in terms of an
2
everlasting life. If death is a limitation of human existence
(= an unauthentic existence) then opposed to it is an eternal
life as authentic existence. If man's lack of authenticity is,
as we have argued, lack of being, translated in Pauline terms =
life, then existence within the sphere, and within the fullness,
of being is eternal life as opposed to death. On this ground
it should be possible to draw some logical and consistent lines
of the eschatological aspect of Paul's anthropology.
Paul has considered man to be an authentic creature when,
accepting his creaturehood, man recognizes, and relates to, the
Other as the source of his existence. This capacity to relate
to the Other, classified as a centrifugal movement, is expressed
in Paul by the concept of awpa, or body. For this reason
Paul's eschatology is body-centred and revolves around the re¬
surrection of the body. By the resurrection of the body man is
going (to be able) to recognize himself as a creature re-related
to his Creator. And then Paul emphasizes that through the
resurrection Christ has revealed the meaning of man's creature-
hood:
coerce eC xlq fev Xpuaxy, wacvfi hxCoiq. (2 Cor. 5. 17).
1. Ibid., p. 96.
2. Rom. 2.7; 5.10, 17, 21; 6.22; 8.6; Gal. 6.8.
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Just as Paul argued that if Christ was not raised everything is
in vain so he argues: oOxe yap TtepLxoufi vC £axtv oOxe
dxpofSoaxCa, dXXd xatvfj xxCaig (Gal. 6. 15).
Hence the threefold aspect of the authenticity of man is fully
revealed. Man is creature and as such depends on his Creator.
His (man's) creaturehood is actualized by his acceptance of him¬
self in terms of his bodily existence. Sin is an attempt to
deny his creaturehood and simultaneously is a destruction of
authentic existence. The re-establishment of authenticity is a
new creation which is fully actualized in the resurrection of the
body. Thus we can agree with Sevenster:
"It will be obvious from what has gone before that his
(Paul's) whole theology is steeped in eschatology, and
that within this eschatological framework the past,
present and future are most closely linked with one
another.
The continuity of man's being and existence, therefore, is twofold.
Man is creature and is to remain a creature in the age to come.
The authenticity of his being is to be actualized by his becoming
a new creature. This existence of the fallen creaturehood is
organically linked with the future existence of the new creature¬
hood. In that respect, according to Paul, the eschatological
events are neither transcendent nor metaphysical, they are
historical events, because in relation to man is decided the
destiny of the world (see p. 131 )• The fulness of the authen¬
ticity of man's creaturehood will culminate in the re-establish¬
ment of full communion with the Creator, which Paul expresses by
1. Sevenster, op.cit., p. 219.
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the term "peace"1 as opposed to the fallen state which is the
state of hostility towards, denial and rejection of, the Other.
Therefore to talk of an immortal soul in Paul's anthropology is
to misread Paul. The resurrection, as a final coronation of
the new creation, occurs not by natural laws and necessities,
but by Christ* s triumph over death and sin. A resurrected man is
going to be fully Imago Dei, because he is resurrected precisely
on account of his recognition of the Other and on account of
accepting himself on terms of his creaturehood.
If we compare Paul's eschatology to Seneca's one striking
thing quickly appears, namely that, while in Paul cosmology was
totally anthropologically orientated, in Seneca it is vice versa:
anthropology is cosmologically orientated. The reason for this
2
is Seneca's understanding of the concept of soul, which is
identical to divine reason (see Chapter 1). The second striking
difference between Paul and Seneca is that, while the eschatolo-
gical aspect of Pauline anthropology was body-resurrection centred,
the eschatological aspect of Senecan anthropology was soul-
immortality centred.
In the first part of the chapter, while dealing with Paul,
we have made it clear that the immortal soul has nothing to do
with Pauline anthropology, in spite of arguments such as Winckler* s
(see pp. 132-33 ), but on the contrary Pauline anthropology, as
1. Rom. 5-1; a.6; 15-33; 16.20; I Cor. 7.15; 14.33; 2 Cor.
13.11; Phil. 4.9.
2. Seneca interchanges frequently the concepts of soul, spirit,
mind and reason.
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Bultmann puts it: "must be understood in terms of resurrection
of the dead and not as the immortality of the soul.""'" As to
Seneca we can quote De Vogel:
"With Seneca, immortality takes an important place. He
speaks of it frequently and inpterms which remind us of
Plato (especially of Phaedo)."
However, De Vogel herself long ago observed how controversial or
ambivalent is the teaching of Seneca about the immortality of the
soul. She has noticed that Seneca on that point is inconsistent,-'
speaking sometimes for, sometimes against the immortality of the
Ll
soul. It was argued that:
"Eine eigentliche persSnliche Unsterblichkeit der Seele
kennt das stoische System nicht."5
on account of the logical argument that:
"Die Lehre von Unsterblichkeit der Seele ist mit dem
stoischen Dogma der periodischen Weltbrennung
unvereinbar."b
Thus Sevenster has rightly argued that "for Seneca, however,
immortality is - even when he states his certain belief in it -
7
bounded by the cyclic return of all things." Gummere has pointed
out that "how far it (soul) was individually immortal was often
Q
debated and by none more than by Seneca," but it has also been
1. EF, p.99.
2. De Vogel, op.cit., iii, p. 99.
3. Ibid., iii, pp. 297-98.
4. See Ad Marc. 19.4-6; Ad Pol. 9-2; De Prov. 6.6; Epp. 65.24;
57.8; 71.16; 31.10-11.
5. Holzherr, op.cit., ii, p. 39.
6. Winckler, op.cit., p. 50.
7. Sevenster, op.cit., p. 227.
8. Gummere, op.cit., p. 57.
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pointed out that "Seneca on this, as on many other questions of
high moment, is not steady and consistent"."1" Zeller has seen
Seneca as "describing the blessedness of the higher life after
death in colours not unlike those of Plato and Christian theolo-
p
gians", mainly because Seneca "gives attention to the kinship
-k
of the human spirit with God and the life after death".-' An
utterly ambiguous interpretation of the question of immortality
in Stoic philosophy is given by Rist: "The Stoic belief seems to
have been that as one dies, so one continues to exist until all
Ll
identity is lost". Some authors have made up their minds on
the question of the immortality of the soul in Seneca's philoso¬
phy arguing that "he is not convinced of the truth of immortality.
5
It is no more to him than a beautiful dream". Almost in
identical terms Pohlenz writes:
"In den Briefen betrachtet er (Seneca) die Unsterblichkeits-
frage zwar als ernsthaftes Problem, aber im Grunde ist
ihm der Glaube an das Fortleben nur ein schSner Traum,
aus dem er sich freilich nur ungern wecken lSsst..."b
Prat has argued the same way by saying that to the Stoics:
"the soul is no more immortal than God is personal, it is
dissolved within the body, returns to the elements and is
lost in the great All of which it is only a tiny part."'
1. Dill, op.cit., p. 502.
2. Outlines, p. 244.
3. Outlines, p. 288.
4. Rist, op.cit., p. 258.
5. Cumont, op.cit., p. 14.
6. Stoa, i, p. 322.
7. Theology, ii, p. 39.
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This interpretation arises from misinterpretation of Paul him¬
self, namely from taking for granted that St. Paul had a concept
of the immortal soul. But, without raising once again the
question of Paul*s attitude towards the immortal soul, let us
quote a final opinion on Seneca's attitude towards the immortality
of the soul:
"Im 1 chaos' zu verschwinden, dies ist der Unsterblichkeits-
glaube Senecas; daftlr entscheidet er sich, wenn er
theoretisch denkt."1
All these arguments for and against Seneca1s possibly having
defended the immortality of the soul are founded on Seneca1s
statements, for at this point, it has to be admitted, Seneca
spoke inconsistently of the soul as sometimes being mortal and
sometimes immortal. Thus he defends the immortality of the soul:
"Itaque de illo quaerendum est, an possit immortalis esse.
Hoc quidem certum habe: si superstes est corpori, praeteri*
ilium nullo genere posse, propter quod non perit, quoniam
nulla immortalitas cum exceptione est nec quicquam noxium
aeterno est."2
Sometimes Seneca is explicitly and categorically defending the
immortality of the soul. In the 102nd letter to Lucilius he
writes:
"Iuvabat de^aeternitate animarum quaerere, immo mehercules
credere."
and later in the same letter he writes:
1. Bickel, op.cit., p. 94.
2. Ep. 57.9.
3. Ep. 102.2.
* Praeteri Buecheler; preter p; propter VLPb; proteri Haupt.
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"Dies iste, quem tamquam extremum reformidas, aeterni
natalis est.1,1
If one is to take seriously these arguments of Seneca one is bound
to speculate, in one way or another, on the immortality of the
soul within the framework of the eschatological aspect of
anthropology. On a number of other occasions Seneca spoke of
the immortality of the soul in affirmative terms. Similarly
he expressed the same opinion in Ad Marciam speaking of the
immortal self:
"Imago dumtaxat fili tui perit et effigies non simillima;
ipse quidem aeternus meliorisque nunc status est,
despoliatus oneribus alienis et sibi relictus."^
Likewise he consoles Polybius over the death of his brother,
saying that his brother:
"Tandem liber, tandem tutus, tandem aeternus est."v
In Ad Helviam Seneca writes:
4
"Animus quidem ipse sacer et aeternus est..."
and:
"Turn peragratis humilioribus ad summa perrumpit et pulcher-
rimo divinorum spectaculo fruitur, aeternitatis suae memor
in omne quod fuit futurumque est vadit omnibus saeculis."
In De Tranquillitate Animi Seneca writes:
"Omnes isti levi temporis impensa invenerunt, quomodo r
aeterni fierent, et ad immortalitatem moriendo venerunt.',vJ
1. Ep. 102.26.
2. Ad Marc. 24.5-
3. Ad Pol. 9.7.
4. Ad Helv. 11.7.
5. Ad Helv. 20.2.
6. De Tranq. An. 16.4.
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From the above quotations one is likely to deduce that eneca did
believe in the immortality of the soul, but at the same time one
has no difficulties in illustrating from his writings that he did
not believe in it, or at least, that he was doubtful of it:
"Mors nos aut consumit aut exuit. Emissis meliora restant
onere detracto, consumptis nihil restat, bona parirer
malaque submota sunt."-*-
And thus Seneca comes to the point of identifying death with non¬
existence:
"'Faciat; ego illam (sc. mors) diu expertus sum.' 'Guando?'
inquis. Antequam nascerer. Mors est non esse; id quale
sit, iam scio. Hoc erit post me, quod ante me fuit...Nos
quoque et extinguimur et accendimur;...In hoc enim, mi
Lucili, nisi fallor, erramus, quod mortem j,udicamus sequi,
cum ilia et praecesserit et secutura sit.'"1
If the immortality of the soul is to be regarded as the central
hub of the eschatological aspect of Seneca's anthropology then we
can agree with the statement that:
"Es ist freilich ftir den Seneca-Leser eine recht schwierige
Aufgabe, ein klares und einheitliches Bild von Senecas
Auffassungen des Jenseits und der Unsterblichkeit der
Seele zu erhalten. Wie oft begegnen wir hier den grbssten
Widerspruchen! Scheint ihm eine Mai das Dogma von der
Unsterblichkeit als etwas SelbstverstSndliches
festzustehen, so aussert er sich an anderen Stellen sehr
skepcisch und resigniert; und endlich schlagt seine
Gtimmung geradezu in eine bewusste Opposition gegen den
Unsterblichkeitsglauben um."^
At the same time it has been argued that "where Seneca does
1. Ep. 24.18; cf. Ep. 82.16; Ad Marc. 19.4.
2. Ep. 54.4-5; cf. Ep. 77.11; "Haec paria sunt, non eris nec
fuisti"; also Ep. 99*30: "...effugit enim maximum mortis
incommodum, non esse."
3« Deissner, op.cit., p. 10 (80).
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deviate from the doctrine of the Porch is when he precisely
states that the soul is everlasting and immortal."1 Hence, if
we are to take Seneca as a serious and consistent Stoic, we
should put less weight on his arguments in favour of the
immortality of the soul. To say the least the immortality
belief in Seneca's anthropology does not make sense as long as
we take seriously the cycles of conflagration as Vinckler has
rightly pointed out. In that.context man's soul is immortal
only insofar as it is a part of the whole of the divine universe
and survives as a substance unchanged, having been always of
divine nature, but its distinct otherness perishes altogether
(see p. 141, n. 4.).
how, insofar as Paul's eschatology is to be considered as
an eschatology of "Jenseits" we have to make a basic distinction
between Paul's and Seneca's anthropology. Consistent with
Paul's view of man as a potential, ec-static being, the
eschatological aspect of his anthropology is future orientated,
and expressed in terms of resurrection. Seneca, on the other
hand, having viewed man as an actualized, in-himself-centred
reality, has brought the eschatological sphere within the life-
2
span of man and put it within the limits of his empirical life.
Thus man, being a creature who creates himself, is realized in
himself by becoming the source of his own existence and the end
1. A.L. Motto, 'Seneca on Death and Immortality', Classical
Journal, L, 1955, p. 189.
2. See Watson, op.cit., p. 40; cf. p,127f.of this thesis.
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of his own being. What we have characterized as a centripetal
movement, a reality characteristic of man's introspective nature,
Niederwimmer describes thus:
' ist 'Seele' oder 'Geist' im Sinne des eigentlichen
und wahren Ich des Menschen. Es ist innerste und geistige
Zentrum des Menschen, das, in dem der Mensch er selbst bei
sich selbst ist. Nur so darf die rede von der
'Unsterblichkeit' der Seele verstanden werden, bzw. so muss
und will sie 'entmythologisiert' werden."1
The dividing line between authentic and inauthentic existence in
Paul's anthropology is death, whereas in Seneca it is the absence
or presence of virtue which is determinative. Death as such is
regarded as a natural process. It is a benefit bestowed upon us
2 "5 4
by nature, a life's duty, the law which admits no exceptions,
R A
hence is not an evil, but an indifferent thing. By this view
of death Seneca managed to focus the anthropological aspect of
eschatology on man's empirical life so that it has been rightly
said:
"Sokrates und Seneca stimmen darin tlberein, dass sie die
Frage nach dem Sinn des Menschenlebens nicht durch
Eschatologie und eine sich auf das Jenseits erstrekkende
Theodizee haben losen wollen, sondern ihrer FrSmmigkeit im
Diesseits Ziel und Sinn gesetzt haben."'
1. Niederwimmer, op.cit., p. 22.
2. "Nega nunc magnum beneficium esse naturae, quod necesse est
mori." Ep. 101.14.
3. Ep. 77.19.
4. "Mors naturae lex est." (N.Q., vi* 32.12); cf. Epp. 4.10; 24.25;
30.11; 37.2; 66.42-43; 71.15; 77.11-13; 78.o; 91.10-12,76;
93.12; 94.7; 98.10; 99.6-9; 101.14; 107.6; 114.26-27; 117.22;
120.14,17; 123-16; 124.14; De Prov. 5-7-8; De Ira, iii, 42.2-3;
43.1-5; Ad Marc. 10.5; 11.1-5; 12.5; 15-4; 17.1; 19.1-3.; 20.2;
21.2; De Tranq. An. 1.13; 11.6; De Brev. Vitae, 8.5; Ad. Pol.
1.2-4; 9*9; 10.4-6; 11.1-4; 17.2; N.Q. i, Praef. 4; ii,
59.4,6-9; vi, 1.8-9; 2.6-9; 32.6-8.
5. Epp. 30.5-6; 82.15-17; 85-26-27; 99.29; 123.16; De Const. 8.3.
6. Ep. 82.10-13; Ad Marc. 19.5-
7. Bickel, op.cit., p. 92.
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An anthropological emphasis is put on virtue as the aim of
man's life precisely because of the cyclical conflagrations
and thus virtue has a totally eschatological perspective, in
the sense that realized virtue is realized authentic existence.
Interpreting the relation between death, virtue and
immortality from the eschatological point of view Eucken wrote:
"Uebrigens bedeutet der grossen Merzahl der Stoiker der Tod
kein volliges Erloschen des individuellen Caseins. Die
Einzelseelen werden so lange fortdauern, bis sie der
periodisch wiederkehrende Weltbrand in die Gottheit, den
Grund aller Dinge, zuriickftlhrt. Aber das Denken befasst
sich hier kaum mit dem Jenseits, es bleibt dem Diesseits
zugewandt und von seinen Problemen erfullt."1
The only consistent eschatology on an anthropological level that
can be worked out from Seneca's philosophy is the eschatology of
"Diesseits" which is contained in Seneca's fully consistent
teaching on virtue. Seneca argues that: "Virtus autem nihil
2
aliud est quam animus quodammodo se habens, ergo animal est."
And virtue Seneca describes as follows:
"Si volumus ista distinguere, ad primum bonum revertamur
et consideremus id quale sit: animus intuens vera, peritus
fugiendorum ac petendorum, non ex opinione, sed ex natura
pretia rebus inponens, toti se inserens mundo et in omnes
eius actus contemplationem suam mittens, cogitationibus
actionibusque intentus, ex aequo magnus ac vehemens,
asperis blandisque pariter invictus, neutri se fortunae
summittens, supra omnia quae contingunt acciduntque
eminens, pulcherrimus, ordinatissimus cum decore turn
viribus, sanus ac siccus, inperturbatus, intrepidus, quem
nulla vis frangat, quem nec adtollant^fortuita nec
deprimant; talis animus virtus est."
1. R. Euken, Die Lebensanschauungen der grossen Denker, Leipzig,
1897, p. lW.
2. Ep. 113-2.
3* Ep. 66.6; cf. Epp. 113. 3-6; 120.10.
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Virtue being in itself a life according to nature"'" should be
2 3
man's primary art since it makes man equal to God. On this
ground it is entirely legitimate to assume that the eschatolo-
gical epicentre of Seneca's anthropology is "Diesseits"-centred,
which has the divinization of man for its final goal. That
divinization is expressed in terms of a vision of God which is
the outcome of one's virtue.
Thus De Vogel writes: "For the Stoics, however, the clear
vision of heavenly bodies was in the fullest sense the vision of
God. Stoics, such as Seneca expect this vision as a right
4
which will be given to them in consequence of their virtue."
If we want to compare Paul's eschatological thought to
Seneca's on the anthropological plane we can agree with Baur
who wrote:
"Folgen wir dem Apostel Paulus in der Reihe der von ihm
1 Kor. 15, 20f. aufgefiihrten eschatologischen Momente,
so ist das Letzte, in welchem die ganze Betrachtung ruht,
der Weltlauf am Ende ist, der absolute Punkt, in welchem
Alles sich abschliesst, dass Gott ist Alles in Allem.
Was entspricht aber diesem Schlusspunkt der christliche
Eschatologie auf der Seite des stoischen Systems? Es kann
nur das gerade Entgegengesetzte sein, die im stoischen
Tugendbegriff realisierte Forderung, dass der Mensch,
d.h. das sich selbst genugende Ich des stoischen Weisen
das Eine und Alles sei."5
And finally what characterizes the futuristic aspect of Pauline
/*
eschatology is that the day of resurrection and judgement belongs
1. Epp. 50.8; 74.30.
2. Ep. 92.10.
3. Ep. 92.29; cf. N.Q. i, Praef. 6.
4. De Vogel, op.cit., iii, p. 100; cf. Ep. 95.10.
5. Baur, op.cit., p. 234.
6. Rom. 2-5,16; I Cor. 1.8; 5-5; 2 Cor. 1.14; 6.2; Phil. 1.6;
1.10; 2.16; I Thess. 5.2,4; 2 Thess. 2.2; 2 Tim. 4.8.
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to God. In Seneca it is man-orientated, where the conscience
stands as man's last judge,1 so that Baur rightly writes:
"Von einem am Ende bevorstehenden Tag des Gerichts spricht
auch Seneca, nur setzt er diesen richtlichen Act nicht in
einen tlber die Menschen ergehenden Urtheilsspruch Gottes,
sondern in das Innere des Menschen selbst."2
While in Paul's thought man, being a creature whose existence is
rooted outside of himself, is striving for the achievement of an
authentic existence in terms of realizing the limits of his
creaturehood, which will happen at the day of resurrection - for
which reason man has to die with Christ - , in Seneca's thought
man's authenticity will be achieved only when he is able to scorn
death and pass his own judgment unto himself, i.e. when he becomes
virtuous to the point of being the source of his own existence.
So, over against Winckler's argument (see p. 132 ) that
Christian and Stoic eschatologies should rest on the same ground
we should rather agree with Holzherr's judgment:
"Gerade die Lehre von den letzten Dingen zeigt am deut-
lichsten die wesentliche Verschiedenheit der Weltanschauung
Seneca's und der heidnischen iiberhaupt von der
Christlichen.
The theological aspect of Pauline anthropology is an outward going
one. It is entirely permeated with the hope of resurrection.
This hope of resurrection affects the course of man's life before
1. De Ben. vii, 1.7; Epp. 43«5; 97.15-16; 105.7-8; De Clem, i,
13.3.
2. Baur, op.cit., pp. 231-32.
3. Epp. 3.4; 24.11-14; 30.5-10; 3^.8,12; 78.5; 80.5; 82.16; 91.19-21;
Be Tranq. An. 11.5-6; N.Q. ii, 49.3; vi, 32.3>7-9,12; De Prov.
6.6; Ad Helv. 13.2.
4. Holzherr, op.cit., ii, p. 75.
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death and man's life affects the development of the course of
history. Thus due to the eschatological aspect of man's
creaturehood he (man) is a decisive agent of the destiny of the
world. He can he that only by the acceptance of his creature-
hood and when he is in solidarity with the rest of creation.
Solidarity with the creation is reflected in the anticipation of
the resurrection of the body, by virtue of which the believers
give their o&paxa to Christ as boaCav OScrav.1 Only by
virtue of the deep conviction that the "transcendent" state of
existence is inseparably bound up with "earthly" existence could
Paul say such a thing. For that reason it is legitimate to infer
here that man is a creature, his creatureliness can be called
body, and the resurrection body is that which Paul calls the
new creation. The new creation, again, is the full actualiz¬
ation in man of the glory and the image of God. In becoming
the fully perfect image and glory of God man is going to be a
creature par exellence. EVen resurrected man remains a creature,
and that points back to our original argument for Paul's bipolar
view of the world, man, reality and existence.
If the comparison with Seneca is to be assessed, an
immediate appearance of a split between anthropological and
cosmological eschatology is apparent. The continuity of
existence is limited to the cataclysmic cycles, which embrace
everything, abolishing the barriers of individual existence and
amalgamating the multiplicity of appearances into the realm of
1. Rom. 12.1.
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monistic oneness. Man perishes as such and there emerges a
need for language in terms of transcendence. However, such
eschatology in Seneca is inconsistently carried out, and the
only eschatology within the sphere of anthropology is an immanent
one, as we have outlined it here. Man is the reality and the
source of reality in the sense that he conditions his whole
existence. His task is to achieve fullness of being, i.e. to
be-in-himself, to abolish his potentiality by actualizing his
existence. By becoming an actual being he becomes the ultimate
source of his own existence, i.e. he becomes an ultimate One. For
that reason he (man) is primarily what he sees himeelf to be. And
he sees himself primarily as the being which wants to be actual.
Therefore he is the will to actualize and the lack of capacity
to wait."1" According to Seneca man's salvation lies in his
actualization of virtue and this is something that is acquired
and thus something that is acquired by one's own force, and is not
2
inborn. Thus man is fully man when he totally disposes of
himself, i.e. when he has made himself to be God. In that respect
he can pass judgment on himself for he springs from himself and
owes his existence to himself, and only to himselfl Such a lofty
task Seneca could assign to man only on his humanitarian grounds
1. We take here waiting to be the true nature of man, sc. an open¬
ness to that which regions; The validity of our
argument depends entirely on appropriateness of this
Heideggerian concept. See Heidegger's Gelassenheit,
Pfullingen, 1959, p. 50.
2. Epp. 50.5-8; 76.6; 90.44,46; 123.16; N.Q., iii, 30.8.
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and that is where he definitely differed from Paul. In a
somewhat too strict judgment on Paul, let us conclude with
Preller's words:
"Allein trotz aller Verwandtschaft mit der Anthropologie
des Paulus huldigt Seneca trotz seiner durchaus positiven
Wertung des Menschen durchaus nicht jener anthropocentri-
schen Weltanschauung, die Paulus bei ganz negativer
Menschenwertung vertritt."1
1. Preller, op.cit., p. 73*
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CONCLUSION
What is now to be investigated are the hinterlands and
trends behind Paul's and Seneca's anthropology. The last
quotation on the previous page voices an opinion to which we have
objected, but which, at any rate, has become a standard estimation
of Paul's anthropology. Preller, in that quotation states that
Seneca offers "durchaus positiven Wertung des Menschen," whereas
Paul presents us with a "ganz negativen Menschenwertung." What
is really meant is that while on the one hand we have a
Hellenistic, totally positive estimation of man (Seneca), on the
other hand we have a totally negative estimation of man in Paul.
And this is thought to imply a different background, in that case
Judaistic. Thus it is not by chance that A. Schweitzer, the
scholar who has most vigorously argued for a Jewish background to
Paul's thought, says: "The possibility that man, as man and
universally, stands in close relation to God lies outside his
(Paul's) horizon.
What these arguments imply is that according to
Hellenistic views the state of man, and man's place in the world
and before God, has been seen as a happy one and therefore has
a positive hallmark, while on the other hand Judaistic thought
pictured it in more pessimistic terms. Here we have a
Hellenistic anthropocentric humanism on one side and a Jewish
Jahve-centred theism on the other.
1. Mysticism, p. 9 •
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Thus Paul, in almost every interpretation, has had to submit
to an interpretation which was very much one-sided. He was
seen either as a Hellenist and thus associated with Seneca, and
their thoughts were extensively matched and compared; or else
he was seen as different and efforts were made to enumerate
as many points of difference between the two as possible. Such
one-sided interpretations were due mainly to the presupposition
that the world of Paul was to be sharply distinguished from the
Hellenistic one. But we have ruled this out from the very
beginning (see p. 1). Thus it is always taken as a rule that
if Paul's anthropology be characterised as optimistic it is
Hellenistic, while if it is pessimistic it is Judaistic. However,
Schoeps who has advocated Paul's strong Judaistic background
goes on to say:
"The Christian religion does not express an attitude of man
gained from the realization of the confrontation between
the creatura and the creator - like the Jewish en-am a - nor
any state that can be attained by action in obedience to
divine commands, but it is an opus operaturn made possible
by Christ's revelation in man. The Christian faith can
neither be defined objectively as opus or virtus sub proprie
merito, nor is it neutrally a mode of being to be aimed at
by poenitentia and attrltio; it is always an imputatio
spiritus sancti made possible by Christ. The gift of
faith to man is divinely bestowed. Man cannot attain
the mode of being proper to faith, nor even prepare for it.
Christianity is the testimony of a voluntas aliena in man,
"the testimonium internum spiritus sancti. "4
For this pessimistic view of man in Christianity Schoeps holds
2
Paul responsible, and then further transfers it to the influence
1. Schoeps, op.cit., p. 291.
2. Ibid., p. 275.
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which the LXX exercised upon Paul."'" Hence here is something
which strongly opposes traditional views in Pauline research.
Running counter to all interpreters Schoeps argues here that it
is a contradiction in terms to assume that pessimism is of
Jewish origin. He argues for precisely the opposite, namely
that the Judaistic view of man is an optimistic one. Of the same
conviction is Knox when he writes:
"None the less there is one element in the Epistle which
appears to be entirely alien to Judaism, and to the rest
of the New Testament, in Rom. 7 with its insistence on the
utter corruption of human nature and its incapacity to
achieve its own salvation."2
Thus one is led to the conclusion that an anthropological pessimism
on the whole is non-biblical. And indeed it is erroneous to
conceive the biblical view of man as a pessimistic one. However,
it is equally misleading to read pessimism into Paul and then trace
it back to Hellenistic influences. K. Stendahl*^ has provided us
with sufficient material, and with sufficient reasons for inducing
us to reconsider the ways and methods by which we read and under¬
stand Paul. Many of the accusations that are levelled at Paul
should really be levelled at his interpreters, such as Augustine,
4 5
Luther and Calvin, who have twistdd the Apostle*s thought and
1. Ibid., pp. 30» 191•
2. Knox, op.cit., p. 96.
3. Stendahl, op.cit., passim.
4. Thus Schoeps correctly traces but interprets wrongly the problem
when he says: "Luther as is well known, was also strongly
influenced by Augustine, who took even further the Pauline idea
of sin, so that Luther estimated the power of sin far more
pessimistically than did Paul, and that even in the Christian
life." (op.cit., p. 275).
5. Note here the significance of the fact that the first work that
Calvin published was, in his youth, the commentary on Seneca's
De Clementia.
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made him responsible for something for which he is not to blame.
At the beginning of the thesis v/e stated that the "problem is
that our contemporary thought is preconditioned by Pauline and
Senecan concepts," (see p. 5 )• What is meant by that is that
the West grew up in such an historical context in which simultan¬
eously, Pauline thought and Pauline interpretations were exposed
to the strong influence of surviving Stoic thought. Thus in the
ages of the rapid growth of the early Church semi-Christian and
semi-Stoic thoughts were read into Paul, mainly owing to super¬
ficial linguistic resemblances. Thus pessimistic thought is
really something read into Paul. For one would hardly find any
intelligible reason for Paul's frequent usage of the noun xdpa1
and the verb xoapetv,2 his view of man and the world surrounding
him were so pessimistic. We do not intend here to come forward
with a mass of arguments in defence of Paul's optimistic view of
man, for it is hoped that such an argument can be deduced from the
main body of the thesis throughout the previous four chapters.
Arguments like Schweitzer's have been dealt with in the chapter
on "Man and God". Hence there is no need to deal with them here.
On the issue of pessimism and optimism Seneca was equally
subject to various interpretations and diametrically opposed views.
Benz uses Seneca's discussion of suicide to demonstrate his
1. Rom. 14.17; 15.13,32; 2 Cor. 1.15,24; 2.3; 7.4; 8.2; Gal. 5.22;
Phil. 1.4,25; 2.2,29; 4.1; Col. 1.11; I Thess. 1.6;
2.19-20; 5.9.
2. Rom. 12.12,15; 16.19; I Cor. 7.30; 16.17; 2 Cor. 2.3; 6.10;
7.7,9,13,16; 13.9,11; Phil. 1.18; 2.17-18,28; 3.1; 4.4,10;
Col. 1.24; 2.5; I Thess. 3-9; 5.16.
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pessimistic view of the world. Thus on Seneca's Ep. 12.10:
"Patent undique ad libertatem viae multae breves, faciles.
Agamus deo gratias, quod nemo in vita teneri potest.
Calcare ipsas necessitates licet."
Benz comments:
"Die Formulierung bei Seneca (sc. des Selbstmordes), in
dessen pessimistischen Weltbild der Selbstmord ein viel-
behandeltes Problem ist, deckt sich hier wSrtlich mit
einer epikureischen Lehre."
Benz is right here for Seneca, whose syncretistic tendencies we
have stressed, (see p. 7, n. 2 ) in his suggestion that this view
2
comes from Epicurus. But Seneca's syncretism does not interest
us here; we are here concerned with the problem of pessimism
in his anthropology, on which Benz once again comments:
"Der Ausdruck Pessimismus ist verwirrend, wenn man nicht
betont, dass innerhalb der Stoa zwei Formen von
Pessimismus unterschieden werden kOnnen: die eine, die,
in einem Falle wie bei Seneca, auf einer vollkommen
dualistischen Lehre vom prinzipiellen Gegensatz der beiden
im Menschen vereinten Prinzipien Leib und Seele beruht,
und der seine Aufhebung in einer erlosenden Trennung der
beiden Teile findet, wie schon oben betont wurde: die
andere Form neben diesem innermenschlichen Dualismus ist
kaum Pessimismus zu nennen; auch in der jtlngeren Stoa
tauchen nSmlich Klagen iiber die Schwere des Daseins auf,
auch dort wird manchmal uber die Unvollkommenheit des
Irdischen gejammert: der Grund dabei ist aber nicht die
innere Unmoglichkeit, den verschiedenartigen Tendenzen,
die sich in der eigenen Person befehden, gleichmassig
nachzugehen, und die daraus entstehende innere
Verzweiflung an der EurchfUhrung einer harmonischen
Lebensgestaltung, sondern eine allgemeine Betrachtung der
unerfreulichen und unvollkomnenen Dinge, Ereignisse und
Einrichtung des Lebens, die bich den Menschen entgegenstellen
und seine Tatkraft hindern: wShrend im ersten Fall der
Iiialismus ein innerer ist, ist er im anderen ein Susserer:
1. Benz, op.cit., p. 56.
2. In para. 11, Seneca states that he is here borrowing from
Epicurus; cf. p. 7, n. 2, of this thesis.
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unter den letzten fallt der Pessimisraus der Kyniker,
unter den ersten z.B. der Platons und Senecas."1
In the chapter on eschatology we mentioned Seneca's anthropolo¬
gical optimism, and yet we find discussions on pessimism in his
philosophy. In fact the question whether he is an optimist or
a pessimist is not settled and for the moment we can pass on
Deissner's judgement in which he argues that:
"...haben wir in der Auffassung von Menschen und von der
Welt bei Seneca weder einen konsequenten Pessimismus noch
einen Optimismus. Der Pessimismus wird bei ihm nicht so
weit verfolgt, dass es zum vSlligen Verzweifeln an der
eigene Kraft des Menschen kommt und dass dann die Bahn
frei wtlrde ftlr eine andere Kraft, die dem Menschen in
seiner innersten Not^hilft und somit eine optimistische
Betrachtungsweise eroffnen wtlrde."2
The problem of the alternation of pessimistic and optimistic dis¬
course in Seneca is on no account an inconsistency on his part.
As far as he is concerned he is neither a pessimist nor an
optimist. He appears to be either the one or the other to those
who judge his writings from a certain point of view. In that
case he can be classified as either, depending on the point of
view from which he is looked at. Thus to describe his De
Consolatione ad Polybium as "herzlosen Reflexionen des
stoischen Pessimismus,implies of necessity the point of view
of the interpreter. So, too, for example, Holzherr, who writes:
"Eine eigentliche persdnliche Unsterblichkeit der Seele kennt
l±
das stoische System nicht", takes for granted that Seneca has
1. Benz, op.cit., p. 60.
2. Deissner, op.cit., p. 26 (104).
5. Baumgarten, op.cit., p. 105.
4. Holzherr, op.cit., ii, p. 39.
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to be a pessimist, for he is looking upon Stoicism from a
quasi-christian eschatological point of view.1 But just as
Seneca has been characterised as a pessimist it has been argued
that at the time of Seneca the Stoics have "die optimistische
Weltansicht ftlr physische Gebiet in einer Weise ausgesprochen
2
und durchgeftihrt, wie dies vorher noch nicht geschehen war".
Heinze himself must have realized that Seneca was frequently
seen as a pessimist in spite of his strongly accentuated humanism,
for he attempted to give a compromising interpretation:
"Die Stoiker liebten die Gegensatze nebeneinander zu
stellen: Gedanke und Materie, Optimismus und Pessimismus,
Freiheit und Nothwendigkeit - der Widerstreit dieser
Begriffe und der Versucn,seiner Ldsung zieht sich durch
ihre ganze Speculation."
Now v/hat is the truth? Is Seneca a pessimist or an optimist?
If one had to give an answer one would do well by saying that he
is both, for he indeed seems to be both, depending on the point
of view. Because of the fact that he envisaged man as being in
such a wretched situation under the threat of the presence of the
Other, fettered by the unhappy reality of his historical existence,
one is bound to describe him as a pessimist. On the other hand,
because of the fact that he had the courage to assign to man the
high aspiring task of becoming totally self-sufficient and describe
1. We call this view "quasi-christian" for it takes for granted
that the New Testament knows of the immortality of the soul
in spite of the fact that we have dismissed it as false.
2. Heinze, op.cit., p. 81.
3- Ibid., p. 167.
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him as the most happy when on his own, in need of no one and
nothing, his philosophy has to be labelled optimism - whatever
sort of optimism it may be.
In conclusion, the issue of optimism and pessimism in
Paul and Seneca is far less clear cut than one would want it to
be. We still maintain that Paul's view of man is an optimistic
one, but a number of interpreters, including Schoeps, seem to
regard Paul as a pessimist on account of his saying that man is
in the grip of sin and thus picturing man as one who cannot save
himself by his own power. However, this view of Paul is one-sided
for it does not give any credit to Paul for his insistence on the
hope of the coming age and the final salvation of all from death
through the resurrection of the body. Paul's whole thought was
future-orientated, he was an apocalyptic eschatologist, and only
on that level can his anthropology be finally judged. Hence,
someone who so consistently and stubbornly, against all reason,
believed in the resurrection of the dead could hardly be called
a pessimist by any standards.
Seneca, on the other hand, being an enthusiastic advocate
of man's virtues and capacities,with all his shortcomings on the
eschatological plane, could not be called a pessimist either. He
invested more hope and belief in an idea of man than in actual man,
and that is what makes his anthropology so hard to understand.
However, he was consistent enough in his writings for it to be
clear that his eschatology is not a transcendent but an immanent
one, and yet - what sounds so odd - his belief is not in a real
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man but in an idea of man. If we do not rebuke him for not
having believed in a real man but credit him with a belief in an
idea of man, then we have to admit that he had a childlike
enthusiasm. But this enthusiasm is a run-away-from-the-reality
precisely because he could not face up to the reality of the real
world.
for/
Now,/over a century of interpretation of the problem of
Paul and Seneca, interpreters have understood it to be their
task to prove that Paul and Seneca did have some points in common
or that they did not. Thus, we have pointed out at the very
beginning (see p. 2f) that the alleged correspondence between
the Apostle and the Philosopher was a forgery. And yet it has
been said:
ffDoch lassen sich noch zwei uralte, von einander
unabhSLngige Traditionen dartlber (i.e. correspondence
between Paxil and Seneca) nachweisen, welche in den Linus-
Akten verarbeitet sind. Zu ihnen kommt als dritte Quelle
die von Hieronimus und Augustin bezeugte Existenz einer
Correspondenz zwischen den beiden grossen Mannern, welche
echt gewesen sein kann. Denn die noch vorhandene
apokryphe Briefsammlung, welche ihren Namen tragt, stammt
erst aus dem Mittelalter und ist entschieden nicht damit
identisch." 1
Thus this interpreter, while recognizing the existence of a forged
correspondence nevertheless still maintains that there once
existed a genuine one also. Kreyher in this respect is a con¬
sistent advocate of a trend which saw Seneca as being close to
Paul. And he writes:
"...Seneca sich von alien antiken Philosophen am meisten
dem Christentum nahert, nur habe man darin nicht eine
1. Kreyher, op.cit., p. 198.
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von dem letzteren ausgehende Wirkung, sondern eine zu ihm
ftlhrende Entwickelung zu sehen."1
Kreyher should be taken as an exuberant, rather than a typical,
example of those who advocate the common roots and trends of
Pauline and Senecan thought. Thus he did not shrink from
producing, not less than 23 pages long, a list of parallels
p
between biblical and Senecan texts, concluding with the words:
"Wir schliessen diese Zusammenstellung paralleler Gedanken,
indem wir noch einmal auf die grosse Zahl von AusdrUcken
Seneca's hinweisen, welche zu der sgecifisch biblischen
resp. christlichen Terminologie gehoren."*
This sort of interpretation and this view belong to an earlier
period of interpretation which has not been discarded altogether.
However, in the later period interpreters have been more cautious
in drawing parallels between the two men when establishing their
points of contact. These efforts to prove that there are common
points between Paul and Seneca or between Christianity and
Stoicism in general were sharply rebuked:
"Die Neigung, Seneca und Christenthum in nahe Verwandtschaft
zu bringen, geht durch alle Jahrhunderte. Diese Neigung
tritt aber sehr haufig in entgegensetzter Weise der
Wahrheit zu nahe; um es kurz auszudrucken, kdnnen wir sagen:
entweder man sSkularisiert das Christenthum, Oder man
apotheosiert den Seneca."^
Such a view runs counter to the view of Kreyher. The question
remains: did Paul and Seneca have anything in common or did they
not? One certainly cannot escape the impression that they have
1. Ibid., p. 61.
2. Ibid., pp. 77j-95.
3. Ibid., p. 9o*'
4. Baumgarten, op.cit., p.
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something in common, especially when we read comments like this:
"...it is quite possible for Paul and Stoics to have
aimed toward a common centre, working in the same period,
the same atmosphere,-.though from different points of
view and approach."
It is hard to know whether one should or should not disagree with
this statement. If the author is saying that Paul and Stoics
hold identical views about certain problems, but tackle them
from different points of view then we strongly disagree. If,
on the other hand, the author is trying to say that the problems
facing Paul and contemporary Stoics were the same, but that they
were offering different solutions to these, then we would agree.
However, it sounds as if the former is the case, i.e. the author
thinks that Paul and Seneca were saying the same thing and
expressing it in two different ways. Therefore we shall object
to such an interpretation for obvious reasons. Equally mis-
2
leading is the claim that Seneca "war ein Ttat6aYcoY&Q ets Xptaxdv."
This is not the only misleading interpretation, for on another
occasion it has been argued that "the thoughtful student may
find many points of likeness in which the Christian theology and
morals may have been indebted to the doctrine of the Stoics".
Of the same sort is an argument that "Seneca was Stoic, and
Stoicism was the porch of Christianity",^ and yet another author
sets it as "one of the purposes...(of his article)... to illustrate
1. PS, p. 281.
2. Burgmann, op.cit., p. 63-
3» Davis, op.cit., p. 114.
4. Gummere, op.cit., p. 54.
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the truth""*" of the above and suchlike sayings.
This sort of argument is based mainly on a) the
similarity and external resemblance of the language of some
Pauline and Senecan passages, and b) post-Senecan interpre¬
tations of Paul. A more careful judgement has been expressed
as follows:
"Es ist nun wahr, dass kein anderer antiker Schriftsteller
der Lehre des Christentums so nahe gekommen ist wie
Seneca; aber die Grundanschauungen sind doch vdllig
verschieden... "2
This is the sort of explanation one would want to see gaining
force, so that the fundamental elements of Paul's and Seneca's
thought could be considered in themselves and thus judged instead
of their being compared as presented and understood by later
interpretations. So, in spite of the fact that "we must never
overlook a fundamental difference between Stoicism and
Christianity, both in motive and in their view of the mutual
relation of man to man",^ and in spite of the fact that "Stoicism
is essentially self-centred and its aims self-sufficiency,
.7i
while the driving force of Christianity is self-sacrifice, it
has been said:
"The general trend of his (Seneca's) moral teaching, which
commended the simple life and the gentler virtues, was
sufficiently near to that of the early Christians to
1. Smiley, op.cit., p. 645.
2. Westerburg, op.cit., p. 22.
3. Macgregor and Purdy, op.cit., p. 255.
4. Ibid., p. 255.
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create a tradition (now wholly discarded) that Seneca
had held converse with St. Paul."1
Although the author here sees clearly that there is little chance
of St. Paul and Seneca having known each other, he seems to
see more similarity between their teachings than would generally
be accepted nowadays. This is once again the error of looking
upon Paul's and Seneca's writings through the misleading
diffraction of later interpretations which flourished especially
2
in early Italian humanism.
Thus one may eventually conclude by agreeing with Kroll
who writes:
"Seneca bleibt in seinem Denken antik orientiert. Von
orientalischem Denken hSlt er sich entfernt, von.,
Christentum vollig trennt ihn eine ganze Welt." ^
If this be the case one is bound to wonder on what plane to inter¬
pret the problem of Paul's and Seneca's thought. One is equally
tempted to ask the question: "WTiy should one interpret them at
all?" The answer to this question we have stated at the beginning
of the thesis (see p.3 ), for St. Paul is being daily preached
throughout the world and the claim has been made that "certain
l±
aspects of the Senecan ideal have their value for men today".
Now, if this be true - which one would scarcely dare doubt - then
1. M. Cary and T.J. Haarhoff, Life and Thought in the Greek and
Roman World, London, 1940, p. 266.
2. K.A. Bluher, Seneca in Spanien, Mtlnchen, 1969, p. 21.
3. Kroll, op.cit., p. 447.
4. J.H.L. Wetmore, Seneca's Conception of the Stoic Sage as
Shown in his Prose Works, Published by University of Alberta,
1936, p. 58.
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this should be taken as a starting point for tackling the problem.
The common denominator of all three, Paul, Seneca and modern man,
is that they have and do live in the same or, at least, a similar
world, hence are facing the same or, at least, similar problems.
By facing the same or similar problems they are likely to ask
the same or similar questions and possibly also suggest the
same or similar answers.
In the main body of the thesis we have attempted to give
a survey of what Seneca and Paul thought of man in a more or less
analytic and direct way. We have tried also to enter into the
core of their thoughts and see what lay behind them, i.e. what it
was that made them think the way they thought. Bearing in mind
what we have said in the main corpus of the thesis we shall
attempt in this concluding part to give a possible "practical
application" of what has been said.
Provided that our presupposition holds good that modern
man is in the same, or at least^similar world/in which Paul andA
A
Seneca lived,then the whole problem will be centred on the question
of man^ dealing with the world. Just as it was argued "that
similar thoughts struck Paul the Apostle, and Seneca the
philosopher",1 and that one cannot help feeling that Seneca
"nearly reached the truth, and owed to the influence of the
religion of Jesus on the age in which he lived, much of the
2
excellence of his philosophy", so it can be argued that the
1. J.H. Bryant, The Mutual Influence of Christianity and the
Stoic School. London and Cambridge. 18b6. p. 55.
2. Ibid., p. 64.
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similar thoughts that struck Paul and Seneca strike modern man
as well and modern man is in some measure indebted to them.
At the beginning of the thesis we stated that that
which constitutes man's historicity is his being in the world.
His dealings with the world are nothing else but the actions
which characterize his historicity (see pp. I4ff.).
Thus Heidegger rightly interprets Paul's concept of >t6auos:
» Kdcruos oStos bedeutet bei Paulus (vgl. 1 Kor. u. Gal.*.)
nicht nur und nicht primSr den Zustand des 'Kosmischen',
sondern den Zustand und die Lage des Menschen, die Art
seiner Stellung zum Kosmos, seiner Schatzung der Gtiter.
Kdaiioc 1st das Menschsein im Vie einer gottabgekehrten
Gesinnung ( oocpCa rod udouov). Kdauoc oStoq
meint das menschliche Dasein in einer bestimmten
'geschichtlichen' Existenz, unterschieden gegpn eine
andere schon angebrochene ( at&v 6 u^^Acov) ."
It is clear here that man's historicity is conditioned by the mode
of his being in the world. Our task is precisely to depict
what are the modes of being in the world that a modern man would
regard as authentic and what relation these modes bear to the
thought of Paul and Seneca. H.A. Overstreet, writes that "not all
adults are adult. Many who look grown-up on the outside may be
2
childish on the inside". Overstreet made this remark in order
to emphasize the importance of maturity and seriousness as opposed
to playfulness and childlike behaviour, for "all childish minds
are dangerous, but particularly when those minds are housed in
1. M. Heidegger, Vom Wesen des Grundes, Frankfurt a.M., 1955» p.24.
2. H.A. Overstreet, The Mature Mind, London, 1950, p. 19-
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adult bodies; for then they have the power to put their
immaturities fully and disastrously into effect".1 This concept
of maturity, so important to modern man, was praised by
R.J. Leslie as follows: "Overstreet arrived at the same wisdom
2
enunciated by Seneca almost 1900 years ago". Leslie argues
along the same lines as Overstreet, underwriting the importance
of maturity and then goes on to quote Seneca saying:
"Tenes utique memoria, quantum senseris gaudium, cum
praetexta posita sumpsisti virilem togam et in forum
deductus es; maius expecta, cum puerilem animum
deposueris et te in viros philosophia trans-
scripserit. Adhuc enim non pueritia sed, quod est
gravius, puerilitas remanet. Et hoc quidem peior res'"
est, quod auctoritatem habemus senum. vitia puerorum,
nec puerorum tantum sed infantum..."3
Seneca exposes here, in accord with Overstreet, the danger of
childishness and immaturity. But this is not the only occasion
on which Seneca spoke with displeasure of adults being like
children. He also writes:
"Nihil ine magis in ista voce delectat quam quod exprobatur
senibus infantia. " 4-
In a somewhat different context, however, he writes:
"...ad eum transeamus, qui consenuit. Quantulo vincit
infantem!"5
1. Ibid., p. 15.
2. R.J. Leslie, * Seneca and the "New Insight"*, Classical Journal,




* The word "res" does not exist in the text published by
Loeb Class. Libr., see apparatus.
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Again, most explicitly, he states:
"...hunc sapiens adversus omnes, quibus etiam post
iuventam canosque puerilitas est...quibus puerilis
animi mala sunt auctique in maius errores, qui a
pueris magnitudine tantum formaque corporum differunt..."
and finally:
"Saepe grandis natu senex nullum aliud habet argumentum,
quo se probet diu vixisse, praeter aetatem."^
These observations of Seneca are virtually identical with the
ones from Overstreet. Seneca's conviction that it is disaster
to remain a child in a grown-up body is based on his conviction
■3 l
that children are devoid of reason-^ and the good, and of course
5
on the most important fact, that they are ignorant. Of course
it is understandable that Seneca should complain about man's
being childish in view of the ignorance of children since
ignorance constitutes a lack of being.0
The same thought is lurking in the back of Overstreet's
mind when he writes:
"As this new insight penetrates our common consciousness,
it helps us to understand the forces that have created
our predicament and brought us close to destruction; and
it affords the clue to our possible advance out of chaos.
This insight is what I choose to call the maturity
concept. The understanding and living out of this
most recent of our psychological and philosophic insights
becomes our next obligation and hope."'
1. De Const. Sap. 12.1.
2. De Tranq. An. 3.8.
3. See Epp. 121.14; 124.9; De Ben. iii, 31.2.
4. See Ep. 124. 1,8-11.
5. De Ira, ii, 26.6; 30-1; iii> 24.3.
o. On this topic see the 1st chapter of this thesis where the
problem of knowledge of God and being was treated.
7. Overstreet, op.cit., pp. 9-10.
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Apparently what Overstreet is concerned with is the problem of
self-knowledge, and he argues that maturity is a step towards
self-knowledge, which is our "obligation and hope". The relation
between Seneca's and Overstreet's arguments is more than obvious*.
He sees an ultimate danger to human life in a lack of maturity
and in man's childlike predisposition. This problem is
expressed by Seneca thus:
"Illud potius cogitabis, non esse irascendum erroribus...
Quid, si pueris, quod neglecto dispectu officiorum ad
lusus et ineptos aequalium iocos spectant".
Having regarded children's plays as "foolish" Seneca has advocated
2
the sound training of children from the very beginning, Just as
it has been advocated in our time, and on account of this it
has been said that "here Seneca and modern pedagogy meet". It
can be argued that Seneca and modern pedagogy meet here acciden¬
tally, but it can on the other hand be argued that modern
pedagogy draws its wisdom from Seneca or post-Senecan sources.
Thus it has been argued that - owing to Paul's having
come from Tarsus, a centre of Stoic philosophy in his time - the
Pauline theology and ethics have carried down the stream of time
many almost purely Stoic thoughts and ideas which are yet so
subtly blended with Paul's non-Stoic corpus of thoughts "that
the effort to discriminate belongs to the very finest researches
A
of the Higher Criticism". Such an argument is really far-
1. De Ira, ii, 10.1.
2. De Ira, ii, 21.1-11.
3. Wetmore, op.cit., p. 61.
4. Ibid., p. 65.
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fetched and makes an ambitious claim, since it tends to
insinuate that where Seneca and modern pedagogy have met Paul
too is in accord with them. In the following pages we shall
elaborate on this point and try to refute the tendency of that
argument. For the time being let us state that Seneca has
emphasized maturity and seriousness as a thing to strive for and
as a proper mode of being which he has exaggeratedly emphasized
in his teaching on the formation of character,1 which has not gone
2
unnoticed nor without praise. The reason which enables the
modern interpreter to agree with Seneca on the question of
character is precisely because he has taken Seneca as an authority
and such an opinion of Seneca is exactly what we have classified
under post-Senecan thought. Thus it has been emphasized that
Seneca's "chief aim was the formation of character".
Precisely on this point Paul and Seneca part company.
While it was important to Seneca to develop the concept of
character, as one of the most practical aspects of his anthropol-
4
ogy, Paul never used the word. While Seneca has conceived the
historicity of man's being-in-the-world in the terms of the
perfection of character, Paul on the contrary has seen it in the
absence of such terms. The following assessment is relevant here:
1. See Epp. 36.6; 40.6; 51.4-12; 52.12; 55.1; 47.21; 82.2; 89.18;
94.1-12,21-25,50; 95-2,36; 121.1-3; 122.17; De Prov. 4.9;
De Tranq. An. 1.16; 17.4; N.Q. iv, Praef. 3; vii, 31-2;
De Ira, ii, 15.1-5.
2. "The great problem of philosophy was to make character self-
sufficient and independent", Dill, op.cit., p. 291-
3. Holland, op.cit., p. 164.
4. The word xapaxx^p is to be found only once in the whole of
the N.T., sc. Heb. 1.3»
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"...character is always and necessarily ambiguous,
strained, and 'posing' so long as the element of
'character' has not been overcome and replaced by
the purely human, namely, that man instead of giving
himself a Self, receives it from the hands of the
Creator, and thus is a believer. We are 'characters'
only so long as, and in so far as, we are not in faith
til
• • •
This thought of man's self coming from outside is by no means
alien to Paul. The falsity of a concept of character is well
revealed in his statement that the Christian's weakness is his
strength (see p. 59 ). However, Paul states it even more
explicitly in his rebuke to the Corinthians: x£ £xetc
5 6ux £A.cx3es; et 6& xat gkafiec# x£ xaux&aat cos kagcSv;
Our intention here is not to enter an argument with Schoeps and
Knox about how human nature is not able to redeem itself by its
own capacities (see pp. 154-55), but to look at the problem
from a different angle. We want to see the problem here in the
light of Seneca's concepts of maturity, character and seriousness.
In Seneca's thought the self-controlled man matures by means of
strengthening his own character. This process itself is a
serious process.
Now, Paul not only did not have the concept of character
in Seneca's sense, but beyond that dismissed any attempt at
encouraging man's efforts to make himself better than he is by
improving his character. Such an action involves the psycho¬
analytic process of self-reflexion and examination. Such a
process involves the utmost degree of seriousness. Self-reflexion
1. Brunner, op.cit., p. 316.
2. I Cor. 4.7.
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and seriousness are identical and they are the mode of being
in which man sees himself as an object. Seriousness is a
subject-object relationship, a worldr-man relationship.
One is almost tempted to claim, as it has in fact been
claimed for centuries, that Paul is one of the most serious and
introspective founders of Western thought, culture and civiliz¬
ation, but the process of correcting this erroneous reading of
Paul is under way."*" Paul is not a joker or a romantic, but,
as it has been observed, he "is deeply aware of the precarious
2
situation of man in this world". It is significant, sadly
enough, that the interpreters have not given enough attention to
Paul's treatment of the problem of anxiety. It is by no means
accidental that Paul uses the word ueptuvAco in the passage
which contains the cbs pr) which has been described as Bultmann's
"Lieblingswort".^ Paul has a definite view of what the world
is like and what the Christian's dealings with the world should
be like. He tells the community in Corinth uap&Yei. ycip t6
axffiia xoO xdapou xotixou (I Cor. 7.31) and therefore he
demands: i>p&£ Apeptpvoug eUvat (v.32). Clearly Paul
does not want anxiety for the world to cancel the lightness of the
yoke (^t. 11.30). The world must not eclipse the good news and
impose the seriousness of its state so as to become the serious
1. We are referring to K. Stendahl's article quoted earlier.
2. Ibid., p. 213.
3. I Cor. 7.32-34.
4. G. Hasenhtittl, Per Glaubensvollzug, Bine Begegnung mit Rudolf
Bultmann aus katholischen GlaubensverstStndnis , Essen, 1963,
p. 226, n. 50.
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and primary concern of man. The believer is to take the world
with as much seriousness as if it were not there, &>q prj.
The expression was called Bultmarrn's "Lieblingswort"
because it is, most probably, the most frequently quoted passage
in his writings.1 Paul gives some particulars about his view
of man and his being in the world thus: 6 xatpoe auveaxaAii£voQ
£otlv x6 AoltiSv Cva nat ol Sxovxee yuvatnae axe uh Sxovxec Scav,
uat ot xkaCovxes a>C xXafovxes, xat ot xadpovxee &£ xaCpovxes*
nat ot &yopA£ovxec &Q U?) xaxSxcvxEC, xat ot ypaxuevou xbv xdap.ov
axe U?) naxaxp&uevot, (1 Cor. 7. 29-31).
In the words of an interpreter this means that:
"Ich bleibe in der Welt, bin aber nicht mehr aus der Welt.
Der Glaubende ist Herr (iber alle Dinge geworden, er ist
radikal frei."2
It would be a misunderstanding of Paul's intentions and arguments
to think that he is suggesting a flight from the world and
-z.
reality on dualistic grounds. It would be equally too sharp
to say that he has failed to perceive the state which man and
the world are in. Paul is not suggesting that the world for
the believer does not matter, but he is saying that the world
does not matter - or at least should not matter - more than it
actually does matter. In Paul's view, insofar as man is
concerned, the world revolves around man and not vice versa. Such
a view could hardly be described as pessimistic. It is optimistic
1. EF, pp. 21-22.
2. HasenhUttl, op.cit., p. 226.
3. R. Bultmann, Glauben und Yerstehen, Zweiter Band, TQbingen,
1952, p. 205.
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in the sense that the playfulness of the Christian*s place in
the world is a very serious matter, or - if you prefer - Paul's
faith in Jesus the resurrected Lord and trust in the Other (= God)
is so serious that he can understand the world in terms of play.
This (*og relation to the world Bultmann calls "Entweltlichung"1
and speaks of:
"...das radikale Verstctndnis der Entweltlichung und der
Verzicht, die eschatologische Existenz im weltlich
Gegebenen adaquat zum Ausdruck zu bringen..."2
This interpretation is true for Paul, especially when we remember
that Schoeps argues that Paul is unintelligible outside of the
eschatological framework of his theology. In speaking of the
situation of man in Christ Bultmann says again: "in alien
weltlichen Yerhaltungen ist deshalb die Haltung des
4
'Entweltlichten' durch jenes 'als ob nicht' charakterisiert."
The reason for Seneca's serious treatment of the problem of man
in the world and Paul's understanding it in terms of play
Bultmann correctly exegetes:
"Nach griechischer Auffassung ist der Mensch ein organisches
Glied des Kosmos, seinem System eingegliedert und durch den
Besitz seines Geistes, seiner Vernunft, dem gdttlichen
Geiste verwandt, der diesen Kosmos durchwaltet, gliedert
und ordnet. Nach alttestamentlich-judischer und auch nach
christlicherc-Anschauung steht der Mensch der Welt
gegentlber."
1. Ibid., ii, p. 205.
2. GV, ii, p. 77.
3. See p. 136, n.2, of this thesis.
4. GV, ii, p. 116.
5. GV, ii, p. 243.
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But tills judgement of Bultmann is too harsh to do justice to
judaeo-christian interpretation. The New Testament does not
see man and the world on a hostile footing, where the world is
trying to beguile man. It simply emphasizes that the source
of man's existence is not in the world but in God." Thus
Bultmann insists that "in dieser Haltung des 'als ob nicht1
2
besteht die christliche Freiheit der Welt gegentlber". This
'light' attitude of Paul towards the world expressed througii
the &C uh Bultmann understands in terms of freedom within the
eschatological scope of Paul's theology:
"Die Paradoxie des 'eschatologischen' Jetzt scheint der
Verfasser (Ren£ Marl£) also nicht verstanden zu haben.
Sie besteht doch darin, dass ich im Glauben
'entweltlicht' bin (als naivfl xxCotg ) und doch in der
Welt und in der Geschichte bleibe als verantwortlich
gegeniiber Vergangenheit und Zukunft. Das Verhaitnis des
Glaubenden zur Welt und zur Geschichte ist das paradoxe
des &£ Gerade diese MOglichkeit des obe u?i wird dureh
die dem Glaubenden geschenkte 'Entweltlichung' gegeben."3
Thus conclusively:
"Diese Paradoxie ist ebenso in dem beruhmten 'Als ob nicht'
(1 Kor. 7, 29-31) ausgedruckt, das nicht die Weltflucht,
sondern die innere Distanz zur Welt als das christliche
Sein charakterisiert.
Thus man has to live in a "paradox" or else he is going to live
anachronistically:
"Waruin die Indifferenz der Welt gegeniiber geboten ist, sagt
Paulus hier sehr deutlich. Der gleiche Grund, der das
Neueingehen einer, Ehe unratsam macht, fordert
gebieterisch die Einhaltung des we U4ftlr den Verheirateten:
1. Mt. 4.3-4; cf. Rom. 1.17.
2. GV, iii, p. 48.
3- GV, iii, p. 183.
4. GV, iii, p. 209.
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die Gestalt dieser Welt vergeht. Dem Ende der Welt,
der damit Verbundenen Parusie Jesu geht die Notzeit
auf Erden voraus. In ihr leben die Christen bereits
jetzt. So gilt: die Zeit ist begrenzt. Wie kann man
sich da noch im Ernste auf ihre Inhalte einlassen? Man
darf die Zeit nicht mehr als wie bisher weiterlaufend
nehmen, sonst Lebte man anachronistisch; also&,G
Braun clearly recognises that this sort of thinking of Paul's
has an ap/^alyptic background2 and recognizes that:
"Paulus geht mit Epiktet konform, wenn er in I, Kor. 7.30
das Weinen und Lachen in die Indifferenz des&g
verweist. Aber diese stoische Position wird von Paulus
nicht durchgehalten. Anderen Ortes mahnt er vielmehr,
sich zu freuen mit den sich Freuenden, zu weinen mit
den Weinenden."3
Finally Braun concludes:
"Gott und Erlosung dagegen heissen bei Paulus: das Wandeln
in dem ^ dessen Frucht an erster Stelle die
Offenheit, ita's Dasein fUr den andern ist. Mann karm
darum schon fragen, ob Paulus gut daran tat, in I. Kor.
7, 29-31 diese stoa-nahe Position zu beziehen. Denn seine
Intention ist nicht die Autarkie der stoischen Indifferenz,
sondern das cnjv 3er 4
Even if Paxil was here after indifference towards the world it does
not necessarily mean that he is at one with Stoics and especially
Seneca. Seneca has preached indifference in the sense that one
must not be affected by external reality to the point of the loss
5
of tranquility of mind. Provided that tranquillity of mind
remains unshaken, Seneca argues, man ought to engage in worldly
1. Herbert Braun, Gesammelte Studien zum Neuen Testament und
seiner Umwelt, TUbingen, 1962, p.161.
2. Braun, op.cit., p. 162.
3. Ibid., p. 166.
4. Ibid., p. 167.
5. De Ira, iii, 6.3-6; De Tranq. An. 13.1.
178
affairs to the highest degree of involvement.
We have clearly pointed out that Paul did not want the
world to take over and impose itself on his converts as the
occasion or cause of an unsurpassable anxiety of a paramount
importance. His view was that the world should not be given
more attention than it deserves. On the other hand Seneca,
mainly under the strain of his "BLesseits" eschatology, could not
endorse the reality of the world as good. His maxim was an
improvement of the world. Such an attitude towards the world
is an ultimate seriousness. To understand to what a degree
seriousness had taken over in Seneca's thought we have only to
2
have a look at his philanthropic narratives concerning slaves,
3
again stemming from his cosmopolitan-humanitarian ideas. On
the other hand Paul was not scandalized at all in advising his
4
converts to remain in the state in which they were found, as far
as their social position was concerned, precisely because of his
apocalyptic view of the world in which he has envisaged the
reality of the world and of life as only of penultimate importance.
Thus it is not surprising that it has been said that "one of
1. De Tranq. An. 3.1-2; De Otio, 3*2-3.
2. Epp. 17.3; 31.10-11; 47. passim; De Vita Beata, 17.2; De
Tranq. An. 1.8; 8.6; 12.6; De Clem, i, 18.1-2; 24.1;
26.1; De Ira, iii, 24.2; 32.1; 35.2; 40.2; 29.1; De
Brev. Vit., 12.15; Be Ben. iii, 18.1-4; 19.1-4; 20.1-2;
21.1-2; 22.1-4; 23.1-5; 24; 25; 26.1-2; 27.1-4; 28.1-6;
29.1; vii, 4.4.
3. E.T. Salmon, A History of the Roman World from 30 B.C. to
A.D. 138. London (Sixth Ed.) 1968, p. 70.
4. I. Cor. 7.22-24; cf. I Cor. 12.13; Gal. 3-28; Eph. 6.5-8;
Col. 3.22; Philem. 16-17.
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Seneca's most depressing traits is his lack of sense of humour...
through all his writings Seneca has point without wit.""^ And
another interpreter has found Seneca's works "exhaustingly
2
boring." Even if these overtones of Seneca's seriousness
have managed to pass unnoticed by many of his interpreters they,
however, were noticed by a poet. William Blake, a man who was
■5
able to write in a most childlike manner, is known for his
insights into the difference between the biblical and post-
Hellenistic thought of the West. And it was he who detected
this seriousness of Seneca's thought. Commenting in the margin
of a book^ where the text reads: "(Solomon's) admirable sermon
on the vanity of every thing but piety and virtue", Blake
1 /' 5
writes: "Piety & Virtue is Seneca Classical 0 Fine Bishop".
And then when the author attempts to speak of "The moral
precepts of the gospel..."' Blake rightly admonishes him: "The
Gospel is Forgiveness of Sins & has No Moral Precepts these
7
belong to Plato & Seneca & Nero".
1. D.R. Dudley, Neronians and Flavians, London and Boston,
1972, p. 12.
2. J. Higginbotham, Greek and Latin Literature, London, 1969,
p.is. "
3. See his Songs of Innocence.
4. R. Watson, Bishop of Landaff, An Apology for the Bible, London,
1797, p. 48.
5. The Poetry and Prose of William Blake, New York, 1970, p. 608.
b. Watson, R., op.cit., p. 108.
7. Blake, op.cit., p. 608.
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Of course the gospel is more than just forgiveness of sins hut
Blake is impeccably right when he denounces the reading of it as
a moral code. Blake here voices the same argument that
K. Stendahl has advocated, namely that no idea is to be pro¬
jected into the Bible and into Paul. Reading our ideas into
the Pauline text is a violence to it for by doing that we are
asking Paul to say what he did not say. Such an interpretation
is analogical and "by way of analogy, one could of course say
that in some sense every man has a 'legalistic Jew' in his heart.
But this is, an analogy, and should not be smuggled into the texts
as their primary or explicit meaning in Paul. If this is done,
something happens to the joy and humility of Gentile Christianity.
In drawing these parallels we have attempted to outline
the not so explicit, and not altogether indisputable, fact that
Seneca's view of the world involved a far greater amount of
seriousness than Paul's view. k;e are here aware of the fact
2
that Paul has often been understood as a joy-killer and praised
as a hero of the introspective conscience. Our point, however,
was to dismantle this argument by shifting the centre of gravity
in interpretation towards a different aspect. Provided that
our presuppositions can stand criticism, then we can point to
the anthropological relevance of these aspects. Brunner writes:
"The fact that man as a whole cannot be understood from himself,
1. Stendahl, op.cit., p. 215.
2. See Friedrich Nietzsche, Morgenrote, Fragm. 08; Antichrist,
Fragments: 41, 42.
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but that, in some way or another, in addition he must be
regarded from a point of view which is 'above' man, is the pre¬
supposition common to all anthropologies". In the light of
this definition Sartre writes:
"The serious attitude involves starting from the world and
attributing more reality to the world than to oneself;
at the very least the serious man confers reality on
himself to the degree to which he belongs to the world.
It is not by chance that materialism is serious; it is
not by chance that it is found at all times and places
as the favourite doctrine of the revolutionary. This is
because revolutionaries are serious. They come to know
themselves first in terras of the world which oppresses
them, and they wish to change this worid...Thus all
serious thought is thickened by the world; it coagulates;
it is a dismissal of human reality in favour of the world.
The serious man is 'of the world* and has no resource in
himself...Man is serious when he takes himself for an
object,"2
This is an accurate picture of Seneca's man in the world, whose
fear of the Other has escalated so much that it has imposed
itself upon man in such a way that he can see himself in
relation to the Other only as one who is being oppressed, limited
and threatened by the presence of the Other. To encounter the
Other is to encounter the peril of one's own Self. Therefore
eagerness and boldness to be is eclipsed by the presence of
the Other. Out of such a situation results a grave seriousness.
On the other hand if man, instead of perceiving a threat, sees
the source of his own being in the Other, if he "apprehends him¬
self as free and wishes to use his freedom, a freedom, by the
way, which could just as well be his anguish, then his activity
1. Brunner, op.cit., pp. 63-64.
2. BN, p. 580.
182
is play. The first principle of play is man himself; through
it he escapes his natural nature; he himself sets the value
and rules for his acts and. consents to play only according to
the rules which he himself has established and defined. As a
l
result, there is in a sense 'little reality* to the world".
Play is possible where confidence in the Other is fully
established and where anxiety is diminished to its lowest possible
point. That is why Paul did not want his converts to be over¬
come by anxiety because it would again bring them down to the
"beggarly elements". Thus no wonder that it has been said:
"der Mensch spielt nur, wo er in voller Bedeutung des
Wortes Mensch ist, und er ist nur da ganz Mensch, wo
er spielt. "2 *" " "
If these arguments are seen against the background of what we
have said of Paul and Seneca it seems that there was indeed a
difference in their views of man. It is equally clear that
terms like "optimistic", "pessimistic" and "dualistic" anthropology
tell us very little of their anthropologies unless we are going -
once again - to project ourselves into their writings and have
them say what we want them to say.
It is clear, therefore, that Paul's and Seneca's views on
man differed basically. Paul understands the whole of reality
in terms of a dialectical dialogue between two things that are
not opposite but different. Man himself is caught up in the
1- BN> PP- 580-81.
2. Friedrich Schiller, Ueber die gsthetische hrzichung des Ilenschen,
Munchen, 1967, Brief, 15, para. 5 tp.131), ef. ferief 2b, and
cf. Cassirer, op.cit., pp. 183ff»
183
midst of such a dialogue. His whole being and reality is
constituted by that being "caught in the midst". His reality
is not actual for it is not "self-explanatory", it has to have a
"point of reference". His reality is potential, potential but
not imaginary. It is real because he is. there. And that is
the greatest paradox of man's reality, namely that he is. there
for as long as he does not attempt to assert his being there.
Only for as long as he recognizes that he is. there because of the
Other's being does he remain true to himself and true to the
nature of his own being. By the attempt to secure his
irrevocable being there he of necessity denies the Other's
being there and by doing so he denies himself. Hence I am not
the Other, each of us is different from the other, each of us
being Other to the other. But I can exist as myself only inso¬
far as the Other exists as Thou. Therefore man's reality is
twofold or bipolar. The two Others are not distant from each
other but they are different from each other. Paul does not
know of the cyclical unity of being where the object and subject
are identical. The twofoldness of the reality is never
eclipsed:
"In der gelebten Wirklichkeit gibt es keine Einheit des
Seins. Wirklichkeit besteht nur im Wirken, ihre Kraft
und Tiefe in der seinen. Auch 'innere' Wirklichkeit ist
nur, wenn Wechselwirkung ist. Die starkste und tiefste
Wirklichkeit ist, wo alles ins Wirken eingeht, der ganze
Mensch ohne Rtlckhalt und der allumfassende Gott, das
geeinte Ich und das schrankenlose Da.
1. M. Buber, 'Ich und Du', Dialogisches Leben, Gesammelte
philosophische und padagogische Schriften, Zurich, 1947, p.97.
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Man exists only insofar as there exists the Other in the
objective aspects of God and world. And it is not only that
man exists only insofar as the Other exists, but this is the
reality of human nature. The oddness of human reality is that
man is not one with himself. Man is in "Widerspruch". That
contradiction is constituted by man's being in the world, and
that is where the vicious circle closes. Man is not one with
himself because of his being in the v/orld and yet he would not
be a man unless he were in the world. Hence, man in himself
is a contradiction. Man is a contradiction in the sense that
he is running-away-from-the-Other without realizing that by doing
so he is running-away-from-himself, since it is his relation to
the Other which constitutes his self. This situation of man's
uneasy feeling about himself Paul describes as sinful existence.
If we look at Seneca's views of man and reality we shall
notice that some of what he says sounds like Paul. However,
we shall regard it as legitimate to claim that Seneca's
concepts of man and reality run counter to those of Paul. To
be sure, there is something common to Paul and Seneca, but that
is something different which we shall mention later. As we
have emphasized throughout the thesis, to Seneca reality is a
self-identical entity, a divine cosmos. To put it bluntly it
simply means that the world exists, but not only that, it
exists from and to itself. In such a perplexed situation it
amounts to one basic, but daring, thought that the object is
identical with the subject. This is mainly, or even exclusively,
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because of the nature of knowledge and man's capacity to know.
Man cannot see things from any other but from the human point
of view. The world is identical to God who created it, and man
is identical to God for two reasons: a) because he is his
natural associate, and b) because he perceives him. Thus the
world and God, being identical, present themselves as the
object of man's knowledge. Man perceives them and thus becomes
the source of their existence. They are abolished as an
objective existence and exist only insofar as they consent to
receive existence from man. Hence, reality is one and totally
complete within itself. That reality is man because it is man
who perceives and thus incarnates the reality of existence. It
follows of necessity, according to this view, that man is fully
and truly man when he is the beginning and the end of reality
and of his own existence. He comes out of himself and returns
into himself, for his self is the source of universal existence.
For that reason his task is to contemplate: "Zieh dich zu dir
selbst zurtlck und gib dich der Philosophie hin, der Betrachtung
Gottes, des Kosmos, des Menschen, des Lebens und Todes".1 This
is what a modern interpreter recommends to a modern reader on
the authority of Seneca himself. From what has been said in
this thesis it should have become clear that these are the same
objects of contemplation that Seneca is recommending. However,
we have clearly stated why Seneca recommends the contemplation
1. Hell fried Bahlmann, L. Annaeus Seneca, Ueber die Kurze des
Lebens, Munchen, 1949, p. 18.
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of God, World, Man, Life and Death. These are objective aspects
of the reality through which existence presents itself to man
as the Other. Hence, the reason for contemplating these objects
is that they have to be destroyed. They have to be expunged
because they are the incarnation of man's limit and incapacity,
and man's nature and task is to be the ultimate one. The Other
is the peril to one's self and is to be destroyed. To be
infinite and ultimate is the true state of man. Therefore,
everything not only exists for the sake of man, but receives its
existence from man. There are strivings of man which make him
unhappy and unsatisfied with the state he is in - the state of
having to face the Other. No doubt Seneca has deeply grasped
the problems of human nature, on account of which it has been said:
"Die Werte, die Seneca kennt, verkimdet den Menschen seiner
Zeit, der die Harmonie und die ruhevolle Klarheit sicherer
VerhSltnisse fehlte, sind Werte, die Menschen aller Zeiten
und VClker immer wieder als die ihren kannten, die von zeit-
loser Dauer uns heute in ihrem tiefsten Wesen so nahestehen
wie den Menschen des neronischen Roms. Dass sie aber
gerade als Gedanken Senecas ihren Weg durch die Geschichte
des Abendlandes nehmen, liegt an der klassischen Form, in
die allein er sie kleidete. Sein Wort, in erregender
Unmittelbarkeit tiber Raum und Zeit von Mensch zu Menscbu
gesprochen, Sffhet sich jedem, der es nur hSren will."
This is a typical example of what we have classified as post-
Senecan thought and as analogical interpretation. The falsity
of this argument we have no intention of proving here, but
reserve the right to object to it on the ground that:
1. Dahlmann, op.cit., pp. 26-27-
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"Unhistorisch, wie die heutigen, dachten auch die antiken
Kosmopoliten.1,1 Suchlike thoughts of contemporary inter¬
preters are not much help to modern man, since they are not
really interpretations of Paul's and Seneca's thoughts, hut the
repetitions and the re-narrations of their thoughts. And that
is what we have been trying to do in this thesis: not to re¬
write Paul and Seneca but to interpret them.
We have recognized at the very beginning that very many
contemporary readers will take Paul and Seneca seriously. There¬
fore the interpreter's task is not, - as the fashion used to be, -
to make an apology for the writings of these two men but to
explain them. That is why they do not speak to men of all
times and places - as Lahlmann wants it - unless re-interpreted
against their historical background. We do not want to dispute
that they both may be equally valid for modern man - provided
they are properly interpreted - but we do want to dispute the
argument that what Paul and Seneca were saying is one and the
same thing. There seems to have existed a confusion of
categories in the modern interpretation of this issue. Paul and
Seneca did have something in common, and that is that they faced
the same - or to a great extent similar - problems of man and
thus have asked the same, or at least very similar questions.
They both sensed the oddness of man's situation in the world.
They both felt man's unease about himself. But on no account
1. Mtthl, op.cit., p. 101; cf. J-P. Sartre,' What is Literature?
London, 1967, pp. 49, 57-
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did they offer the same answers to these problems. Hence, the
questions they posed are not, by virtue of confusion, to be put
in the place of answers they offered to these questions. The
fact that they found themselves in the same situation does not
mean that they saw the same way out of the situation. And here
we meet the final point at which Paul and Seneca are valid for
modern man, and that is that modem man is faced with the same,
or at least very similar, questions as Paul and Seneca and is in
search of an answer. Common to all three is their humanity.
Should modern man attempt to answer his questions from Paul's
and Seneca's works by "slotting in" Paul's or Seneca's wisdom
he will uproot his own historicity and Paul and Seneca will be
of no help to him in any respect. In this sense Paul and
Seneca are not timeless. This is the only common thing between
all three, Paul, Seneca and the modern man: their historicity,
i.e. they are living men in the world, faced with similar
problems and asking similar questions. The fact that they are
asking the same questions tells us nothing more than that they
are human. Both, Paul and Seneca, in answering these
questions sensed and said things which are well founded, but it
still does not mean that they have said the same thing.
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